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Abstract 
 
This thesis surveys the politics of asylum seeking in Canada and Australia, charting 
the asylum policies and related parliamentary debates of Jean Chrétien’s Liberal 
Government (1993–2005) in Canada and John Howard’s Liberal Government (1996–
2007) in Australia, as well as those of their respective opposition parties. In doing so, 
this thesis reveals how the major political parties of Canada and Australia justified the 
disjunction between what they said about asylum (their rhetoric) and what they did 
(their policy). In regards to what they said, politicians of the centre-left and centre-right 
frequently affirmed their commitment to the state’s obligations to refugees. Yet, in 
regards to what they did, the major political parties of Canada and Australia supported 
policy measures that restricted the entrance of asylum seekers. Given these findings, 
this thesis proposes to understand the politics of asylum as a conflict of aspirations. On 
the one hand, the major parties of Canada and Australia held an aspiration to provide 
asylum to refugees and, on the other, they held an aspiration to regulate the entrance of 
non-citizens into their national community. The practice of asylum seeking brought 
these aspirations into conflict because asylum seekers frequently entered nations by 
irregular means, frustrating a government’s capacity to regulate entrance. In trying to 
reconcile this conflict, the major parties of Canada and Australia subordinated their 
aspiration to provide asylum, narrowing its scope to those refugees who arrived by 
regular means. This redefinition of the aspiration to provide asylum has substantial 
implications for the global refugee regime. 
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Introduction 
 
Over the last thirty years, asylum seeking has become a major political issue among 
liberal democratic nations. The simplest explanation for this is the dramatic growth of 
asylum claims made in the West throughout the 1980s and 1990s. According to OECD 
figures, annual asylum applications in Western Europe, Australasia, Canada and the 
United States rose from 90,400 in 1983 to a record high of 828,645 in 1992 (Castles 
2003: 15). This boom put substantial pressure upon the asylum systems of these 
nations, creating administrative delays and vast backlogs of unprocessed asylum claims. 
Western governments have ‘converged’ in their response, implementing a range of 
policy measures which have had the cumulative effect of restricting the practice of 
asylum seeking.1 The twenty-first century has seen a substantial downturn of asylum 
claims in industrialized nations, from 655,100 claims in 2001 to 336,100 claims in 2005 
(UNHCR 2006). While this is partly a result of greater political stability in refugee-
producing regions, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2006) has 
expressed the view that the West’s restrictive policies have ‘undoubtedly… played a 
role’ in this downturn. Indeed, many observers have expressed their concern over the 
state of asylum in the West,2 with one declaring that ‘the institution of asylum for 
refugees faces a severe crisis’ (Nathwani 2000: 354). It is the nature of this ‘crisis’ that 
this thesis seeks to better understand. 
                                                 
1
 This is one dimension of the ‘convergence hypothesis’ of international immigration policy, the theory 
that labour-importing countries have become increasingly similar in their entrance policies, integration 
policies and public response to immigration. See Cornelius et al. (1994, 2004) and Meyers (2002). 
2
 See also Ray Wilkinson (2004), Catherine Dauvergne (2004: 601–2), Jeff Crisp (2003), Matthew 
Gibney (2004: 1–15) and Gil Loescher (1992: 1–8). 
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More specifically, this research investigates the implications of an empirical 
observation made by Niklaus Steiner (2000) in his book, Arguing about Asylum. In his 
survey of parliamentary debates on asylum issues in Britain, Germany and Switzerland, 
Steiner found that ‘not a single parliamentarian in any of these debates spoke against 
refugees or against the principle of asylum’ (ibid.: 134), a finding that is reinforced by 
this study of parliamentary debates in Canada and Australia. This observation stands in 
curious contrast to the policy trend amongst Western nations towards the restriction of 
asylum seekers, and begs the question: How do major political parties justify the 
disjunction between what they say about asylum (their rhetoric) and what they do (their 
policy)?  
To answer this question, this thesis proposes to understand the politics of asylum as a 
conflict between two aspirations: the aspiration to provide asylum to refugees and the 
aspiration to regulate entrance. For these purposes, an ‘aspiration’ will be taken to mean 
an earnest ambition which is held by a political agent. Three important features need to 
be mentioned here. Firstly, a political agent may hold multiple aspirations. Secondly, 
different aspirations are not necessarily compatible with each other, even when they are 
held by a single political agent. This means that situations will arise where an agent’s 
aspirations come into conflict, each dictating a different course of action where only 
one is possible. In such situations, the political agent will be forced to pursue one 
aspiration and subordinate the others. Thirdly, an aspiration does not cease to exist if it 
is not acted upon. If a political agent does subordinate one aspiration to another, or if 
circumstances determine that an agent is unable to act in accordance to an aspiration, 
the agent may nonetheless continue to earnestly hold that aspiration. Thus, a single 
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course of action does not necessarily come out of a single intention; it can emerge out 
of a muddle of conflicting aspirations.  
To use an example, a budding academic may earnestly foster an aspiration to reduce 
her ‘carbon footprint’. In spite of this, she may choose to subordinate her environmental 
aspiration to her professional aspirations and fly around the world to attend illustrious 
academic conferences. Her actions are counter to her environmental aspiration yet it 
does not follow from this that her aspiration has been abandoned. It is quite conceivable 
that she will continue to aspire to carbon-neutrality in spite of her globe-trotting 
lifestyle. In the meantime, she will simply have to ignore, endure or excuse the gap 
between her actions and her aspirations. The restriction of asylum seekers can be 
understood in a similar way, seen as a compromise to the aspiration to provide asylum 
rather than an abandonment of it. A survey of policy will determine a government’s 
actions, while a survey of rhetoric will reveal the aspirations that lie behind it.  
 By thinking about the actions of governments as an outcome of conflicting 
aspirations, it is possible to capture the complexities that characterize the asylum issue. 
As noted by Steiner (2000: 6–10), contemporary research on asylum is often hindered 
by an overly simplistic view of its politics. Such research typically depicts the politics 
of asylum as ‘a tug-of-war between international norms and morality loosening asylum 
on the one hand and national interests tightening it on the other’ (ibid.: 7). By this 
account, the nation-state is seen as reluctant to admit asylum seekers, opposed to the 
way that they challenge control over who does and does not enter.  
Yet Steiner’s analysis of parliamentary debates in Germany, Britain and Switzerland 
reveals a more complicated interplay of motives with ‘national interests also pulling to 
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loosen asylum, and international norms and morality also pulling to tighten it’ (ibid.: 
134). Clearly, morality, norms and interests are more normatively diverse than the ‘tug-
of-war’ model assumes. Moreover, Steiner argues, these factors are ‘significantly 
entangled’ (ibid.) rather than clearly divisible. The crossover between morality and 
international norms is obvious enough: many norms, especially those related to the 
human rights regime, have moral reasoning at their foundations. Less obvious, 
however, is the way in which national interests are coexistent with norms and morality. 
Yet it can be argued that it is within a nation’s interests to act in accordance with moral 
norms because to do otherwise would risk censure from the international community. 
This self-interested concern not to ‘outrage world opinion’ (Robertson 1999: 80) is at 
the root of a norm’s coercive strength. In short, national interests are not naturally at 
odds with norms. By assuming a dualism between the state and the international 
humanitarian regime, the model of the ‘tug-of-war’ fails to capture the full complexity 
of the asylum issue. 
Steiner’s (2000: 134) observation that parliamentarians never ‘spoke against refugees 
or against the principle of asylum’ reinforces the conclusion that asylum politics are 
complicated. Given the financial costs of asylum and the political controversy it creates, 
it is pertinent to ask why parliamentarians have not simply argued for abandoning the 
practice outright. From the ‘tug-of-war’ perspective, the failure of the state’s political 
organs to denounce asylum would only make sense if it were interpreted cynically, seen 
as a rhetorical façade to protect the public from the uncomfortable truth that national 
interests trump moral concerns.  
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However, an analysis of contemporary asylum policy offers evidence that material 
self-interest is not the only consideration for governments. For example, despite the 
broad trend towards restriction among Western nations, a substantial number of asylum 
seekers are given protection even when they do not strictly satisfy the criteria for 
refugee status and are at risk for reasons beyond the refugee definition’s narrow focus 
(this point will be fully addressed in Part One of this thesis). Consequently, Western 
governments refrain from expelling them, sometimes creating additional immigrant 
categories to accommodate them. For example, in 2004, in addition to the 127,000 
asylum seekers granted refugee status in industrialized countries, about 51,100 asylum 
seekers were allowed to remain under broader ‘humanitarian’ categories (UNHCR 
2006b: 39). The fact that Western governments regularly go beyond what is strictly 
required by international legal norms suggests that states are not strictly driven by self-
interest. It appears that states, at least some of the time, are willing participants in the 
asylum regime, providing protection to people who are in need of it, even when this 
takes them beyond their minimum legal duty. What is required, then, is a more flexible 
and nuanced theoretical understanding of asylum politics, a conception that can 
accommodate the apparent contradictions in the behaviour of states.  
This thesis proposes an alternative to the ‘tug-of-war’ model. It argues that the 
politics of asylum can be defined as an attempt to reconcile the conflict between two 
aspirations: the aspiration to provide asylum to refugees and the aspiration to regulate 
entrance. By this account, morality, international norms and national interests are not 
exclusive to the domain of either aspiration—they are, rather, employed in support of 
both. Rather than thinking of the relationship between these aspirations as a ‘tug-of-
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war’, it might be more useful to use an analogy of two plants in a single potting box. To 
an extent, these plants can coexist but, as they grow, they will intrude upon the other. 
The gardener must then decide whether to let them struggle to their mutual frustration 
or to prioritize one by pruning back the other. In either case, the gardener is acting in a 
way that will preserve both plants, even if one must live a stunted life. Similarly, by 
‘pruning back’ the aspiration to provide asylum, by limiting asylum to refugees who 
enter through regular routes of immigration, a government can preserve both aspirations 
by reducing the conflict between them. As such, this aspirational model captures the 
fundamental dilemma of asylum while remaining receptive to the complexities that 
define its politics. The first part of this thesis will be largely dedicated to fleshing out 
these aspirations and illuminating the factors—such as the specific morals, norms and 
interests—that are thought to compel a political agent to hold them.  
Implicit within this conceptualization of asylum politics is the conviction that material 
factors alone, such as economic and strategic considerations, cannot explain the 
entrance policy of a state. Undoubtedly, material factors—economic considerations 
especially—have a critical influence on all facets of immigration, asylum policy 
included. However, approaches that focus solely on economic factors—such as Marxist 
or neo-Marxist theories of immigration—inevitably fail to accommodate the discernible 
influence of other important factors, particularly considerations of race or culture, 
foreign policy and national security (Meyers 2000: 1250–1). This is especially true of 
refugee policy where the influences of foreign policy, supranational organizations and 
international regimes are seen to have special significance (ibid. 1247). Moreover, the 
emergence of social constructivism as a major school of thought in political theory has 
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led to a far greater theoretical and empirical appreciation of the influence of ‘ideas’ on 
the behaviour of states, a range of influences which includes national identity, culture, 
norms and morality (Goldstein et al. 1993; Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999).3 
Consequently, this thesis takes the view that a government’s aspirations for entrance 
policy emerge out of an array of influences, both material and non-material, and that a 
proper understanding of asylum policy cannot be achieved without being receptive to 
them all. It is not the intention of this thesis to argue for the greater importance of any 
particular factor over any others. The intention is simply to adopt a flexible and 
inclusive approach to the study of entrance policy.  
As an agenda for empirical research, however, this sets a difficult challenge. Non-
material factors, by their very nature, are not easily measurable. While one can turn to a 
range of well-established measures to quantify material influences, such as the 
economy or strategic capability, there is not any obvious way to measure the influence 
of non-material factors such as identity, morality, culture and norms. As subjects of 
investigation such ideational forces are a great deal more ambiguous, more 
controversial and only fairly recently the basis for substantive empirical research 
(Wendt 1999: 4). 
To gain an insight into the material and non-material factors that are relevant to 
policy formulation, this thesis has undertaken a survey of political rhetoric. In doing so, 
it has employed a strategy used by other academics to capture ideational influences on 
policy formulation (Steiner 2000; Rathbun 2004; Lind 2005). Specifically, this thesis 
has principally drawn on the transcripts, known as the Hansards, of debates and 
                                                 
3
 Steiner (2000: 146–50) also recognizes the potential contribution that social constructivism has for 
understanding asylum politics. 
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comments made in the lower chamber of each country’s Parliament: the House of 
Commons in Canada and the House of Representatives in Australia.4 Secondary 
sources—news media and academic literature—have also been used to provide a wider 
context in which to situate and understand the debates. Online versions of the 
Canadian5 and Australian Hansards were used for this research. Debates on the asylum 
issue were identified by examining the transcripts for dates when relevant legislation 
was introduced or under discussion; when important asylum-related events had taken 
place; and by using the search engines that supplemented Hansard websites. To support 
the conclusions drawn from these transcripts, this thesis provides appropriate references 
to Hansard and, in many cases, direct quotations.  
Of course, this was not the only sample of political rhetoric that might have been 
undertaken and a more comprehensive study could have included surveys of Senate 
debates,6 press releases, media statements, political speeches, and personal interviews. 
Nonetheless, a study of lower chamber parliamentary debates serves as a useful 
window to the concerns, values and ambitions that contribute to a particular policy 
outcome. In the hostile and combative environment of the parliamentary debating 
                                                 
4
 Punctuation has been adjusted in Hansard quotations where it is necessary to clarify meaning, and to 
maintain consistency with the main body of text. In regards to spelling, quotations from parliamentary 
debates and secondary sources will retain regional variations in spelling, respecting, for instance, the 
North American preference for ‘-ize’, the Australian preference for ‘-ise’, and the preference of both 
for ‘labor’.   
5
 Canadian parliamentary debates, delivered in a mixture of English and French, are translated in full into 
both languages. This research draws only on the English language version. 
6
  Being federal states, Australia and Canada both have a Senate, an upper chamber of Parliament. An 
analysis of Senate debates was not included, however, because legislation is typically introduced, 
debated and amended in the House, being subsequently passed onto the Senate for approval. Usually, 
this is a matter of formality; the focus is on whether legislation is constitutionally sound and bills are 
rarely rejected. In the case of Australia, however, the Opposition had an unusually strong presence in 
the Senate during the period covered and used this power to robustly oppose and criticize legislation, 
far more so than it did in the lower chamber. While this anomaly does not weaken the findings of this 
research, any future analyses of the Australian Labor Party’s rhetoric during the Howard era could be 
augmented by the inclusion of Senate debates. 
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chambers, politicians must do all they can to fortify their arguments against criticism. 
They will draw on any relevant justifications that they believe will strengthen their 
position vis-à-vis other parties, or will help to make it resound with the electorate. A 
politician may appeal to economic justifications for their policies; raise concerns 
relating to potential threats such as terrorism, criminal activity or health issues; or 
appeal to non-material factors such as national identity, morality or international norms 
and trends. By surveying these justifications, this thesis has created montages of the 
factors that the major political parties of Canada and Australia purport to be relevant to 
the development of asylum policy. By revealing this complex tangle of motives, these 
montages demonstrate the need for a more flexible and nuanced framework for 
understanding asylum policy formulation. 
It is important to note here the limitations of this research. By including an analysis of 
political rhetoric, this thesis identifies the material and non-material factors that 
politicians declare to be relevant to the formulation of asylum policy. This may not be 
equivalent to the factors that actually determined the formulation of policy. Because 
political rhetoric is designed with a public audience in mind, an analysis of it cannot 
claim to openly expose the factors that influence entrance policy. Politicians may 
declare that their policy is shaped by factors that in fact have little influence; or they 
may refrain from publicly revealing factors that have, in fact, had a significant 
influence on policy formulation. While political rhetoric does offer a window into 
policy formulation, it is a window that is subject to distortion. 
Nonetheless, there is no good reason to dismiss political rhetoric as a wholly 
unreliable or meaningless source of data. Given the high level of scrutiny by the media, 
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non-governmental organizations and other political parties, politicians are not free to 
invent any excuse for acting the way they do. Moreover, in the competitive 
environment of the debating chambers, a politician cannot expect to have a contentious 
claim go unchallenged, unless there is widespread consensus or ignorance on an issue. 
This is an important reason for examining both sides of a parliamentary debate, for 
surveying the rhetoric of the Government and the Opposition. Such an analysis will be 
receptive to inter-party conflict where it occurs, providing a wider context in which to 
situate the claims of politicians. 
Yet let us imagine the worst-case scenario: a politician who is shaped by the worst 
clichés of their occupation and whose rhetoric in no way resembles his or her own 
actual views on the matter. Imagine, for example, a politician who publicly declares 
that states do have a moral obligation to provide asylum yet privately believes that this 
is not the case, or is not the case all of the time. If rhetoric can plausibly be used in this 
way, then what can be learnt from its analysis? The answer is that while rhetoric may 
not accurately represent the personal motives of the speaker, it can still reflect the 
material and non-material factors that are affecting policy formulation. By 
meretriciously declaring that the state has an obligation to provide asylum, our 
hypothetical politician is recognizing the political importance of being seen to support 
that obligation, irrespective of his or her own beliefs. Given the widespread acceptance 
of asylum in liberal society, it would be electorally deleterious (and thus contrary to the 
interests of a politician and his or her party) to be seen as wholly dismissive of asylum. 
Thus, a politician must give the impression that they respect the principle of asylum, 
and will do this through their rhetoric and their policy. Similarly, a politician may argue 
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that entrance policy ought to be tightened because the nation’s identity is under threat, 
even though he or she personally believes that cultural matters ought to be irrelevant to 
statesmanship. This cynical rhetoric does not reflect the politician’s beliefs but it will 
probably reflect the beliefs of their constituency and thus be essential to their electoral 
strategy. In conclusion, then, while rhetoric may not represent the speaker’s personal 
views, it still reflects their political considerations on pertinent material and non-
material factors, such as public opinion, intra-party politics, issues of security or 
economy, moral principles, legal constraints and international norms. While it would 
certainly be naïve to take political rhetoric at face value, it would also be short-sighted 
to dismiss it as having no value at all. 
Given this capacity for untruthfulness, however, it is necessary to further clarify the 
relationship between political rhetoric and policy. Thus far, political rhetoric has been 
described as subsequential to policy, a public justification of decisions and strategies 
that have already been devised behind closed doors. Yet there are ways in which, as the 
saying goes, the tail can wag the dog. After all, if ‘ideas’ do have an influence on policy 
outcomes, as social constructivism argues, then one would expect political rhetoric to 
have a measure of influence insofar as it contributes to a nation’s pool of ideas. This is 
implicit within the study of ‘securitization’, advanced by the Copenhagen School of 
critical security studies (Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 1998). This approach sees ‘security’ 
as a process of political classification whereby a securitizing agent ‘imbues [an issue] 
with a sense of importance and urgency that legitimizes the use of special measures 
outside of the usual political process to deal with it’ (Smith 2005: 34). Importantly, 
securitization is seen to be ‘a discursive act, a speech act’ (ibid.), a product of 
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persuasion rather than inevitability. Given that this thesis includes an examination of 
political discourse, this is an important point to keep in mind, especially in light of the 
securitization of immigration since the end of the Cold War (Huysmans 1993, Wæver et 
al 1993). Thus, whether or not an issue is an urgent threat is not as important as whether 
it is perceived to be an urgent threat—only in the case of the latter will it become the 
object of responsive policy. As such, a genuine threat to security can be overlooked, or 
an insignificant threat can become a pressing security issue by way of exaggerated or 
erroneous discourse. Certainly, in the view of some commentators (Gibney 2002; Turk 
2003; van Selm 2003), asylum seekers have been securitized in this latter manner, 
unreasonably labelled as threats through a process of overwhelmingly negative 
discourse, a point that will be returned to later.  
This sort of thinking has not only emerged in the field of security studies. Academics 
have developed the concept of ‘frames’ to describe the means by which ideas influence 
domestic policy outcomes. As defined by Erik Bleich (2002: 1063), ‘[a] frame is a set 
of cognitive and moral maps that orients an actor within a policy sphere.’ Cognitive 
maps involve the ‘definitions, analogies, metaphors and symbols that help actors to 
conceptualize a political or social situation, identify problems and goals, and chart 
courses of action’ (ibid.: 1064). Moral maps involve the allocation of moral relevance 
to certain terms and courses of action (ibid.). In his analysis of race policies in Britain 
and France, Bleich demonstrates that, while traditional explanations7 of policy 
outcomes play an important role, race policy cannot be properly understood without an 
appreciation of the way the issue of race was framed (ibid. 1071–3).  
                                                 
7
 Specifically, these traditional explanations for policy outcomes are the roles of power, self-interest, 
institutions and problem-solving.  
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Given the wide dissemination of political rhetoric and its testimonial air, politicians 
contribute significantly to policy frames and the process of securitization through the 
concepts and language that they employ. This is especially true of the asylum issue 
where much of the terminology is ill-defined and susceptible to misrepresentation 
(Steiner 2000: 8–9). The way in which politicians represent the asylum issue impacts on 
how asylum seekers are perceived by the greater community and on which policy 
response is seen to be appropriate. Of course, the ability to use ‘the power of language 
to set the political agenda’ (Steiner 2000: 9) is vulnerable to misuse. There is an 
opportunity for politicians—deliberately or not—to misrepresent the issue of asylum 
and create public support for pre-established policy objectives. While this possibility 
must be kept in mind, it is not the intention of this thesis to judge the veracity or 
prudence of political rhetoric, merely to describe and document it. For these purposes, it 
is not necessary to know the truth-value of everything that politicians say—it is enough 
to simply know that they said it. As such, critical commentary of political arguments 
will be restricted to that which is necessary for understanding the asylum issue in each 
case. It will be largely left to the reader and to other researchers to decide whether 
political rhetoric on asylum in Canada and Australia was morally or factually correct.  
To sum up so far, two explanations have been given for how a study of political 
rhetoric can contribute to our understanding of asylum policy. Firstly, it helps to reveal 
the material and non-material factors that influence policy outcomes. Secondly, 
political rhetoric itself plays a minor but significant role in policy outcomes. It is for 
these reasons that there is some empirical value in augmenting an analysis of asylum 
policy with a study of the associated parliamentary debates. The result is a deeper and 
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more nuanced analysis of policy trends in Australia and Canada: an analysis that does 
not overlook the political considerations that played a role in a government’s 
calculations yet did not ultimately determine its actions. As such, this is not merely a 
study of policy and rhetoric specifically, it is a study of the relationship between them. 
In asking how politicians justified the restriction of asylum seekers, this thesis is asking 
how politicians legitimized policy through their rhetoric. In an authoritarian state, such 
justifications would be largely unnecessary, but in a liberal democracy—such as 
Canada and Australia—an important factor in policy formulation is how successfully a 
policy can be ‘sold’ to the voting public. As such, the empirical case studies of Canada 
and Australia begin with a comprehensive survey of the entrance and asylum policies of 
each nation, including a description of the general asylum situation. These policies 
represent the tangible outcome of the conflict between a government’s aspirations for 
entrance, demonstrating the shift of these nations towards greater regulation. The 
subsequent surveys of rhetoric bring a depth of understanding to this policy trend, 
revealing some of the factors that encouraged a government to take the actions that it 
did, and highlighting the instrumental role that rhetoric played in advancing certain 
policies.  
This focus on asylum policy and associated parliamentary rhetoric has the additional 
benefit of encouraging analysis at the sub-state level, a level of analysis that has 
generally been neglected in immigration research. Typically, political analysis of 
immigration has tended to focus on the state, treating it as a unitary actor and thereby 
overlooking the influence of domestic agents (Avci et al. 2000: 193, 197–8). Moreover, 
those studies that do examine sub-state politics are usually weakened by their neglect of 
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a general theoretical context and a tendency to assess a single country over a limited 
time period (Meyers 2000: 1259). This thesis avoids these shortcomings by situating 
the research within the context of contemporary political theory. It also draws on the 
cases of two countries, Australia and Canada, both ‘settler societies’ with well-
established immigration regimes that are broadly similar in structure and aspiration 
(Freeman et al. 1995). 
Given that asylum policy and its related parliamentary debates are the major 
empirical focuses of this study, the appropriate units of analysis are the majority 
political parties of the left and right, as they are a clear manifestation of the bipolar 
parliamentary environment. Under usual circumstances,8 one of these major parties will 
be in government, either as a majority government or in coalition with one or more 
minority party; and the other will be in opposition. For a focus on party politics, the 
case studies of Canada and Australia provide a unique opportunity for analysis. From 
October 1993 to January 2006, the Canadian Government was controlled by Jean 
Chrétien’s centre-left Liberal Party, while from March 1996 to December 2007 the 
Australian Government was controlled by John Howard’s centre-right Liberal Party. 
Despite sharing the same name, these parties had very different political agendas. The 
Canadian Liberal Party was essentially a Third Way party, both economically and 
socially liberal, while the Australian Liberal Party was economically liberal and 
socially conservative. Of equal interest was the rhetoric of the opposition parties: the 
left-wing Australian Labor Party and, in Canada, a right-wing opposition that variously 
                                                 
8
 It is possible for the government and opposition to be controlled by parties on the same side of political 
spectrum—as indeed was the case in Canada between October 1993 and June 1997 when the centre-
left Liberal Party was in Government and the Bloc Québécois, a left-wing minority party, was in 
Opposition.  
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went under the title of the Reform Party of Canada, the Canadian Alliance and the 
Conservative Party of Canada. Of course, given the different ideological backgrounds 
of these parties, it can be expected that they will deal with the conflict of their 
aspirations in crucially different ways. As such, the case studies in this thesis will chart 
the course of each Government and its Opposition from the date of their induction 
(October 1993 in Canada and March 1996 in Australia) to the end of 2005, a cut-off 
point determined by the commencement of this research in early 2006. This time 
period—as we shall see—also coincides with a particularly eventful period in asylum 
politics, a period of very high numbers of asylum claims and a major shift in the 
international security context after 11th September 2001. 
 
  
Part One of this thesis will draw on existing literature and political theory to make a 
broad sketch of the factors that can compel a political agent to aspire to provide asylum 
and to regulate entrance. It will then relate these to the asylum situation over the last 
sixty years, revealing the way in which the global situation has increasingly brought 
these aspirations into conflict. In doing so, Part One is a background to the issues and 
theoretical concepts that are relevant to the politics of asylum, providing a wider 
context within which to understand the behaviour of major political parties in the case 
studies that follow. 
Parts Two and Three of this thesis provide empirical surveys of the politics of asylum 
in Canada and Australia respectively. Each case study will take the same structure, 
being divided into four sections. The first section provides a brief historical overview of 
the asylum and immigration systems of each country, describing the legislation and 
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institutions that each Government inherited when it came to power. The second section 
provides a survey of the asylum policies that each Government implemented through 
legislation and regulation before the end of 2005. The third section will examine 
parliamentary debates over this period to describe the justifications that Government 
members offered for their policies. This section firstly identifies those remarks that 
reflected an aspiration to provide asylum; secondly identifies those that reflected an 
aspiration to regulate entrance; and finally identifies those that justified the balance 
struck between the two. The fourth section, using the same format as the analysis of 
Government rhetoric, examines the rhetoric of Opposition parties, identifying their 
criticisms of Government policy and their own proposals for policy alternatives, itself a 
dimension of political rhetoric.  
Finally, Part Four of this thesis provides a comparative discussion of the cases of 
Canada and Australia, drawing out the common trends and distinctions that are 
discernible in the rhetoric and policies of their governments and opposition parties, and 
between the majority parties of the political left and right. In light of these findings, this 
thesis then draws conclusions about the normative implications of policy trends for the 
global asylum regime. 
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Part One: The Aspirational Model of 
Asylum Politics:  
A Theoretical Framework  
 
 
1.1 The Aspiration to Provide Asylum to Refugees 
 
The aspiration to provide asylum is the description that this thesis gives to the range 
of factors that cause political agents to accept refugees onto their territory. That 
Western governments continue to maintain their asylum systems, in spite of the costs 
and controversy they attract, is a testament to the strength and persistence of this 
aspiration. This section will examine the factors that are typically thought to motivate 
the aspiration to provide asylum: moral theory, human rights theory, and the norms, 
laws and institutions that constitute the refugee regime. Additionally, this section will 
make the less familiar argument that, by adhering to the norms and morals that support 
asylum, a government is acting in its own—as well as the nation’s—interests. 
 
 
The Moral Foundations of Asylum 
 
Moral grounds for some form of hospitality to refugees can be found in an array of 
religious and philosophical traditions (Buchanan et al. 2003). At the root of the 
principle of asylum is the fundamental virtue of providing assistance to those who are 
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in need of it. Relevantly for Western nations, this notion of asylum as charity is 
promoted implicitly and explicitly within Judeo-Christianity, the religious tradition 
from which most Western nations have inherited their moral foundations (MacEoin 
1985; Steiner 2000: 10–11). Yet, moral justifications for asylum can also be derived 
from a range of secular theoretical perspectives, notably those of liberalism and 
utilitarianism. In The Ethics and Politics of Asylum (2004), Matthew J. Gibney 
identifies the virtue of impartialism as the common ethical thread of these theories, the 
view that all parties ought to be given equal consideration in matters of justice. On 
entrance policy specifically, Gibney argues that the impartialist perspective holds ‘an 
ideal of states as cosmopolitan moral agents, and sees states as morally required to take 
into equal account the interests or rights of citizens and foreigners in entrance 
decisions’ (ibid.: 59). As such, ethical accounts derived from liberalism and 
utilitarianism generally gravitate toward an ideal of open borders, where transnational 
migration is impeded by little or no regulation.  
Within the broad paradigm of thought that fits under the heading of liberalism, this 
right to free movement can be derived from a range of starting points. Immanuel Kant, 
for instance, derived his ‘cosmopolitan right’ to free movement, from an observation of 
geographical fact: ‘Since the earth is a globe, [people] cannot disperse over an infinite 
area, but must necessarily tolerate one another’s company’ (Kant [1795] 1970: 106).9 
Libertarianism, on the other hand, is opposed to border control because it defies the 
libertarian view of property rights, a view where territory can only be properly owned 
                                                 
9
 From this factual observation, Kant reasoned an obligation of ‘universal hospitality’ to displaced 
peoples. However, the ‘right of resort’ he proposed was only temporary: permanent residence was an 
agreement to which the receiving state was not morally or legally obliged (Kant [1795] 1970: 105–8). 
For discussion of Kant and the ethics of asylum, see Seyla Benhabib (2004: 25–48). 
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by individuals, not nations or states. According to libertarianism, only individuals can 
prohibit the entrance of others onto territory that they have justly acquired, and any 
regulation of national borders goes well beyond the scant duties of the minimal state 
(Carens 1987: 252–4; Kukathas 2003). This liberal insistence on free movement is 
reinforced by the various contradictions that arise from the regulation of borders. Why, 
for instance, should the free movement of people be restricted at the same time that the 
free movement of capital and information is so widely encouraged (Goodin 1992: 12–
3)? Furthermore, how can the right to leave freely a country be supported by liberal 
states when the right to enter freely another is not (Dummett 1992: 173)? These 
contradictions expose the incompatibility of border control with liberal ideals. 
An open border policy can also be founded on consequentialist liberal theories that 
aspire to a pre-conceived pattern of social justice, such as egalitarianism. Some liberal 
theorists have proposed the ‘globalization’ of John Rawls’s (1972) theory of justice, 
expanding the principle of ‘justice as fairness’ beyond the state and applying it to the 
global community (Pogge 1989). By this liberal egalitarian account, the freedom to 
move between states is an important dimension of global justice: it provides an 
opportunity for people to escape the poverty or oppression they were born into through 
no fault of their own (Carens 1987: 254–62; Kukathas 2003). Thus, the restriction of 
entrance does not merely infringe on a person’s right to move freely, it infringes on 
their right to pursue social and economic equality. 
Utilitarianism also employs a consequentialist approach toward matters of justice, 
arguing that the aim of moral behaviour is to create the greatest level of happiness for 
the greatest number of people. Accordingly, the ideal outcome of any transaction is that 
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which maximizes well-being. If one applies the moral logic of utilitarianism to the 
question of contemporary global migration, one finds little justification for the levels of 
regulation that Western nations presently enforce. Given the current levels of 
international economic, social and political inequality (Pogge 2002), the West is in no 
position to deny access to those who come searching for what it has in relative 
abundance. If it can provide security, rights, employment, social welfare or statehood to 
those who lack it in their own nations, then it has an obligation to do so. In respect of 
refugees, utilitarians have a natural bias toward their rights because their urgent 
humanitarian needs trump the social and economic concerns of a receiving community 
(Singer et al. 1988; Carens 1987: 263–4). 
This said, impartialists generally do recognize a limit to open borders. According to 
the utilitarian calculus, the regulation of entrance is justified when the costs of 
unlimited entry outweigh the benefits, when, for instance, continued immigration 
threatens to permanently damage the ecosystem or create intolerance in the community 
(Singer et al 1988: 127–8). Similarly, liberals would find regulation justified when, on 
balance, immigration infringed on more rights than it served. For instance, in his liberal 
defence of open borders, Michael Dummett (2001: 14–7) recognized that border control 
would be justified if the host culture was in danger of being ‘submerged’ as this would 
infringe on the rights of individuals to maintain their traditions and values. Gibney 
(2004: 83) argues that regulation would be justified ‘only in order to protect the 
institutions and values of the liberal democratic state’, defining these as systems of civil 
and political rights as well as any welfare apparatus that advances social justice. What 
liberals and utilitarians share is a belief that the ‘only good reasons for restricting the 
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entry of outsiders into a particular state are reasons that could be justified to all 
members and non-members alike’ [author’s emphasis] (Gibney 2004: 64). The reason 
that impartialists argue for less border control is precisely because Western nation-
states—being economically prosperous, relatively underpopulated and culturally 
flexible—are a long way from this critical juncture, capable of absorbing many more 
immigrants before there is a plausible threat to their structural or cultural existence 
(Dummett 2001). 
Obviously, the impartialist prescription for open borders goes much further than what 
is minimally required to justify the provision of asylum to refugees. In its ideal form, 
impartialism offers moral justifications for the unregulated entrance of all immigrants, 
not merely those that have been forcibly displaced. As an aspiration, this is not likely to 
be seriously entertained by many political agents, especially an elected government that 
depends upon the continued support of its voters. The impartialist ideal is so inclusive 
that its implementation would almost certainly cause far greater levels of immigration 
into Western nations, possibly resulting in substantial changes to the cultural make-up 
of their communities and a sacrifice of the material well-being of citizens. If a policy of 
open borders did have any support among Western voters, it would not be very 
significant, and it would certainly not be enough to counter those who opposed it.  
Yet, even if the impartialist ideal is unrealistic as a political project, it still contributes 
to the conviction that states and their governments do not have an absolute and 
inviolable right to determine who does and does not enter. Any political community 
with liberal inclinations is philosophically disposed to recognize that in certain 
circumstances a government has no ethical justification to restrict entrance. These 
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circumstances are most clearly defined by the international refugee regime and, more 
broadly, the human rights regime. It is here that specific and tangible guidelines are 
spelt out regarding the obligations of states to refugees. 
 
 
Asylum and the Human Rights Regime 
 
The human rights regime is the political manifestation of a particular philosophical 
approach toward morality.10 Very simply, human rights are ‘the rights that one has 
simply because one is human’ (Donnelly 1998: 18). While there is philosophical 
disagreement over precisely what are the minimum requirements for a dignified human 
existence, it is generally recognized that this includes those things that ensure a 
person’s security, subsistence and liberty (Shue 1980). Because all individuals are seen 
to have equal entitlement to these things, human rights are a universal—and thus an 
inherently impartial—concept. Ideally, the obligations that stem from these entitlements 
are also universal: everyone has a duty to protect everyone else’s rights, irrespective of 
the boundaries or distances that lie between them. While no person or institution is seen 
to be exempt from these duties, human rights obligations are typically thought to fall 
upon states because states are the most powerful potential instrument for their 
protection—as well as their violation.  
Part of what has made human rights so compelling is that, in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, they were adopted into international law. Human rights became 
                                                 
10
 While some argue that the concept of human rights is universal (Chun 2001: 21), the more prevalent 
view is that human rights are the outcome of Western philosophical traditions, especially the tradition 
of natural rights (Donnelly 1989). 
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more than just abstract moral principles; they became a set of legal conventions, 
guidelines and rules. The most important of these is the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, a list of civil, political, social and economic rights which states agree to 
uphold and promote by endorsing one of its United General Assembly Resolutions. 
Unlike domestic law, however, international human rights laws do not generally have 
any coercive power: there is no equivalent system of law enforcement at the 
international level to guide the behaviour of states. What human rights rules do possess 
is normative force—they are part of what is known in legal parlance as the opinio juris, 
meaning that governments obey those rules not because are forced to but because 
‘breaches are so prone to outrage world opinion’ (Robertson 1999: 80). In other words, 
it is in the interests of governments to be seen to respect international norms and their 
moral bases because it is in the national interest to avoid censure from the international 
community. As such, governments keep any transgressions of human rights law ‘hidden 
or, if exposed, defended on legal technicalities’ (ibid.), or, more positively, they simply 
avoid breaching human rights altogether.  
The right to seek asylum is identified as a human right by Article 14 (1) of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: ‘Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy in 
other countries asylum from persecution.’ In a normative sense, ratifying states are 
obliged to recognize asylum simply because it is a right—its mere existence justifies its 
obligation. Yet asylum also has an important instrumental function: it is one solution to 
the problem of how governments can provide rights and freedoms to non-citizens that 
lack them. The asylum regime can be considered as an alternative to direct 
humanitarian action, ‘a subsidiary system of human rights protection’ (Nathwani 2000: 
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364). When a government is unable or unwilling to intervene on behalf of non-citizens 
whose rights are being abused or neglected in a foreign country, that government can 
still provide refuge to those who escape or are expelled. It can do so actively by 
relocating mandated refugees from countries of first asylum through official 
resettlement programmes, typically organized in conjunction with the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees. Alternatively, a government can provide asylum 
passively by accepting claims of refugee status from people who are within their 
territory, people who are termed ‘asylum seekers’.  
In comparison to impartialism, the human rights regime has a narrower, more specific 
view on entrance. It demands that if an individual’s human rights are being violated or 
neglected, then they ought to be exempt from the usual systems of regulation. To apply 
selection criteria to a refugee is to fail to take their humanitarian needs seriously. 
Unlike impartialism, the human rights regime has nothing to say about the rights of 
entrance for those whose rights are not in jeopardy: it does not necessitate an obligation 
of unregulated entrance for all immigrants. As such, a human rights approach to asylum 
is a more realistic framework for a political aspiration to provide asylum. Moreover, 
given the remarkable penetration of human rights ideas into political decision-making 
around the globe over the last sixty years (Donnelly 1998: 3–17), it might be expected 
that asylum will be conceived in these terms. In light of this, it is time to turn to the 
asylum regime specifically. 
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The International Asylum Regime 
 
On 1st January 1951, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(henceforth, the UNHCR) opened its offices with a mandate to ameliorate the situation 
of those who had been displaced throughout Europe by World War Two. To achieve 
this, the UNHCR developed the United Nations Convention Relating to Status of 
Refugees, the principal legal framework for the asylum regime.11 With its adoption by 
the United Nations on 28th July 1951, there was, for the first time, a legal document that 
set out the minimum level of treatment that a refugee ought to expect from a state—in 
other words, a list of refugee rights and corresponding duties for signatory states. Very 
broadly, the 1951 Refugee Convention (as it will henceforth be known) declared that 
any refugee within a foreign country ought to have the same level of access to public 
goods and personal freedoms as citizens or, at the very least, other aliens.  
Certain articles within the 1951 Refugee Convention are especially relevant to the 
practice of asylum. One particularly important principle is that of non-refoulement: 
 
‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever 
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened...’ (1951 Refugee 
Convention: Article 33[1]).  
 
As an international norm, non-refoulement enjoys wide recognition and is the most 
significant legal constraint to state sovereignty in entrance decisions (Gibney 2004: 55). 
It is also the practical basis of the asylum regime because as long as governments wish 
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 There are other asylum-related principles in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 
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to adhere to the norm of non-refoulement, they will treat the claim of each asylum 
seeker seriously. Otherwise, they run the risk of returning a refugee to harm’s way. This 
is why gaining access to a nation’s territory is of utmost importance to asylum seekers, 
even if it means using irregular routes of entrance. Only by making an asylum claim on 
a nation’s territory does an asylum seeker oblige its government to consider their case 
and provide them with protection for at least as long as it takes to make a decision.  
Another important principle within the 1951 Refugee Convention is its absolution of 
asylum seekers whose entrance or presence in a state is irregular: 
 
‘The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or 
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom was 
threatened in the sense of [A]rticle 1, enter or are present in their territory without authorization, 
provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their 
illegal entry or presence’ (1951 Refugee Convention: Article 31[1]).  
 
In practical terms, this provision gives asylum seekers the benefit of the doubt, 
offering absolution to refugees who have arrived irregularly and transgressed domestic 
immigration laws in the process. As long as their asylum claim is genuine, the 1951 
Refugee Convention declares that their entrance or presence should not be considered 
‘illegal’, that their infractions are justified by their humanitarian need. It is on account 
of this that the term ‘irregular’ is more suitable to describe the anomalous modes of 
immigration that asylum seekers frequently resort to.  
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The final aspect of the 1951 Refugee Convention to be examined is the refugee 
definition. This sets out the legal criteria that determine whether an asylum claimant’s 
situation meets the standard of refugee status. It declares that:  
 
‘the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who… owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country...’ (1951 Refugee Convention: 
Article 1A). 
 
This definition reveals the 1951 Refugee Convention’s concern for the political and 
civil rights of individuals. In this sense, the refugee definition is very much a product of 
its times, a response to the unique situation following World War Two. Indeed, in its 
original formulation, the refugee definition was strictly limited to post-war 
displacement, applicable only to those who were displaced before 1st January 1951, and 
binding beyond Europe only by the discretion of the signatory state.12 Those who 
drafted the 1951 Refugee Convention were apparently concerned that governments 
would refuse to ratify if it obliged them to future refugee crises, particularly because 
there was no clear idea of their size or nature (Wilkinson 2004: 8). Thus, the original 
refugee definition reflects an aspiration to provide asylum only to those displaced by 
the Second World War—nothing more. 
These temporal and geographical limitations were annulled with the adoption of the 
1967 Protocol Relating to Status of Refugees. Nevertheless, the refugee definition still 
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 See Article 1B [1] of the 1951 Refugee Convention.  
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betrays its post-war origins. In particular, the refugee definition specifies persecution as 
the only legitimate cause of refugee status, further specifying race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion as the only relevant 
grounds of persecution. By being so precise, the refugee definition does strongly 
compel governments to assist those claimants that meet these particular criteria. 
Controversially, however, the refugee definition’s specificity means that it fails to 
include victims of other forms of persecution and displacement, such as those fleeing 
natural or environmental disasters, gender or sexual discrimination, famine, destitution 
or the indiscriminate path of war. The widespread use of the term ‘refugee’ to describe 
New Orleans residents who were displaced throughout the United States by Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005 demonstrates the gulf that exists between the legal and the popular 
definitions of what it is to be a refugee.13 
Interestingly, then, the refugee definition proposes a much narrower grounds for 
entrance than what one would expect from a rights-based conception of asylum, failing 
to include individuals whose rights to security, liberty and subsistence are undeniably 
under threat. As the basis for an aspiration to provide asylum, a strict interpretation of 
the refugee definition sets the bar for asylum provision surprisingly high—indeed, 
higher than what Western nations appear to practice. As noted at the outset of this 
thesis, almost a third of all asylum claimants granted protection in industrialized 
countries are allowed to stay under ‘humanitarian’ categories despite their failure to 
meet the 1951 Refugee Convention’s criteria for refugee status (UNHCR 2006b: 39; 
ibid. 2007: 49). While persecutions related to gender and sexuality are not explicitly 
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 See, for instance, this headline from the New Zealand Herald (2005): ‘Texas struggles to cope as 
refugees hit 250,000’.  
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recognized by the 1951 Refugee Convention, claims for protection on these grounds are 
frequently—although not invariably—accepted by Western governments.14 Perhaps 
even most surprising is that, among OECD nations, the removal rate of asylum seekers 
who fail to gain refugee status or any other entrance category is in the range of only ten 
to twenty per cent. It is thought that somewhere between fifty and seventy per cent of 
failed asylum seekers remain in the country where their application was declined 
(Gibney and Hansen 2003: 4). Clearly, there are other factors guiding the behaviour of 
governments, encouraging them to exercise a more inclusive conception of asylum than 
what is required by the refugee definition. It is time to look at the normative agents 
whose ‘outrage’ a government skirts by respecting the principles of asylum. 
 
 
Asylum and its Advocates 
 
In the search for normative agents, there is an implicit assumption that a state will 
only ever relinquish its sovereignty over entrance if it is somehow forced to do so. Of 
course, we have seen that there are strong moral reasons to sacrifice sovereignty for the 
sake of refugees, but it is hard to reconcile such self-motivated moral behaviour with 
traditional conceptions of the state as a rational, materialistic and self-interested agent.15 
Thus, in asking who might compel a state into going beyond its minimal legal 
requirements to asylum claimants, the most obvious suspects are those normative 
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  For further discussion of issues relating to the recognition of grounds for asylum relating to gender 
and sexuality, see Crawley (2000), McGhee (2001) and Oxford (2005). 
15
 Such is the perception of the state as advanced by political realism and largely taken for granted by 
liberalism (Crawford 2000: 116–8). 
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agents in the international sphere that have the power to influence the considerations of 
a state. Of those that might be suspected of having a positive influence on asylum 
provision are other sovereign states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
international governmental organizations (IGOs).  
The influence of other states is especially relevant where an internationally co-
ordinated response to refugee issues is being sought, either to stop asylum seekers being 
deflected from restrictive states onto more liberal neighbours,16 or to ‘share the burden’ 
of a refugee crisis that the international community is unwilling to ignore.17 Non-
governmental organizations—such as Amnesty International, Oxfam, Médicins sans 
Frontières, and the Red Cross—play an influential role in refugee politics, either 
operationally as providers of humanitarian aid or, more relevant for this thesis, as 
advocates for refugee issues (Terry 2002). The most prominent external normative 
agent, however, is the Office for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 
an international governmental organization. Throughout its existence, the UNHCR has 
consistently encouraged governments to take an inclusive approach to asylum, offering 
prescriptions on how the 1951 Refugee Convention ought to be interpreted; it has, for 
instance, argued that gender-related persecution ought to be recognized under the 
refugee definition’s ‘membership of a particular social group’ (UNHCR 2002a). 
Moreover, the UNHCR has widened its own sphere of activities throughout the 1990s 
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 For instance, the Federal Republic of Germany’s strong support for the 1990 Schengen Accord (which 
harmonized Western European border policies) was largely motivated by the deflection of asylum 
seekers from its more restrictive neighbours (Gibney 2004: 99, 101–2).  
17
  For instance, Australia and the United States subjected a reluctant New Zealand to normative 
pressure to ‘share the burden’ of South East Asian refugees in the late 1970s (Hau Liev 1995: 
101–2). 
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into countries of refugee origin, working directly with internally displaced persons and 
thus beyond its traditional mandate (Loescher 2003: 11–3). 
Yet a ‘top-down’ explanation, where international forces are seen to constrain and 
guide the behaviour of states, does not encompass the range of normative agents that 
might influence a state’s behaviour. It is necessary to consider the influence of 
normative agents within a state, domestic political actors that compel a state to sacrifice 
its sovereignty in the realm of asylum. Of course, if one concedes that internal agents 
do influence a state’s behaviour, then a more complicated picture of state involvement 
in asylum emerges. It suggests that international norms are not simply forced on states 
from above and beyond: to some extent, states choose to abide by norms. Indeed, on the 
issue of the West’s surprisingly low removal rates of immigrants without permits, 
Christian Joppke (1998: 270) has argued that ‘Not globally limited, but self-limited 
sovereignty explains why states accept unwanted immigrants.’ The pressure to take an 
expansive view of asylum comes not only from external political entities, it comes from 
a state’s own constituent parts: its political institutions and civil society. 
Domestic courts play an especially important role in determining how human rights 
law is to be interpreted by the state, and by incorporating international legal norms into 
domestic law and legal practice (Gibney et al. 2003a: 10–1). The increased recognition 
of sexual persecution in asylum decisions in the West, for instance, has been driven by 
domestic courts, particularly through the adoption of legal precedents set by the courts 
of other Western nations (McGhee 2003). Ethnic lobby groups, humanitarian 
organizations, civil society groups, refugee advocates and the media can encourage the 
state to provide asylum by exerting direct pressure on governments and political parties. 
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In regards to immigration policy generally, business lobby groups and modern-day 
trade unions (Avci et al 2000; Haus 1995) have generally supported looser entrance 
policies (or, at least, opposed restrictive ones) in their attempts to liberalize 
transnational labour markets. All of these groups use their political influence to steer 
governments towards policies that meet their own ideals. 
Yet, if we are to take seriously the moral force and persuasiveness of asylum, then we 
also need to recognize that liberal democratic governments must have their own 
motives to provide asylum. As we have seen, ideological justifications for asylum can 
be derived from both ends of the liberal spectrum, from libertarianism and liberal 
egalitarianism, so a Western government that refused to recognize asylum in some 
shape or form would run the risk of negating its liberal credentials. Thus, liberal 
democratic governments are not merely slaves to the norm of asylum, but willing 
participants in its provision.  
In light of the harsh treatment of asylum seekers by liberal governments in recent 
years, this statement might seem contrary to the evidence. It might seem that the norm 
of asylum is something that governments have reluctantly acquiesced to and are now 
trying to extricate themselves from. Yet circumstantial evidence suggests that an 
aspiration to provide asylum is not only held by majority political parties, but by parties 
across the political spectrum. After surveying the parliamentary debates of Britain, 
Switzerland and Germany, Steiner (2000: 134) found that ‘not a single parliamentarian 
in any of these debates spoke against refugees or against the principle of asylum’, a 
finding that is reinforced by this study of the parliamentary debates of Canada and 
Australia. Even a notoriously restrictive party such as Australia’s One Nation Party 
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recognized in its 1998 policy statement that ‘Compassion must be extended to genuine 
refugees’ (One Nation 1998). 18 Certainly, One Nation had a narrow conception of what 
this obligation entailed, declaring, for instance, that ‘temporary refuge need not extend 
to long-term permanent settlement’ (ibid.); yet its recognition of asylum demonstrates 
just how widely accepted it is throughout Western political communities.  
It seems that humanitarian ideals, such as the provision of asylum, are not merely 
abstract concepts that lie beyond domestic concerns: they are part of a liberal 
community’s political fabric. As Peter Nyers (2006: 124) has put it, ‘a humanitarianism 
that presumes to possess an autonomous existence, separate and distinct from the 
vicissitudes of political life, is—and always has been—an impossibility.’ These norms 
and ethical ideals exist—in some shape or form—within politicians, voters, civil 
servants and society at large. Consequently, a political party that was seen to be openly 
dismissive or hostile to a widely recognized human right, such as asylum, would risk 
attracting widespread contempt from its own members of parliament and its electorate. 
In this sense, a party’s support for human rights is self-interested: it is necessary for 
survival in a liberal democratic political system. As long as the principle of asylum 
resonates widely within a given community, as long as it is deemed to be a virtuous and 
plausible objective, a political party must convince its electorate that it aspires to 
provide asylum.  
Of course, precisely what this aspiration entails is bound to differ substantially 
between parties. Some will aspire to a high standard of asylum provision, some (such as 
the One Nation Party) will aspire to a low standard, and others will fall somewhere in 
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 For an excellent summary of One Nation and its attitude towards immigrants and asylum seekers, see 
Jupp (2002: 123–40). 
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between. Political ideology can be expected to play a role in this, as can the 
circumstances of a nation’s asylum situation. Yet such partisan differences can be 
justified—as are most policy differences—through the medium of political rhetoric; 
parties can argue that their aspiration to provide asylum is the more plausible, effective 
or appropriate. Whatever the details, it is the act of aspiration that is most important; 
and, on this, a party will be judged by its statements of commitment and, where 
relevant, the policies it has implemented.  
 
 
1.2: The Aspiration to Regulate Entrance 
 
The aspiration to regulate entrance is the description that this thesis gives to the range 
of material and non-material factors that contribute to a government’s ambition have 
control over who does and does not enter its national community. This section will 
begin with a discussion of how such an aspiration is encouraged by representative 
democracy, the dominant political system of the West, and compels a government to 
protect the interests of citizens. In the following discussion of threats that asylum is 
seen to pose to a nation’s interests, it will become clear that regulation also has some 
support from international norms and moral considerations, especially those of 
communitarian conceptions of justice. Finally, this section will look at how asylum 
potentially imposes on this aspiration to regulate entrance. 
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Entrance and the Interests of the Electorate 
 
At the root of a government’s aspiration to regulate entrance is the notion that one of 
the state’s roles is to protect the interests of its citizens. For Western nations, this role is 
institutionalized through the dynamics of representative democracy, operating within 
the boundaries of the nation-state. In such a system, the formation of government is 
largely determined by voters’ perceptions of which political parties best represent their 
interests. In most liberal democracies (including Australia and Canada), where the right 
to vote is limited to citizens,19 political parties are driven to appeal to their interests. 
Meanwhile, there is no equivalent motive for a political party to appeal to the interests 
of those who are ineligible to vote. An electoral strategy pitched at the interests of 
foreigners would offer no immediate electoral advantage and potentially alienate its 
existing supporters. As such, a representative democracy naturally encourages partiality 
in a government’s attitude toward entrance policy. This is, of course, an alternative to 
impartialism and considers that states have ‘a right to self-determination which justifies 
priority for the interests of citizens over those of refugees in entrance decisions’ 
(Gibney 2004: 23).  
This illuminates a fundamental tension within the liberal democratic nation-state. 
While liberalism leans towards an ideal of impartiality, democracy is innately self-
interested when it is circumscribed by national borders. Benhabib (2004: 19) has 
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 While citizenship is usually required to be eligible to vote, this is not always the case. New Zealand, 
for instance, allows permanent residents to vote. Nonetheless, asylum seekers are still excluded from 
the democratic process because they will not gain permanent residency until their refugee status has 
been approved. 
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described this as ‘an irresolvable contradiction... between the expansive and 
inclusionary principles of moral and political universalism, as anchored in universal 
human rights, and the particularistic and exclusionary conceptions of democratic 
closure.’ This does not, however, mean that impartiality is wholly incompatible with 
democratic sovereignty. Universalist ethical ideals, such as human rights, do exist 
within liberal communities, carried along by the moral beliefs of its members. Indeed, 
the democratic political arena provides a discursive space for these beliefs to expressed, 
propagated and defined. In this spirit, Benhabib (2004: 19) has advanced the concept of 
‘democratic iterations’, which she describes as ‘complex processes of public argument, 
deliberation, and learning through which universalist right claims are contested and 
contextualized, invoked and revoked, throughout legal and political institutions as well 
as in the public sphere of liberal democracies.’ Through such discursive mechanisms, a 
universal right can gain popular appeal and a government will serve the moral interests 
of its citizens by respecting it. In such instances, the gap between liberalism and 
democracy can be bridged. 
So, partialism is not inherently hostile to the idea that states have obligations to 
refugees, nor does it assume that humanitarian considerations are irrelevant in entrance 
decisions. What partialism does do is refuse to accord gratuitously universalist rights 
claims any special status over and above the interests of citizens. Within the democratic 
arena, humanitarian ideals, such as unregulated entrance for refugees, must compete on 
an equal footing against other material and non-material factors that might affect the 
interests of citizens. Unfortunately for refugees, these factors may be considered more 
urgent or pressing for the community than its compliance to moral ideals. It is time to 
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examine the factors that academic literature has identified that encourage restrictive 
entrance decisions by liberal democratic governments.  
 
 
The Regulation of Entrance 
 
The most fundamental reason for regulation is simply to control the absolute scale of 
immigration, typically achieved through the bureaucratic enforcement of an annual 
quota. Given the vast demand for membership in the prosperous nations of the West, 
there are legitimate reasons for a limit to immigration. After all, it is quite possible that 
unregulated entrance would lead to the receiving state being overwhelmed, putting 
undue pressure on its infrastructure and public services, or threatening the existence of 
the host culture. It will be recalled that even impartialists recognize exceptions to the 
ideal of open borders, viewing regulation as permissible only when it can be justified to 
citizens and non-citizens alike. The structural or cultural collapse of the receiving 
community would meet this criterion because it would spell the end for the benefits that 
had attracted immigrants in the first place. Partialism, on the other hand, which 
prioritizes the interests of citizens, sets a much lower level for regulation. The concern 
is not cultural or structural collapse per se, it is any adverse effect on the culture or 
infrastructure of the receiving nation. At its crudest, partialism sees the restriction of 
entrance as justified simply if it is supported by the majority of citizens. While some 
partialists have averred from such a strong position, arguing that it is necessary to look 
past reactionary pressures to the latent values and ‘shared understandings’ of a 
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community (Walzer 1983, cited in Gibney 2004: 32–5), the fact remains that, in its 
ideal form, partiality is precisely this insular and self-justifying. So, while there is some 
consensus between impartialists and partialists that regulation can be ethically 
justifiable, there is a vast difference in the circumstances where they deem it to be 
appropriate. In this sense, the aspiration to regulate entrance—like the aspiration to 
provide asylum—is widely held within the liberal political community but prone to 
great variation in its shape, form and implications. 
Aside from the absolute level of immigration, regulation is also used to influence 
aspects of an immigration flow, to determine the make-up of an annual quota. In this 
constitutive role, immigrant groups and individual entrants are determined to be either a 
source of possible opportunity or of potential threat. Subsequently, systems of 
regulation are developed to facilitate the entrance of the former while preventing the 
entrance of the latter.  
The facilitation of desirable immigrants is critical for Western nations whose 
economies rely heavily on foreigner-born workers to meet their labour demands 
(Cornelius et al. 2004). With such a vast pool of potential immigrants in the developing 
world, Western nations can afford to be highly selective in who fills their annual 
immigration quotas, prioritizing the entrance of the ‘best and the brightest’ (Dauvergne 
2003: 10–11). This is achieved by selection criteria for entrance permits, typically 
through ‘point systems’, which favour those with occupational experience, appropriate 
language skills, academic qualifications and good health. The object of such regulations 
is to make immigration as profitable as possible, facilitating the entrance of immigrants 
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who can make a significant contribution to the nation’s financial pool without needing 
to draw on it for assistance. 
More characteristically, though, regulation is a restrictive force, a means by which 
certain individuals or groups are prohibited from entering a national community. This 
restrictive approach to entrance, where immigrants are treated as a threat rather than a 
opportunity, fits neatly with traditional accounts of state sovereignty, where entrance 
policy is held to be instrumental to a state’s control over territory and its ‘capacity to 
govern a particular space’ (Dauvergne 2004: 593). Even the 1951 Refugee Convention 
recognizes the need for a minimum level of sovereignty and, accordingly, it includes a 
number of discretionary provisions for signatory states. Most importantly, Article 1F 
states that its obligations ‘shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are 
serious reasons for considering that… he has committed a crime against peace, a war 
crime, or a crime against humanity… a serious non-political crime outside the country 
of refuge… [or is] guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations.’ Further articles declare that provisional measures can be enforced to protect a 
nation’s security ‘in time of war or other grave and exceptional circumstances’ (ibid.: 
Article 9); and that a refugee may be expelled ‘on grounds of national security or public 
order’, provided that this ‘is a decision reached in accordance with due process of law’ 
(ibid.: Article 32).20 Thus the 1951 Refugee Convention is not a carte blanche 
obligation to accept each and every person who arrives and claims refugee status. It 
promotes norms of regulation as well as asylum provision. 
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 In relation to expulsion, see also Article 33[2] of the 1951 Refugee Convention which qualifies the 
principle of non-refoulement on these grounds; and Article 2 which sets out the duties for refugees 
within countries of asylum. 
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Compared with state practices of the past and present, however, the 1951 Refugee 
Convention’s grounds for exclusion are narrow. Through their prohibitive border 
policies, governments regulate against a far broader array of contingencies. In addition 
to restricting those who might pose a threat to national security or the community, such 
as members of terrorist organizations or transnational criminal organizations, systems 
of regulation can be used to deny entrance to individuals with criminal convictions and 
those who threaten a nation’s biosecurity, especially by carrying contagious diseases. 
Regulation can protect a state’s welfare system by denying access to those with medical 
conditions that require expensive treatment or who might otherwise gain access to 
public resources, such as social welfare benefits. It can restrict access to the many 
prospective economic immigrants who are unable to secure a legitimate entry permit 
into a developed country. Regulation can be used to limit the entrance of individuals or 
groups whose political activities are deemed to be a threat to the receiving nation, or 
who are fleeing from regimes with which it is allied. And, finally, a system of 
regulation can exercise discretion on cultural grounds, limiting cultural diversity and 
thereby minimizing its anticipated effects. This last point deserves further mention. 
Justifications for cultural regulation have found their most cogent basis in 
communitarian theory21—two of its claims are worth noting here. The first of these is 
that a cultural community has the right to be protected because culture is a core 
component of its members’ identities (Sandel 1982; Walzer 1983; MacIntyre 1984; 
Taylor 1985). Communitarians argue that human beings are, in large part, products of 
their social surroundings, and therefore they need to be able to operate within the 
culture that shaped them. This ‘social embeddedness’ is overlooked by liberal theorists 
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 For an overview of communitarian theory and its contemporary variations, see Miller (2000: 97–109). 
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who generally take an abstract and atomized view of humanity, a view that 
communitarians consider to be unrealistic and potentially harmful. The second 
communitarian claim is that political projects that advance the common good, such as a 
generous welfare system, require a strong sense of national solidarity, of shared destiny, 
to maintain public support. Cultural diversity threatens the solidarity of a national 
community and thereby undermines the capacity to implement public projects, such as 
the redistribution of wealth (Miller 2000: 24–40). Working from these two claims, a 
partialist defence of regulation can be developed, a justification for restricting the 
entrance of groups and individuals who are culturally dissimilar and unlikely to 
assimilate. Whether or not one finds the claims of communitarianism compelling,22 it is 
important to recognize that these are substantive ethical arguments. The liberal ideal, 
where ‘the right of a community to fashion its own entrance policy is circumscribed 
morally by the right of all individuals to reside wherever they wish’ (Gibney 2004: 60), 
is not the only ethical approach on entrance. The particularist moral claims of 
communitarianism further demonstrates the insufficiency of the ‘tug-of-war’ model of 
asylum in which morality is assumed to be the exclusive domain of universalist 
approaches.  
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 For a critical commentary on the communitarian account of entrance, see Gibney (2004: 35–58). For 
discussion of the broader debate between communitarian and liberalism, see Kukathas et al. (1990). 
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The Implications of Regulation for Asylum Seeking 
 
So, what does all this mean for asylum seekers? The problem with asylum seeking is 
that it potentially frustrates a government’s aspiration to regulate according to these 
sorts of criteria. Asylum seekers arrive on a state’s territory by whatever means they 
can and declare refugee status, thereby invoking a moral and legal right to have their 
status determined according to the terms of the 1951 Refugee Convention, irrespective 
of the government’s preferred entrance criteria. The greatest threat to regulation are 
those asylum seekers whom arrive by irregular means: using fraudulent documents, 
providing false information or evading border authorities entirely. When such irregular 
entrants make a claim of refugee status, they subject themselves to some aspects of 
regulation (such as security and identity checks, and verification of their refugee status) 
but this occurs only after their entrance, meaning that they have still successfully 
evaded other preferential criteria, such as a government’s economic, cultural and 
political preferences. To a lesser extent, asylum seekers who arrive by regular avenues 
(such as a work, student or visitor’s permit) also undermine a government’s control 
over membership because, while they have been granted temporary entrance under a 
specific set of criteria, by demanding the right to stay as refugees these asylum 
claimants have succeeded in evading the criteria that a government usually applies to 
permanent residents. Unlike regular immigrants and mandated refugees, who are 
subjected to the government’s usual criteria for entrance, asylum seekers are effectively 
exempting themselves from regulation by virtue of their potential refugee status. 
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It is precisely this evasion of regulation that makes asylum seekers so controversial. 
By its very nature, asylum seeking is irreconcilable with the bureaucratic imperative for 
an immigration flow that is finely engineered to fulfil a government’s policy objectives. 
Moreover, asylum seeking is susceptible to misuse by individuals who do not meet the 
criteria for refugee status. By lodging a claim, such individuals succeed in gaining 
access to a community until their initial applications and any subsequent appeals have 
been processed. Most recent figures show that, in 2006, only 28 per cent of asylum 
claimants around the globe were recognized as refugees, although the total proportion 
who were given official protection was 39 per cent (UNHCR: 2007: 49).23 Obviously, if 
these unsuccessful asylum claimants had been tested prior to their arrival, then 
governments could have avoided much of the costs and controversy that their entrance 
necessitated.  
While asylum does present demonstrable challenges for receiving states, some of the 
threats described are a matter for debate. Certainly, the transformation of asylum into a 
security issue is contentious (Huysmans 1993); various commentators have argued that 
the perception of asylum seekers—or even immigrants—as a threat to national security 
in the post-9/11 era is vastly exaggerated (Gibney 2002; Turk 2003; van Selm 2003). 
Cultural justifications for regulation are also controversial. For instance, Michael 
Dummett (2001: 14–21) has argued that the communitarian perspective underestimates 
the existing heterogeneity of Western cultures and their demonstrated capacity for 
accommodating cultural diversity. In regard to the potential effects of asylum seekers 
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 There is an absence of empirical research on the level of misjudgement in refugee status determination 
decisions. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to amend this. Thus it is important to keep in mind that 
statistical summaries of asylum decisions, such as that given above, tend to conceal how many genuine 
refugees were rejected, how many people in refugee-like situations were ignored, and how many false 
claims were approved.  
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and immigrants on the welfare state, a recent survey of Western nations failed to find 
any empirical support for the claim that greater cultural diversity results in declining 
investment into welfare resources (Banting and Kymlicka 2006).  
To some extent, however, this is beside the point. Regardless of whether a threat is 
real or imagined, urgent or hypothetical, tolerable or not, the perception of that threat 
can still motivate a government to develop a policy response. In this sense, entrance 
policy is often speculative, creating tangible border controls out of intangible 
perceptions, just as speculation in the share market yields measurable economic 
fluctuations. The major driving force behind this process is the dynamics of electoral 
politics. After all, in their pursuit of power, democratic governments are greedily 
sensitive to the whims and wants of voters, regardless of whether these are a product of 
misunderstanding or misinformation. The perceptions (or misperceptions) of imminent 
danger that exist in the public sphere are a potential source of votes to be courted and 
encouraged by political tacticians. Even when a threat is agreed to be distant, an 
unregulated stream of immigrants can be held as evidence that a government is 
incapable of imposing control in the event of that threat becoming imminent. Thus, a 
government’s aspiration to regulate entrance is as much to do with the threat of what 
might happen as it is to do with what is happening. 
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1.3: A Conflict of Aspirations 
 
So far then, Part One has explored the aspirations to provide asylum and to regulate 
entrance, revealing the material and non-material factors that motivate them. This 
concluded with a description how the ideal of asylum, which allows refugees 
unregulated entrance into a nation, can potentially impose on a government’s aspiration 
to regulate entrance. It is time to describe the changing global context which has 
brought these aspirations into ever greater conflict in developed Western nations.  
 
 
The Politics of Asylum since the Mid-Twentieth Century 
 
For its first few decades, the international asylum regime imposed very little upon the 
West’s capacity to regulate entrance. The few asylum seekers that arrived from 
communist nations slipped neatly into the bipolar dynamic of Cold War politics: their 
movement from East to West, from communism to capitalism, signified to Western 
minds a stark rejection of socialist values, conveniently reinforcing the West’s 
propaganda about its own superior quality of life. Indeed, the United States 
Government considered refugees so strategically important that they limited their 
financial contributions to the UNHCR, reluctant to grant it too great an influence in 
such an important strategic sphere (Loescher 2003: 7–9). In serving the strategic 
interests of Western states, asylum was understood in terms of political realism, 
conceived as a further dimension to the greater conflict between the world’s 
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superpowers (Meyers 2000: 1264). Additionally, circumstantial factors meant that 
asylum seekers were rarely at odds with the West’s regulatory preferences. The tight 
exit restrictions enforced by states in the Eastern Bloc meant that the number of asylum 
applicants was relatively small and easily manageable—with the exception of the 
occasional exodus, from Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Strong post-war 
economic growth in the West ensured that those asylum seekers who did arrive—
generally skilled and well-educated—were easily absorbed into the labour market. 
Finally, most refugees were Eastern European and so less threatening to the host 
community than arrivals from less familiar cultures. Given the insignificant costs of 
asylum and its tangible benefits, asylum was relatively uncontroversial throughout 
much of the Cold War. 
In spite of this, the asylum regime fell far short of being a normative ideal (Crisp 
2003). In keeping with the realpolitik of the times, refugees escaping from regimes that 
were allied to the West were not at all welcome. For instance, the United States 
generally did not recognize refugees who arrived from non-communist regimes outside 
of the Middle East—particularly, those asylum claimants that fled the right-wing 
dictatorships of Central and South American (Ferris 1987: 126; Gibney 2004: 132). 
And, for the many refugees in Asia and Africa, lodging an asylum claim in the West 
was practically impossible—it was simply too far away. Thus, while the actions of 
receiving states often coincided with humanitarian ideals, this was a matter of 
convenience rather than design, reflecting the peculiar circumstances of the era rather 
than an unusually strong commitment toward asylum. 
                   —48— 
The asylum situation began to change in the late 1970s. Developments in transport 
and communication diminished the hurdles to intercontinental travel, making it more 
feasible to look further afield for asylum than one’s neighbouring country, a nation that 
may not have had the resources or the inclination to provide protection to refugees. Yet, 
not only were the means of migration changing, so was the nature of demand. The 
number of refugees was growing around the world, largely due to civil conflict. In 
1970, the global population of refugees was under two and a half million; a decade later 
it was almost nine million and by 1990 well over seventeen million (UNHCR 2000: 
310). Other types of migrant were also on the rise, especially economic migrants, 
enticed or compelled to move by the intensification of global economic inequality. For 
some, this was a matter of  finding better employment opportunities and a higher 
standard of living, a driving force that was exacerbated by the global media’s lush 
representation of Western lifestyles. For others, migration was a potential escape from 
life-threatening poverty, chronic unemployment and famine, situations that made these 
‘economic refugees’ morally and practically difficult to differentiate from political 
refugees. Yet, for all these would-be migrants, there were only limited opportunities for 
acceptance through the regular immigration systems of Western nations, systems that 
gave priority to those with occupational skills, education and family already in the 
destination country. As a result, the asylum system became the only plausible means of 
entrance for those excluded by the West’s regulations. Throughout the 1970s, Western 
Europe received no more than 13,000 asylum claims a year. By 1985, this had risen to 
170,000 and, by 1992, to 690,000. North American applications also grew, from 28,000 
in 1985 to 173,000 in 1995 (UNHCR 1997: 148).  
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So, by the 1990s, a situation had emerged that was markedly different from preceding 
decades. With the Cold War over, the strategic and ideological impetus for asylum 
provision had evaporated. The status of asylum seekers had become increasingly 
ambiguous, requiring Western governments to develop specific legal institutions to 
determine the veracity of claim of refugee status. Given the difficulty of determining 
these claims, as well as the growing number of asylum claimants, these institutions 
came under immense administrative pressure, accumulating backlogs that proved 
difficult to reduce. For instance, Germany, which received an exceptionally large 
number of asylum claims due to constraints in its constitution, had an average 
processing time of three years for refugee status determinations in the early 1990s 
(Gibney 2004: 97). Judicial appeals further exasperated attempts by governments to 
shorten the refugee determination process.  
To complicate matters further, asylum seekers have increasingly resorted to irregular 
methods of entry, using false information or fraudulent documentation to pass through 
border systems, or evading border authorities altogether. A British Home Office 
research paper concluded that there was ‘strong circumstantial evidence’ to show that 
this shift was exacerbated by the restrictive entrance policies of Western nations (Zetter 
et al. 2003: 130). These irregular routes of entry typically involve the services of people 
smugglers: transnational criminal organizations and vigilantes who, for a monetary 
sum, assist border crossings, sometimes by perilous means. The hazards of irregular 
immigration was tragically illustrated when a boat, known as SIEV X,24 went down en 
route to Australia in October 2001, taking with it 353 people (Marr et al. 2003: 224–
38). Another less visible danger is that of being subsumed into human trafficking 
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 SIEV is an Australian Naval acronym for Suspect Illegal Entrance Vessel. 
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routes, diverted into sexual slavery or forced labour through debt bondage (Gibney 
2000). The shift of emphasis towards people smuggling has also served to further 
weaken public sympathy for asylum seekers, bringing them into close association with 
criminal activities. This negative image has been reinforced by the popular political 
usage of the term ‘illegal’ to describe irregular entrants, a term which is notably lacking 
in neutrality (Dauvergne 2004). Moreover, the occurrence of unregulated immigration 
became even more intolerable to an already anxious polity after the attacks on the 
World Trade Centre on 11th September 2001.  
In sum, changes to the international environment have brought the practice of asylum 
seeking into heightened conflict with the regulation of entrance. By sidestepping a 
nation’s usual entrance procedures, the activity of asylum seeking exposes a community 
to the perceived threats of an unregulated inflow of foreigners. The overwhelming 
policy response of Western nations has been to restrict and discourage asylum seekers 
through a range of restrictive policy measures, a survey of which will now be offered.  
 
 
Restricting Asylum: Western Policy Responses to the Asylum Crisis  
 
Faced with overburdened asylum systems and growing public discontent over 
immigration, Western governments have sought to regulate access to their asylum 
systems by introducing a range of restrictive policies. Gibney and Hansen (2003: 5–13) 
have organized these policies into four categories according to the principal objective of 
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each: strategies of border control, strategies of deterrence, reducing the length of stay, 
and improving the refugee regime’s efficacy  
The first category consists of what are essentially border control measures. 
Restricting the entry of asylum seekers is a foolproof way of reducing the pressures and 
expenses of the asylum system. To make an asylum claim, an asylum seeker must first 
reach the territory of the country he or she wishes to claim asylum in. Only once a 
claim is lodged within its territory is a nation bound to treat the asylum seeker with all 
the protections he or she would have under the United Nations Refugee Convention. 
Consequently, it is far easier—legally and politically—to keep asylum seekers from 
arriving than it is to remove them after the fact. Legally, a government avoids the rule 
of non-refoulement if the asylum seeker cannot lodge a claim. And, politically, a 
government can subsume such measures under efforts to reduce ‘illegal immigration’ 
and people smuggling, issues that have unambiguous public and political support. A 
major part of bolstering border control involves strengthening the traditional 
instruments of border security: the borders and ports of entry, and the immigration 
officers and customs inspectors that manage them. However, it also includes methods 
that redefine national boundaries. Some asylum policies have, in effect, extended their 
border controls beyond traditional national boundaries to the places asylum seekers are 
arriving from. Pre-inspection regimes such as ‘advance passenger processing’ (APP) 
systems have provided an opportunity to detect potential asylum seekers before they 
board their carrier. Carrier sanctions have allowed governments to impose fines on any 
sea, air or land carrier that brings a person into a country without the proper 
documentation, compelling carriers to be vigilant about whom they allow to board. Visa 
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regimes prohibit the visa-free entrance of nationals of certain countries, typically any 
country from which it is suspected that there would be a large number of asylum 
seekers, overstayers or workers without appropriate permits. Finally, some governments 
have undertaken proactive strategies of interdiction, arresting the progress of asylum 
seekers before they reach a nation’s territory. Governments have even redefined their 
national borders by disclaiming parts of their territory, designating their airports as 
‘international zones’ or, as we shall see in the case of Australia, excising sections of its 
territory from its migration zone.  
The second category consists of strategies of deterrence, measures that will 
discourage asylum seekers from even trying to enter a state as an asylum seeker. There 
is some overlap here with the former category—after all, a successful border control 
strategy will have a deterrent effect on prospective asylum seekers or those that traffic 
them. Specifically deterrent measures, however, aim to make ‘the costs of entry so high 
(or the benefits so low) that arrival is not attempted’ (Gibney et al. 2003b: 7). The most 
controversial of these is the mandatory detention of asylum seekers. Obviously, the 
punitive quality of detention is a pointed disincentive, yet detention also discourages 
asylum seekers in a less obvious manner: it isolates them from the affluent and liberal 
community that they were seeking to join. In a similar vein, governments have imposed 
restrictions on where asylum claimants can live, limited their ability to work and 
limited their access to welfare, all strategies that reduce the ostensible benefits of 
asylum. Whether or not such strategies are successful in deterring asylum claimants is a 
matter of controversy. Nathwani (2000) has argued that, for someone escaping 
persecution or life-threatening poverty, the costs of entry into the developed world are 
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unlikely to outweigh the costs of remaining in the developing world. If this criticism is 
justified, then a strategy of deterrence will simply prolong the hardship of asylum 
claimants without making any major improvement to the regulation of entrance.  
The third category of restrictive measures involves reducing the length of the asylum 
seeker’s stay. Having a rapid turnaround system is important for governments because 
the longer an asylum applicant remains in the community, the more socially embedded 
he or she will become and, consequently, it will be more morally, politically and legally 
difficult to remove her or him. An asylum seeker’s stay can be reduced by speeding up 
the refugee status determination process; by giving successful claimants temporary 
rather than permanent residence; or by excluding them from the asylum system on 
technical grounds, such as arriving via a safe country where they might have otherwise 
lodged their claim. Moreover, a government can enforce a swift deportation for those 
individuals whose asylum claims have failed or whose refugee status has changed in 
light of improvements to the situation in their home country. 
The final category of policy measures includes those that improve the efficacy of the 
refugee regime as a whole, encouraging a more manageable and orderly system. The 
creation of domestic legal bodies to administer the determination of refugee status has 
been an important development, allowing for a strategy of restriction that discriminates 
between entrants in urgent danger and those entering for less pressing reasons. There 
has also been a growing interest among some governments, such as the British 
government, to implement refugee resettlement programmes. Of course, by relocating 
pre-screened refugees directly from camps in countries of first asylum, a government 
has a far greater level of regulatory control over its humanitarian intake (a fact which 
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may explain renewed interest in refugee resettlement). Traditionally, the only nations to 
operate such programmes have been the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand 
and—to a lesser extent—the Netherlands and the Nordic countries. Finally, this 
category includes the various unilateral and multilateral operations to diminish the 
global refugee population and the causes of refugee flows; and to tackle human 
trafficking, people smuggling and other forms of irregular migration.  
From a normative perspective, these are among the more positive developments for 
the asylum regime. Yet the consequences of such policies for asylum seekers are rarely 
straight-forward. For example, the current drive to combat people-smuggling does 
restrict an activity that exposes asylum seekers to great danger, yet it also closes off the 
only realistic route to the West for many asylum seekers. Similarly, refugee 
resettlement programmes, while themselves morally commendable, may be used as a 
justification to limit the entrance of asylum seekers, thereby reducing a nation’s overall 
intake of refugees (this argument will be properly addressed later). In short, the 
consequences of an asylum policy are multi-faceted and so, to fully comprehend their 
implications, policies ought to be examined in the widest possible context. 
 
 
The Subordination of Asylum to Regulation 
 
These policies, in one way or another, have served to limit the access of asylum 
seekers and other irregular immigrants into the West and thus strengthen the regulation 
of entrance. Regulation creates a semi-permeable barrier, restricting immigration to that 
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which occurs on the West’s own terms. In the words of one commentator, these border 
controls have enabled developed nations to ‘quarantine’ the developing world and its 
‘Pandora’s box of insoluble problems... so as not to sink into its quicksands or be 
contaminated by its problems’ (Hassner 1998: 278).  
Whether these policies have actually succeeded in reducing asylum claims or 
irregular immigration is difficult to determine. Statistics show a drastic reduction in 
asylum claims in the industrialized world, dropping by half between 2001 and 2006 
(UNHCR 2006). This decline is shadowed by a reduction in the global refugee 
population: after reaching a record of over 18 million in 1992, the global refugee 
population has experienced an overall decline to 10 million refugees in 2006 (UNHCR 
2008). Yet the UNHCR has argued that the drop in asylum applications is due to a 
combination of improved conditions in some of the major countries of origin of asylum 
seekers and the West’s asylum restrictive policies (UNHCR 2006). While this is not the 
place to address this question fully,25 it is worth noting that, regardless of their effect on 
the number of asylum claimants, these policies have undoubtedly had an adverse effect 
on the quality of asylum provision for refugees, reducing the likelihood of having a 
favourable refugee status decision and curtailing their rights and benefits as residents 
within the West. The push to prohibit and discourage so-called ‘bogus asylum seekers’ 
has come at a serious cost to refugees seeking protection. This circumstantial evidence 
shows that the asylum regime has been disempowered at the expense of a more 
impenetrable regime of regulation, a clear sign that the aspiration to provide asylum has 
been subordinated to the regulation of entrance.  
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 For further discussion, see Gibney and Hansen (2003: 14–7). 
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In spite of this decline in the relative quality and quantity of asylum provision, there 
is little sign that the asylum regime is being abandoned. Western governments have 
continued to invest significant resources into the maintenance of their asylum systems, 
in spite of their political controversy. In the United Kingdom, for instance, the cost of 
social support for asylum seekers in 2000 was estimated at £835 million and, when the 
cost of refugee status determination was included, the total was closer to £2 billion 
(Gibney and Hansen 2003: 4). Certainly, Western governments are looking to reduce 
these costs, yet their very size is a testament to the strength of support for asylum 
within those nations.  
Indeed, as argued earlier, if there were any reason to believe that a liberal democratic 
government was properly abandoning its aspiration to provide asylum, it would be 
likely to offend liberal voters and lose their electoral support; to lose the support of a 
party’s own liberal members; and to attract criticism from a range of intra- and 
international normative agents. Thus, liberal democratic governments have not sought 
to abandon asylum but to adjust the balance between regulation and asylum provision, 
giving greater weight to the former at the expense of the latter’s inclusivity. By curbing 
asylum seeking, Western governments are inhibiting the circumstances that brought 
their aspirations into heightened conflict. Ideally, this greater degree of regulation will 
channel prospective asylum seekers into entrance routes that are regulated and, 
therefore, of lesser threat to the interests of citizens. This increases the prospect of a 
global asylum regime that conforms to the demands of regulation.  
Yet, even by subordinating asylum to regulation, a government is still leaving itself 
vulnerable to a liberal backlash. After all, the restriction of asylum seekers is a 
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substantial compromise to humanitarian ideals, where a refugee’s need for protection 
ought to trump all other considerations. Indeed, if all the world’s governments were to 
follow the lead of those in the West, it would become increasingly difficult for people 
to ever leave a nation in which they were endangered. In this sense, the restriction of 
asylum seekers creates a new conflict, a conflict between a government’s actions and its 
aspiration to provide asylum. The enforcement of restrictive policies will appear to 
contradict a government’s declaration of support for the state’s obligations to refugees. 
If a government wishes to avoid the fallout of its apparently ‘illiberal’ practices, it will 
have to find a way to reconcile this conflict also, to defuse the unease that its policies 
provoke amongst liberal sectors of the national community. As the investigations of the 
parliamentary debates in Canada and Australia show, political rhetoric plays an 
important role in this, framing the asylum issue in such a way that its restrictions appear 
to be justified. Precisely what justifications politicians put forward is the principal focus 
of the surveys of political rhetoric that take up Parts Two and Three of this thesis. Yet, 
before turning to these, it is necessary to introduce a sub-plot to this move towards 
restriction: the role of political ideology. 
 
 
Asylum Seeking and Political Ideology: Attitudes of the Political Left and Right 
 
Given that this is principally a study of parliamentary debates, it is important to 
consider the ramifications of ideological difference within a parliament. It can be 
expected that the political left and right, with their differences in worldview, will have 
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conflicting approaches to the politics of asylum. This is not to say that discord is going 
to be the standard: a government and its opposition, both emerging out of the liberal 
democratic political environment, are going to share far more philosophical foundations 
than they are likely to let on. Yet the egalitarian spirit of the left and the deep-founded 
conservatism of the right are likely to lead to important differences in their aspirations 
to provide asylum and regulate entrance, and the balance they strike between them. 
Since their emergence during the time of the French Revolution, the left and right 
have shown themselves to be surprisingly variable in the specific political positions that 
they have adopted. Nonetheless, stable traits can be identified (Bobbio [1994] 1996). 
The cornerstone of the political left is its support for reform toward greater equality in 
the political, economic and social spheres (Putnam 1973: 213–4; Inglehart 1977: 185). 
Because liberalism is an effective instrument for achieving this objective, the political 
left is often associated with liberal values—for instance, the contemporary left’s 
support for social and political liberty is related to its pursuit of equality in these areas 
(Rathbun 2004: 16–7). This commitment to liberalism is not a given, however; it is 
circumstantial and, as such, left-wing support for liberalism depends upon the expected 
outcomes. Communism is the clearest example of this, an instance where the left 
widely curtailed a range of freedoms to pursue economic equality, giving the left-wing 
a reputation in the twentieth century for regulation rather than liberalism. Nonetheless, 
even if the left’s association with liberalism is contingent, its commitment to equality is 
not. By this virtue, left-wing parties are naturally more inclusive than those of the right, 
morally driven to encourage equality at all levels, not just within the borders of the 
nation-state. This broader sense of political community also encourages the left to see 
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its national interests as shared amongst other members of the international community, 
making it more receptive to the notion of international society and multilateralism 
(ibid.: 18–21). In respect to asylum, therefore, one would expect left-wing parties to be 
more sympathetic to liberal egalitarian accounts of the ethical virtue of asylum, more 
receptive to humanitarian norms, and less likely to be threatened by cultural diversity 
because of its broader notion of community.  
The fundamental ambition of right-wing parties, on the other hand, is to maintain the 
existing hierarchical order (Putnam 1973: 213–4; Inglehart 1977: 185). In the social and 
political realms, this usually translates into stressing obedience to the state and, in some 
cases, the family and the church; and enforcing traditional moral norms through 
policies of tough criminal justice. Insofar as cultural diversity threatens to unseat the 
dominance of the ruling community and its traditional values, the right-wing will be the 
natural home to political unease over diversity. Additionally, members of the political 
right ‘are more likely to agree that both individuals and states respond to threats and 
punishment’ (Rathbun 2004: 22), and therefore more likely see the value of prohibitive 
regulations, even where these are punitive in nature. Finally, given that the right-wing 
generally limits its ‘conception of the national interest abroad so as to take into account 
primarily the needs of the national community’ (ibid.: 21), it is less likely to consider 
the issue of asylum in relation to the context of vast global inequality in social, 
economic and political rights.  
In sum, it can be anticipated that, in relation to the political left, the right will have a 
broader aspiration to regulate entrance because it is more sensitive toward threats to the 
status quo. Indeed, public unease over immigration has played a significant role in the 
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rise of the ‘radical right’ throughout liberal democratic states, mobilizing substantial 
minority support from more conservative voters (Norris 2005: 44–6, 166–9). These 
parties are generally defined by their support for cultural protectionism, an objective 
that they propose to advance through the repatriation of immigrants, the tightening of 
borders against ‘foreigners’, and economic protectionism (ibid.: 23–5). Norris suggests 
that there is evidence that centre-right parties in France, Austria, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway and Denmark have responded to the electoral successes of these 
minority parties by shifting their own policy platforms further toward the right (ibid.: 
263–9).26 In respect to refugees specifically, the contemporary right is likely to have a 
narrower aspiration to provide asylum because it lacks the inclination to actively pursue 
egalitarian objectives at the domestic or international levels, and is more prone to 
advocating unilateralism in the international sphere.  
Given these differences, it is tempting to wonder whether the politics of asylum will 
be waged along partisan lines, with the left opposing the right’s support for the 
restriction of asylum seekers. Yet such a prediction is clearly insufficient given that the 
move towards restriction is common to all liberal democratic nations, those governed 
by the left as well as the right. The prioritization of regulation is clearly a bipartisan 
trend but this does not shut out the possibility that the right will advocate a strong form 
of regulation while the left simply supports a weaker form. For the right, with its large 
assortment of reasons to regulate entrance and its smaller assortment of reasons to 
provide asylum, the balance can be expected to tip further towards regulation. 
                                                 
26
 As Part Three of this thesis will demonstrate, there is evidence to suggest that this occurred in 
Australia too. The centre-right Liberal Government adopted a notably more conservative position on 
cultural issues in response to the success of the radical right One Nation Party in the 1998 federal 
election. 
                   —61— 
Yet, even a cursory examination of the historical entrance policies of the left and right 
ought to make one wary of drawing assumptions that are too broad. The left and right 
vary their positions on entrance depending on how its outcomes are expected to affect 
their rudimentary ambitions of equality and conservatism respectively. Thus, the 
entrance policies of the left and right are instrumental rather than inevitable, shifting 
with the global situation rather than remaining static. Thus, it would be wrong to 
consider the regulation of entrance an intrinsically right-wing issue. Indeed, throughout 
the twentieth century, it was left-wing parties that were associated with restrictive 
immigration policies, largely due to the political influence of trade unions, traditionally 
a major lobbying influence on the left. It was feared that imported workers would 
accept lower standards of employment, flood the labour pool and depreciate wages, 
thus frustrating the trade unions’ efforts for their members (Kukathas 2003: 574; 
Higham 1988: 305–7). Right-wing parties, on the other hand, were associated with the 
deregulation of immigration, applying libertarian principles to entrance policy 
throughout the twentieth century, and encouraging the importation of foreign labour to 
undermine the demands of trade unions.  
Of course, these historical trends may have little relevance for an analysis of asylum 
policy in the twenty-first century. Certainly, recent evidence shows that trade unions in 
the United States and Britain have opposed restrictive entrance policies throughout the 
1990s because foreign-born workers have come to be a significant source of 
membership, as well as an important potential source of future members (Haus 1995; 
Avci et al. 2000). Moreover, it should be recalled that it was a left-wing Democratic 
President, Harry S. Truman, who fought off strong domestic opposition in the early 
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1950s to develop a refugee resettlement program that would dwarf those of other 
Western nations (Gibney 2004: 132–146). What the longitudinal variations in the 
entrance policies of the left and right demonstrate is the dangers of drawing broad 
assumptions about party positions on the politics of asylum, especially in an era where 
the global migration context is changing so swiftly and dramatically. Just as it is 
necessary to be mindful of oversimplifying the politics of asylum at the state level, 
there is a danger of oversimplifying party politics too. 
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2: The Politics of Asylum in Canada 
 
Part Two of this thesis is an analysis of the asylum policies and related rhetoric of 
Canada’s major political parties during the Chrétien Government, covering the period 
from late 1993 to the end of 2005. This case study will be divided into four sections. 
The first section will provide a brief historical overview of the asylum and immigration 
systems of Canada, describing the system that the Chrétien Government inherited when 
it came to power. The second section will offer a survey of the asylum policies that the 
Chrétien Government implemented through legislation and regulation before the end of 
2005. The third section will examine parliamentary debates over this period to sample 
the justifications that Liberal Government members offered for their policies. This 
section will firstly identify those remarks which reflect an aspiration to provide asylum, 
secondly identify those that reflect an aspiration to regulate entrance, and finally 
identify those that justify the balance struck between the two. The fourth section, using 
the same format as the analysis of Government rhetoric, will examine the rhetoric of the 
Opposition parties, examining their criticisms of Government policy and their own 
proposals for policy alternatives, itself a dimension of political rhetoric. 
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2.1: The Canadian Immigration Regime: A Historical 
Overview 
 
Regulation has determined the make-up of Canadian immigration flows since the 
nation’s foundations in the sixteenth century. Until the mid-twentieth century, a 
‘traditional source’ policy was used to deter the entrance of immigrants whose 
ethnicities were deemed too dissimilar to Canada’s colonial founding races: the British 
and the French (Li 2003: 18–9). Racial discrimination in entrance was abandoned only 
in the latter half of the twentieth century in response to normative and economic 
pressures. Successive Canadian governments responded to the normative objections of 
liberal organizations and interest groups inside and outside of Canada, as well as a 
concern that the traditional source policy was jeopardizing its strengthening 
relationships with governments in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean (Dirks 1995: 10). 
Most importantly, though, the traditional source policy limited Canada’s ability to meet 
its labour requirements in the prosperous post-war period where the pool of potential 
European immigrants was being rapidly absorbed into Europe’s recovering economies 
and the labour forces of other immigrant nations, the United States especially (Li 2003: 
24–5). Canada needed to look further afield for sources of labour and its racial biases 
were therefore an obstacle to its economic interests. While regulation of entrance would 
remain an aspiration of the Canadian state, it needed to be adjusted to suit the changing 
global context. 
Canadian entrance policy was liberalized throughout the 1960s by a series of 
regulatory amendments to the 1952 Immigration Act. The most significant of these was 
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the introduction of a points system in 1967 which would determine entrance on 
economic criteria alone. Immigrants would be judged on their education, age, 
occupational skills, language capabilities in English and French, and the level of 
kinship with existing Canadian residents—not their ethnicity or country of origin (Li 
2003: 22–6; Mackey 1999: 52–3; Dirks 1995: 11). This had a significant effect on the 
make-up of Canada’s immigrant intake. In the period 1956–1967, 79.1 per cent of 
immigrants arrived from Europe and Britain while only five per cent arrived from Asia. 
In the period 1968–1978, this had shifted to 44.2 per cent and 21.1 per cent 
respectively; and from 1979–2000 only 22.5 per cent of immigrants arrived from 
Europe while 53.8 per cent arrived from Asia (Li 2003: 32). Thus, racial considerations 
were eclipsed by economic concerns as the major determinant of entrance regulation.  
Another important influence in Canadian entrance policy was its self-conception as an 
intrinsically generous and tolerant society, something Mackey (1999: 24) has described 
as ‘the central foundational myth of Canadian nationhood and identity’. In large part, 
this has emerged out of Canada’s preservation of distinct British and French 
communities. Crucially, Canada’s pluralism has differentiated it from the United States, 
where immigrants were encouraged to assimilate into a unified society, allowing 
Canada to construct a national identity that was independent and distinctive from its 
powerful southern neighbour (ibid.: 30–2). In the mid-1960s, this ‘heritage of tolerance’ 
was crystallized in the centre-left Liberal Government’s adoption of a policy of 
biculturalism, a policy that was adjusted to ‘Multiculturalism within a Bilingual 
Framework’ after attracting protest from other established ethnic minorities who were 
not recognized by this dualist framework. Adopted officially on 8th October 1971 by the 
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government of Pierre Trudeau, the new policy succeeded in facilitating the social 
inclusion of Canada’s growing minority groups; undercutting the Québécois separatist 
movement by framing it as one of many cultural communities within Canada; and 
reinforcing the distinction between Canada’s cultural diversity and the United States’ 
cultural ‘melting pot’ (ibid.: 50–65).  
To reflect these changes in Canada’s sociopolitical context, the Liberal Government 
introduced the 1976 Immigration Act, described by one commentator as ‘the most 
liberal piece of legislation ever to become law in Canada’ (Dirks 1995: 14). In 
replacing the 1952 Immigration Act, this new legislation brought an official end to 
racial biases in entrance policy and, for the first time in Canada’s entrance policy, 
recognized refugees as a distinct category of immigrant. Prior to the establishment of 
this category, refugees could only enter Canada through its normal immigration 
channels, where consideration was rarely given to their special circumstances; or by ad 
hoc resettlements programmes adopted by governments to address specific refugee 
crises. With the inclusion of a formal refugee class, however, Canada had committed 
itself to a permanent programme of asylum provision (ibid.: 20–3, 280–1).  
The legislation provided guidelines for two modes of entry for refugees. The first was 
entry through official resettlement programmes where mandated refugees would be 
accepted from countries of first asylum. The second mode of entry dealt specifically 
with asylum seekers. Prior to the 1976 Immigration Act, the few asylum claims that 
were made each year were assessed by an ad hoc committee advised by the Minister of 
Immigration. The 1976 Immigration Act formalized this committee as the Refugee 
Status Advisory Committee, assigning it the role of verifying the authenticity of asylum 
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claims and avoiding the refoulement of wrongly failed refugee claimants. To reduce the 
incidence of the latter, two levels of appeal were established. First, a written appeal 
could be made to the Immigration Appeals Board. Second, an appeal could be made to 
the Federal Court if the complaint referred to matters of law or interpretation (ibid. 
1984: 285–9; 1995: 79). These generous provisions, introduced to ‘eradicate the rigid 
and uncompassionate features of former immigration programs’ (ibid.: 26), were well-
received amongst immigration-related interest groups, yet concerns were raised by 
immigration officials that such loose regulations would encourage exploitation of the 
system.  
The system’s shortcomings became quickly apparent. Drafters of the 1976 
Immigration Act had presumed that the normal route of entry would be through refugee 
resettlement programmes, anticipating no more than a few hundred asylum seekers a 
year (ibid.: 79–80). Yet Canada, like most other Western nations, experienced a steep 
rise in asylum claims in the following years: from 3,450 in 1981 to 6,100 in 1983, to 
25,000 in 1987 (Dolin et al. 2002). Within two years of operation, a backlog of refugee 
claimants developed that, despite attempts to modify the system, grew unabated over 
the following years. By 1986, the backlog was over 18,000 claimants and rose to almost 
50,000 by May 1987. Popular support dwindled so that by 1987 only 42 per cent of the 
public supported existing levels of immigration (Dirks 1995: 15, 83–9).  
Additionally, a landmark case in 1985 redefined Canada’s responsibilities towards 
asylum claimants through its so-called ‘Singh decision’. Lawyers representing a group 
of failed refugee claimants successfully argued in the Supreme Court of Canada that the 
lack of an oral appeal for Refugee Status Advisory Committee decisions was contrary 
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to the principles of fundamental justice in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, a bill of rights written into the Constitution of Canada. The Supreme Court 
concluded that the Canadian Charter was applicable to all people physically within 
Canadian territory, including refugee claimants who did not, as yet, have any formal 
status of citizenship (Dolin et al. 2002). Essentially, the domestic courts were 
pressuring the government to take an impartial approach to legal rights, in spite of 
reluctant immigration officials who feared that oral hearings would only worsen the 
asylum system’s backlog (Dirks 1995: 80). 
A watershed moment was the arrival of a boatload of Tamil refugee claimants in the 
summer of 1986, creating a surge of public anxiety. This event, combined with the 
immigration system’s continuing inefficiency, propelled the centre-right Progressive 
Conservative Government to introduce a number of changes through Bill C-55, the 
Refugee Reform Act, which came into force in 1989 (García y Grieco 1994: 127−8). 
This legislation replaced the Refugee Status Advisory Committee with the Immigration 
and Refugee Board, a quasi-judicial tribunal that had a two-tiered refugee status 
determination process. Firstly, on arrival, two officials would assess an asylum seeker’s 
eligibility for entrance into Canada, prohibiting entry to those who were found to have a 
serious criminal conviction, or had refugee status or residency in a safe third country. 
Secondly, if the asylum seeker passed this first tier, they could enter Canada to make a 
refugee status claim with the Immigration and Refugee Board. This claim would be 
assessed by a two-person panel and could only be rejected by unanimous decision.  
The Refugee Reform Act also introduced legislation that would allow the 
Government to enforce a safe third country policy for asylum claimants who had 
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lodged an appeal with the Federal Court. Thus, if an asylum claimant had arrived from 
what was deemed to be a ‘safe’ country, they would be sent back there to await the 
Federal Court’s decision. Despite opposition from the Liberal Party, the Refugee 
Reform Act was passed through the House in July 1988. Yet just days before the 
legislation came into force, the Progressive Conservative Government announced that it 
would not implement the safe third country policy (Dirks 1995: 89–94). The relevant 
legislation remained, however, and the feasibility of a safe third country policy was 
investigated several times over the following years (Lacroix 2004: 150–1). 
Finally, in regards to regulated refugee resettlement, Canada had a well-established 
programme by the early 1990s which has remained largely unchanged ever since. This 
includes a refugee resettlement programme (which generally takes about 7,500 
refugees), a programme of private-sponsored refugees (which generally takes about 
3,000 refugees), and a family reunion category for the spouses and dependants of 
refugees in Canada (which has ranged between 3,000 and 6,000 over the last decade).27 
In sum, by the time of the 1993 general election, Canadian entrance policy was fairly 
amenable to asylum seekers, with asylum claimants allowed to enter the Canadian 
community to pursue their refugee status claims provided they had passed a preliminary 
security and identity screening. This relative ease of entrance, however, compromised 
Canada’s regulatory control, allowing more asylum claims than its existing institutions 
were capable of processing swiftly and raising the prospect of the asylum system being 
used by people for whom it was not intended.  
 
                                                 
27
 Figures come from the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website, accessed on 20th April 2008: 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2006/overview/01.asp 
                   —70— 
2.2: The Asylum Policy of the Canadian Liberal Government: 1993–
2005 
 
The general election of October 1993 resulted in a spectacular defeat for the 
Progressive Conservative Government, plummeting from 169 seats in the House of 
Commons to only two. Led by Jean Chrétien, the Liberal Party won a strong majority 
Government, a position it would hold for the next thirteen years. Replacing the 
Progressive Conservative Party as the major right-wing party was the Reform Party of 
Canada, a more conservative radical right party that had been founded only six years 
earlier. It would re-invent itself twice in the period covered by this research, becoming 
the Canadian Alliance in March 2000 and the Conservative Party of Canada in 
December 2003. 
On 28th February 1995, the Liberal Government enforced a ‘right of landing fee’, a 
charge of nearly $1000 to all new applicants for permanent residency. Ostensibly, this 
policy was introduced to cover the costs of their application and thereby offset the 
overall cost of the asylum system. The policy attracted criticism from parties of the left 
and right, as well as non-governmental organizations, for its uneven impact on 
immigrants from the poorer nations. Refugees were eventually excluded from paying 
the ‘right of landing fee’ in February 2000 (Canadian Council for Refugees 2000).  
The other major policy initiative, Bill C-44, was born out of very specific events the 
year before. This legislative amendment to the Immigration Act 1976 came as a 
reaction to the shooting of Georgina ‘Vivi’ Leimonis, a twenty-three year-old female 
hairdresser, during the robbery of Toronto’s Just Desserts Café in April 1994. The 
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killing caused extraordinary outrage amongst the Canadian public, in large part because 
of the victim being young, ‘attractive’, white and middle-class. When it was discovered 
that the four perpetrators were Jamaican citizens (although all had lived in Canada since 
children) and that one was already subject to a deportation order, scrutiny swung 
towards the immigration system (Henry et al. 2000: 123–60).  
Bill C-44, commonly known as the ‘Just Desserts Bill’, restricted access to the 
asylum and immigration systems in three ways. First, the asylum claims of any 
individual convicted of a major crime28 in Canada would be rendered invalid and 
limitations would be imposed upon their access to procedures and appeals that would 
hinder their removal. Second, an individual’s asylum claim could be invalidated 
retrospectively if their criminal record came to light only after their entry decision was 
made. Third, individuals subject to security certificates would be disallowed access to 
appeals with the Immigration Appeal Division. Additionally, Bill C-44 provided 
customs officers with the right to withhold fraudulent documents that could be used to 
circumvent the provisions of the 1976 Immigration Act (Statutes of Canada 1995: ch. 
15). All these measures improved the Liberal Government’s ability to restrict the 
membership of non-citizens who had been convicted of crimes, withdrawing the means 
by which they could extend their stay. 
For the remainder of its first two terms, the Liberal Government implemented little in 
the way of asylum policy. Nonetheless, serious challenges faced the Canadian asylum 
                                                 
28
 Bill C-44 used 10 years imprisonment as a guideline for serious crime, a sentence applicable to 
murder, rape and assault. However, ministerial discretion was also in place so that any anomalies (such 
as the ten year sentence given to those convicted of writing a fraudulent cheque worth more than 
$1000) could by exempted.  
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system. Asylum claims were on the rise, from 10,059 in 1998 to 12,993 in 2000.29 
Research published in 1998 showed that it took an average of seven months for a 
refugee claimant to receive a hearing with the Immigration and Refugee Board and 
another twenty-two months for a permanent residency application to be processed 
(Renaud and Gingras 1998, cited in Lacroix 2002: 152). A 2001 report noted that the 
backlog of unheard refugee status claims at the Immigration and Refugee Board had 
risen to about 32,000. Of these claims, some 15 per cent were abandoned and, because 
Canadian border officials did not register the identities of those departing the country, 
there was no way to determine the whereabouts of these persons (Standing Senate 
Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology 2001).  
Rather than introduce piecemeal legislation to target these problems, the Liberal 
Government prepared for a major overhaul of its immigration legislation, initiating 
various investigations into prospective solutions. In 1997, the Government formed a 
three-person panel to review and report on all aspects of Canadian immigration policy. 
Another report, Not Just Numbers, was published by the House of Commons’ Standing 
Committee on Citizenship and Immigration in June 1998. The arrival of about 600 
‘boat people’ from China’s Fujian province to the coast of British Columbia in July and 
August 1999 motivated the Liberal Government to order another report, Refugee 
Protection and Border Security: Striking a Balance, published in March 2000, which 
formed the lineaments of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001.  
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 was first introduced to the House 
of Commons in the form of Bill C-31 on 1st May 2000. As well as adopting the 
                                                 
29
 Figures come from the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website, accessed on 20th April 2008: 
http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2006/overview/01.asp 
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recommendations of the Government’s reports, Bill C-31 absorbed the existing 1976 
Immigration Act and its more than thirty amendments (Li 2003: 26). The legislation 
was passed by the House of Commons on 6th June 2000 but, before it could be 
approved by the Senate, the Liberal Government called a general election and Bill C-31 
died on the Senate’s Order Paper. Upon the Liberal Government’s election for a third 
term, the legislation was re-introduced to the House of Commons in the slightly revised 
form of Bill C-11 on 26th February 2001. Bill C-11 passed through the requisite 
legislative stages and received the Royal Assent on 1st November 2001. The 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 came into force on the 28th June 2002.  
The most significant change brought by the new legislation was the reduction of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board from two persons to one. It was hoped that this would 
streamline the refugee status determination process by reducing the time and labour 
required to authenticate each claim. This measure directly targeted Canada’s 
voluminous backlog of claims.  
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 also introduced a range of 
measures aimed at deterring irregular immigration. Existing penalties for people 
smuggling were raised to a maximum one million dollar fine and/or a sentence of life in 
prison if caught smuggling ten or more people (Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act 2001: 117[3]); and provisions were introduced whereby property and proceeds 
gained through people-smuggling could be withheld by the state (Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act 2001: 130). The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 
also tightened provisions for the detention of refugee claimants whose identification 
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could not be satisfactorily ascertained (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001: 
55[2b]), a measure aimed at discouraging the smuggled rather than the smugglers.  
A large proportion of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 was simply a 
reiteration of existing legislation and regulations—for instance, retaining the provisions 
for a safe third country policy (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001: 103). 
Yet the new act also clarified and simplified much of this older legislation—especially 
the grounds for inadmissibility—so that the decision-making process was no longer 
frustrated by ambiguous legal interpretations (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
2001: 33–43). Some grounds for inadmissibility were even expanded. For instance, the 
legislation continued to allow entry to be denied to individuals who were involved in an 
organized criminal organization, but extended this definition to include those who were 
involved in people smuggling, trafficking in persons and money laundering. The 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 also allowed the inadmission or 
expulsion of those found guilty of non-compliance with its rules, a catch-all principle to 
diminish general misuse of the immigration system.  
Yet not all of the measures in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 were 
restrictive. In response to long-standing complaints by refugee advocates, the 
legislation included provisions for the creation of a Refugee Appeal Division (Dolin et 
al. 2002). As it stood, the only form of review for an Immigration and Refugee Board 
decision was through the Federal Court where, controversially, asylum claimants had to 
have the Federal Court’s permission before they could lodge an appeal. The Refugee 
Appeal Division would provide an open forum for appeals of Immigration and Refugee 
Board decisions and diminish the need to appeal to the Federal Court. The 
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Government’s inclusion of these measures was viewed as something of a trade-off by 
refugee advocates, a compensation for the harsh regulations being passed (ibid.). 
By all accounts, however, the legislation was considered a move towards restriction. 
The influential Canadian Council for Refugees (2001: 2) argued that Bill C-11’s ‘heavy 
enforcement emphasis... promotes negative stereotypes about refugees and immigrants 
and caters to xenophobia and racism within Canadian society.’ Perhaps the strongest 
sign of the Liberal Party’s partialism was the criticism it attracted from the left-wing 
minority parties, the Bloc Québécois and the New Democratic Party, both of which 
voted against the legislation for being too restrictive. Members of left-wing parties also 
accused the Liberals of pandering to right-wing sentiments;30 Bloc Québécois members 
argued that the Liberal Government was ‘reinforcing prejudice against refugees and 
immigrants.’31 Similarly, New Democratic Party members argued that by focusing on 
criminal issues within the immigration system, the Liberal Government was creating an 
atmosphere that was inimical to refugees and immigrants.32 Bloc Québécois members 
argued that the Liberal Government was relenting to the security concerns of the United 
States, responding to the comments of American officials that Canada had become a 
‘Club Med for terrorists’.33 
The right-wing Opposition, by then known as the Canadian Alliance,34 supported the 
legislation’s restrictive qualities yet voted against it for not being restrictive enough.35 
                                                 
30
 For instance, see Bloc Québécois member Bernard Bigras in Hansard (1/5/2000: 1335) and New 
Democratic Party member Judy Wasylycia-Leis (13/6/2001: 1630). 
31
 Bernard Bigras in Hansard (1/5/2000: 1335). See also Daniel Turp (1/5/2000: 1715) and Madeleine 
Dalphond-Guiral (26/2/2001: 1635; 13/6/2001: 1605). 
32
 For instance, see Judy Wasylycia-Leis in Hansard (26/2/2001: 1650–5; 13/6/2001: 1625) and Pat 
Martin (1/6/2001: 1230). 
33
 Madeleine Dalphond-Guiral in Hansard (26/2/2001: 1615). See also Pierre Paquette (4/6/2001: 1240).  
34
 In early 2000, the Reform Party of Canada, then the Official Opposition, initiated a merger with the 
remains of the Progressive Conservative Party in an attempt to create a stronger, more formidable 
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Yet the Government, which had a majority in the House of Commons, passed the 
legislation in spite of the widespread opposition. Interestingly, however, Bill C-31, the 
earlier version of the legislation, was substantially more restrictive than Bill C-11, the 
version that was ultimately adopted. The differences in these bills demonstrate that, 
while the Liberal Government had ultimately prioritized regulation over asylum, it was 
still concerned to diminish the extent to which its strengthened regulations would 
impose on refugees. The Minister of Immigration, Elinor Caplan, listed these changes 
when she introduced the more liberal Bill C-11 in February 2001,36 of which the 
following were specifically relevant to Canada’s asylum system: 
 
• Bill C-11 exempted family reunion class immigrants and refugee claimants, and the 
dependants of these individuals, from being denied entrance on the grounds that 
they might put an excessive demand on the health system. 
• Bill C-11 clarified that minors making an undocumented arrival should only be 
detained as a ‘last resort’.  
• Bill C-11 required that a ‘ministerial danger opinion’ be given to all refugee status 
applicants whose claims were denied due to their previous conviction of a serious 
crime. This provision reduced the chances of genuine refugees being denied entry 
because of an unfair or unjust conviction. 
                                                                                                                                                  
opposition party. While many Progressive Conservative members changed sides, others, objecting to 
the Reform Party’s history of social conservatism, chose to ignore the merger and remain 
representatives of the Progressive Conservative Party. Nonetheless, in recognition of this shift, the 
Reform Party changed its name to the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance or, more commonly, 
the Canadian Alliance. 
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• Bill C-11 stated that individuals refused admission into the refugee resettlement 
programme by a Canadian immigration officer would still be allowed to apply for 
refugee status from within Canada. 
• Bill C-11 reinstated oral—rather than written—hearings for appeals against the 
revocation of permanent residence status. 
• Bill C-11 allowed representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees to observe Immigration and Refugee Board hearings and participate as an 
intervener in refugee appeal cases. 
 
The attacks on the United States on 11th September 2001 occurred after the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 had passed through the House of 
Commons but before it had come into force. Given that Canada shared with the United 
States the world’s longest common border, America’s sudden sense of vulnerability had 
major political ramifications for its neighbour. This had already been demonstrated by 
Ahmed Ressam, the so-called ‘Millenium bomber’, who had been intercepted entering 
the United States from Canada on 14th December 1999 with a car full of explosives.37 
Nonetheless, in the face of strong criticism from the Opposition, the Liberal 
Government refused to introduce new legislation, maintaining that the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act 2001 was sufficiently restrictive, providing adequate grounds 
for inadmissibility and arrest, and restriction to appeal processes.38 It did, however, 
strengthen its general security policies, a move which undoubtedly had an effect on 
irregular asylum seekers. For instance, the Government doubled its funding for 
                                                 
37
 Ressam had arrived in Canada in 1994 as an asylum claimant, leaving in 1998 when his refugee status 
claim was denied. He entered Canada again in 1999 under an assumed name (Gunaratna 2002: 110–1). 
38
 See Elinor Caplan in Hansard (17/10/2001: 1420; 23/10/2001: 1040–5). 
                   —78— 
interdiction officers posted at overseas airports at the end of 2001 (Canadian Council 
for Refugees 2005: 7). These officers could prohibit passengers from boarding flights if 
their identity or their intentions seemed suspicious. While the target of this policy was 
terrorists, this policy would have undoubtedly affected asylum seekers who were 
unlikely to have a prearranged visa and may have relied on inadequate identification. 
For the most part, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 came into force 
on 28th June 2002. The part that was not enforced was the legislation relating to the 
creation of a Refugee Appeal Division. When the Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration, Denis Coderre, announced in April 2002 that the Refugee Appeal 
Division would not be enacted, the Government received enough criticism that, by late 
May, he had promised to implement it within a year. This never happened. Despite 
continuing criticism, the Refugee Appeal Division had still not been implemented when 
the Liberal Party lost control of Government in January 2006.  
In 2004, the Liberal Government finally succeeded in securing the support of their 
American counterparts for a mutual safe third country policy between Canada and the 
United States. The Safe Third Country Agreement, implemented on 29th December 
2004, meant that asylum claimants could no longer arrive from one country to make an 
asylum claim in the other. The asylum claimant would be returned to make their claim 
in the country they first entered. While Canada, consistent with global trends, 
experienced an overall decline of asylum claims after 2001, the decline of asylum 
claims made on its land border with the United States lowered drastically after the Safe 
Third Country Agreement was formalized, dropping by 51 per cent between 2004 and 
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2005 (Canadian Council for Refugees 2005: ii). As a restrictive measure, the safe third 
country policy proved itself to be enormously effective. 
The only other piece of legislation of any relevance to asylum policy was Bill C-49, 
introduced to the House on the 12th May 2005, which amended the Criminal Code to 
include human trafficking as a crime, thereby expanding the punitive abilities of the 
state. The legislation was supported by all parties, demonstrating the widespread 
disapproval of human trafficking by the liberal political community.39 
 
In sum, then, it appears that the provision of asylum, while maintained and reinforced 
by the Liberal Government of Jean Chrétien, was subordinated to the regulation of 
entrance. Over his government’s period, general border control was boosted in the wake 
of 11th September 2001, making it more difficult for asylum seekers to arrive 
irregularly. Strategies of deterrence were enforced to discourage irregular immigration, 
including increased punitive measures for people-smugglers to expanded provisions of 
detention for irregular arrivals. Measures were introduced to hasten the removal of 
certain entrants, particularly those who had arrived via a safe third country and those 
who had criminal convictions. Finally, the Liberal Government made adjustments to its 
asylum system, reducing the refugee status determination panel from two persons to 
one in order to make it more efficient. The Government’s refusal to implement its 
Refugee Appeal Division further demonstrates its reluctance to strengthen the provision 
of asylum where it might undermine its regulatory powers.  
2.3: The Rhetoric of the Canadian Liberal Government 
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The Aspiration to Provide Asylum 
 
Despite the subordination of asylum provision to the regulation of entrance in Liberal 
Government policy, the Liberals had little intention of being mistaken as hostile or even 
ambivalent toward immigration or refugees. Throughout the period covered, Liberal 
members explicitly argued that the state had an ‘obligation’40 or a ‘responsibility’41 
towards refugees. This duty was often conceived in terms of legal duty—both to 
domestic42 and international law.43 Elinor Caplan, the Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship, in differentiating the Government from the Opposition, argued that the 
Liberal Party had a respect for the law that the Canadian Alliance did not:  
 
‘We are not going to scrap the Charter [the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms]. We 
are not going to embarrass Canada internationally by ripping up the Geneva Convention. We are 
going to live up to our legal obligations and ensure that anyone who comes to us making a 
serious claim and asking for protection under our Refugee Protection Act will receive the due 
process of the law.’44 
 
Caplan’s comments also reveal her recognition of the normative pressure that lay 
behind such duties, the Government’s self-interested concern not to tarnish Canada’s 
international reputation by being seen not to respect humanitarian norms.  
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There are times, however, early on in their tenure, when Liberal Party members 
expressed a notably inclusive conception of asylum, one that clearly went beyond the 
strict demands of international law. Stan Dromisky, the Liberal Member for Thunder 
Bay–Atikokan, opposed a Reform Party motion to withdraw social welfare for failed 
refugee claimants by arguing that: 
 
‘There are some people who do not fit the strict [1951 Refugee] Convention refugee 
definition but who still deserve to have their cases examined as a humanitarian consideration. It 
would be distinctly un-Canadian to punish these people who have already experienced great 
suffering. […] We have a moral obligation to see that does not happen.’45 
 
Note that Dromisky is not only arguing that the Government has a ‘moral obligation’ 
to unsuccessful asylum seekers, he is also identifying a duty to represent the 
humanitarian concerns of the Canadian people, to refrain from acting in an inhumane or 
otherwise ‘un-Canadian’ manner. In this respect, Liberal Government members 
justified the provision of asylum by invoking aspects of the Canadian national identity, 
arguing that any digression from Canada’s traditional generosity to refugees and 
immigrants would be unacceptable to its citizens. As such, comments such as the 
following, by Elinor Caplan, were commonplace in Government rhetoric: ‘Canadians 
want a new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that… continues our tradition of 
welcoming newcomers. We must continue the humanitarian traditions of openness and 
compassion that have made this country so proud.’46  
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Not all arguments in favour of asylum relied on claims of altruism: asylum was also 
defended within a context of material self-interest. In 1995, when the nation was in the 
midst of an economic recession and thus sensitive to the financial cost of asylum 
provision, Government members defended asylum by arguing that refugees were not, 
perforce, an economic liability and ‘have contributed substantially to this economy.’47 
More generally, the Liberal Government emphasized the importance of maintaining an 
entrance policy that was liberal enough to facilitate the entrance of skilled immigrants. 
In this respect, Joseph Volpe, the Liberal Member for Eglinton–Lawrence, described 
the Canadian immigration intake as ‘self-serving generosity’.48  
In sum, Liberal Party rhetoric reflects an aspiration to provide asylum and, more 
broadly, to accept immigrants into Canada. This aspiration was supported in terms of 
rights, legal norms, morality, public support, national identity and even economic 
benefit. So, while there was a policy shift towards the restriction of asylum seekers, 
Liberal members were still boldly declaring their continued commitment to their 
obligations toward refugees. The Canadian move towards regulation is complex—it is 
not simply a self-interested rejection of liberal morals and international norms. 
 
 
 
 
The Aspiration to Regulate Entrance 
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Despite the Liberal Government’s strong rhetorical commitment to the rights of 
refugees, this commitment had its limits, a fact that is clearly demonstrated by the 
restrictive trends in Canadian asylum policy. These limits were clearly expressed in the 
rhetoric of Raymonde Falco, the Liberal Member for Laval West, during the debates 
over the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001: ‘We must not forget that, as a 
government, our first responsibility is to Canadians and to the standard of living they 
want to have.’49 This claim, which is unambiguously partialist, is at the root of the 
Liberal Government’s move towards regulation.  
The threat to the interests of Canadian citizens that was mentioned most prominently 
in parliamentary debates over entrance policy was crime committed by non-citizens. 
Liberal members argued that not only did such entrants incur unacceptable costs on the 
Canadian community, they tainted the reputation of other immigrants and refugees.50 
Related to these concerns about crime were more specific concerns regarding people-
smuggling and fraudulent asylum claims,51 as well as a growing concern over terrorism. 
In discussing such threats, Liberal members frequently qualified their remarks, 
emphasizing that the problems were caused by a minority of entrants52 and carefully 
rejecting any prima facie connection between refugees and criminality.53 This is 
illustrated in the following statement by Anna Terrana, the Liberal Member for 
Vancouver East, in defence of the regulations in the Bill C-55, the Just Desserts Bill of 
1995: 
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‘We are not a government that will punish the innocent just to get at the guilty. We have no 
intention of making people who really deserve Canada's protection pay for the actions of a small 
criminal element. […] We will fight with our every breath to prevent the word “immigrant” 
from becoming a synonym of the word “criminal”.’54 
 
Five years later, supporting the legislation that would become the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act 2001, the Liberal Government adopted a tone that was 
distinctly more restrictive. Elinor Caplan, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 
introduced Bill C-31 in 2000 as ‘a tough bill’ with ‘severe new penalties for people 
smuggling and those caught trafficking in humans.’55 Introducing Bill C-11 the 
following year, Caplan claimed that it ‘remains a tough bill’, emphasizing that it would 
be ‘tough on criminal abuse of our immigration and refugee protection systems’56 and 
‘tough on criminals, terrorists and those who are threats to our security in Canada.’57 
The legislation was explicitly described as a response to contemporary global 
challenges, such as transnational crime and the changing trends of immigration.58  
With its focus on criminal threat, the Government had a ready justification for most 
regulations. The Government could justify a controversial policy, such as tightening 
access to immigration-related appeals, by making a less controversial claim: that 
serious criminals had to be removed as quickly as possible.59 Such an argument stepped 
around the issue of diminished rights for non-citizens by focusing on the protections it 
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provided citizens. The focus on criminality, on unlawfulness, also allowed the 
Government to justify its ‘tough’ policies by arguing, as did Raymonde Falco, that ‘this 
bill perpetuates a great Canadian tradition, which is to maintain a society governed by 
the rule of law.’60  
By the time the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act legislation was being 
debated, the Government also appeared to be less sensitive to the ethical implications of 
its policies. This is illustrated in debates over how the expansion of grounds for 
deportation would affect long-time permanent residents who were eligible for 
citizenship but had not yet applied for it. During debates on the Just Desserts Bill in 
1995, for instance, Gar Knutson, the Liberal Member for Elgin–Middlesex–London, 
raised concerns over the legislation’s implications for permanent residents who were 
convicted of a serious crime: ‘Are we going to take people who have virtually lived 
here all their lives... and deport them simply because they have not become Canadian 
citizens?’61 Similarly, Harbance Singh Dhaliwal, the Liberal Member for Vancouver 
South, opposed the notion that entry should be dependent on a clean criminal record, 
citing a case where a man had been deported after he was convicted for assault: ‘Should 
we say because this person assaulted someone he should never be allowed to come to 
this country to join his wife and two children?’62 By the time of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act 2001, however, such self-reflection had disappeared from 
Government rhetoric. Steve Mahoney, the Liberal Member for Mississauga West, 
argued that if long-term permanent residents had failed to apply for citizenship, then 
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that was their own problem.63 Indeed, when the centre-right Canadian Alliance 
advanced amendments to exclude long-time permanent residents from deportation 
proceedings after acts of serious crime, Mahoney remarked, ‘Why the Opposition 
continues to foster the idea that somehow we should provide greater rights and 
protection for convicted criminals or potential terrorists in this country is truly mind-
boggling.’64 Such a statement shows the Government seizing an opportunity to position 
itself as the staunchest protector of citizen’s interests, going even further than the right-
wing Opposition to exclude unlawful non-citizens from the national community. 
 
 
A Conflict of Aspirations 
 
So how did the Liberal Government straddle its strongly stated aspirations to provide 
asylum and regulate entrance? More specifically, how did it manage the conflict that 
arose out of their incompatibility: the fact that a crackdown on irregular entrance would 
invariably result in the restriction of asylum seekers? Certainly, this incompatibility was 
not missed by the left-wing minority parties, the New Democratic Party and the Bloc 
Quebecois, both of which criticized the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 
legislation for reacting to a minority of criminal entrants and thereby imposing undue 
restrictions on other immigrants.65 Judy Wasylycia-Leis of the New Democratic Party 
even implied that the legislation amounted to a renunciation of the Liberal 
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Government’s moral traditions, arguing that ‘we are looking at probably one of the 
most restrictive and punitive pieces of legislation that parliament has seen in a long 
time. It is certainly out of character in terms of Canadians’ expectations with respect to 
Liberals in this country.’66 In short, the Government’s restriction of asylum policy put 
the Liberal Party in danger of being seen to renounce certain liberal values.  
To defuse this apparent conflict between its restrictive actions and its liberal 
aspirations, the Liberal Government employed a rhetorical frame of ‘balance’ in its first 
two terms. This is unsurprising given the position of political centrism that the Liberal 
Party inhabited. To the Liberal Party’s right were parties that put greater emphasis on 
the regulation of entrance; to its left were parties that put greater emphasis on the 
provision of asylum. The Government clearly saw some value in both positions yet it 
was out-gunned in both, unwilling to take a stance as restrictive as the right-wing 
Opposition’s or as inclusive as that of the minority parties of the left. This left the 
Government open to criticism from either direction. Anna Terrana observed of her 
party’s critics that ‘On the one side we are becoming heartless by going too far and on 
the other side we are not doing enough’.67 Consequently, Liberal members argued that 
their policy approach aimed to find a middle ground, striving to control the undesirable 
aspects of immigration without leaning excessively towards restriction.68 Sergio 
Marchi, for instance, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration between 1994 and 1996, 
proposed that ‘A balanced, realistic middle course is often the wisest course, for it takes 
us away from the rocks of extremism and reaction while steering us clear of the dead 
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waters of those who would do nothing.’69 This ‘balanced’ approach also conveniently 
reinforced the Liberal Government’s frequent boast that, ‘as everyone knows, our 
refugee determination process is one of the most generous in the world.’70 If the 
Government had advocated a major change in the direction of entrance policy, as did 
the Opposition and other minority parties, it would have amounted to an admission that 
the asylum system was not as enviable as the Government liked to suggest it was. 
This metaphor of ‘balance’ evolved in later years, culminating in the ‘front door/back 
door’ analogy that Elinor Caplan, then Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 
pioneered to support the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001: 
 
‘Closing the back door to those who would abuse our system will allow us to open the front 
door more widely, both to genuine refugees and to the immigrants Canada will need to grow and 
prosper in the future.’71 
 
This analogy made a clear rhetorical division between the means of entrance that 
were acceptable—regular immigration—and the means of entrance that were not—
irregular immigration. So while Caplan could claim to be ‘tough’ on those who 
exploited the immigration and refugee systems, the legislation ‘would not be tough on 
the immigrants and refugees who built this country in the past or who would help us 
build it in the future.’72  
Of course, in reality, no such clear division existed: this was simply a rhetorical 
device. Some genuine refugees were likely to arrive through the ‘back door’, just as 
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some undesirable entrants (such as terrorists or criminals) were likely to arrive through 
the ‘front’. Various statements by members of the Liberal Government show that they 
recognized as much. At one point, Elinor Caplan clearly rejected suggestions from the 
Opposition that an entrant’s refugee status claim was unjustified if their means of 
entrance was irregular: ‘We cannot assume that everyone who comes undocumented is 
not a genuine refugee.’73 As already mentioned, members of the Liberal Government 
also explicitly rejected any connection between refugees and criminality.  
Nonetheless, the ‘front door/back door’ analogy gives the impression of a clear 
division between regular and irregular immigration, and explicitly singles out the latter 
as a form of abuse of the asylum system. To some extent, then, the Government’s 
insistence on regulation amounted to a form of bureaucratic pride in its own efficacy. 
As Sergio Marchi remarked in 1995, ‘When drug dealers or other thugs slip through the 
cracks of the enforcement or screening net, they discredit a program that has made 
Canada the envy of the world.’74 More importantly, though, the ‘back door/front door’ 
analogy implies that irregular immigration imposes on the Government’s ability to 
facilitate the entrance of genuine refugees and skilled immigrants through regular 
routes. Thus, the analogy does more than just deflect accusations that the Government’s 
‘tough’ legislation is compromising its aspiration to provide asylum: it frames 
regulation to make it appear to be integral to the provision of asylum. This was implicit 
in the Liberal Government’s frequent claim that an orderly and regulated immigration 
system was necessary to retain public support, without which it would be impossible to 
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facilitate asylum provision or fulfil the nation’s humanitarian obligations.75 This 
somewhat circular argument ultimately rests on the premise that, to protect the interests 
of non-citizens, it is necessary to first protect the interests of citizens. The fact that all 
other parties—even the minority parties of the left76—recognized this general principle 
demonstrates its prevalence in perceptions of asylum politics. 
In sum, the Liberal Government framed the politics of asylum in such a way that the 
increasing restriction of asylum seekers appeared to be beneficial to immigration and 
refugee resettlement in Canada. The Liberal Government clearly had no desire to be 
seen as overtly hostile to asylum seekers, a point that is demonstrated by repeated 
statements of commitment to refugee obligations. Indeed, this diagnosis is reinforced 
by Liberal Government policy, particularly its moderation of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act 2001 legislation in light of strong left-wing criticism. Thus, 
rather than merely impose greater levels of regulation on entrance policy, the Liberal 
Government worked to reconcile its restrictive policy initiatives with its aspiration to 
provide asylum. 
 
 
 
2.4: The Canadian Opposition: Rhetoric and Policy Proposals  
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An Aspiration to Provide Asylum 
 
Before analysing the right-wing Opposition, it is necessary to briefly cover its 
turbulent political history between 1993 and 2005. Canada’s major right-wing party 
began as a minority party, the Reform Party of Canada, founded in 1987 by Preston 
Manning, a lay fundamentalist Baptist preacher. Its ideology was essentially ‘radical 
right’, combining populist politics with unmistakably conservative values. The Reform 
Party advocated a laissez-faire approach to the national economy, thus representing 
fiscal conservatism at a time when the centre-right Progressive Conservative 
Government was implementing relatively high levels of taxation and public spending. 
In relation to the Progressive Conservative Party, the Reform Party’s voters also had a 
more conservative stance on moral issues such as abortion and gay rights, and, to a 
lesser extent, on social issues such as immigration, Québécois separatism and crime 
(Lusztig et al. 2005).  
After the Progressive Conservative’s spectacular defeat in the 1993 general election, 
the Reform Party became the dominant right-wing party in Canadian parliament. It did 
not, however, become the Official Opposition Party: that honour went to the Bloc 
Québécois, a party dedicated to Québécois sovereignty, which had two more seats than 
the Reform Party. Because the left-leaning Bloc Québécois and centre-left Liberal 
Government were in broad ideological agreement on social and economic issues, this 
thesis will follow Reform Party rhetoric between 1993 and 1997, even though it 
technically did not hold the role of Opposition at the time. It was not until the following 
election in June 1997 that the Reform Party edged ahead of the Bloc Québécois to 
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become the Official Opposition, a role it would hold for the remainder of the period 
covered by this research. 
As it matured into a major political party, the Reform Party shrunk away from its 
radical conservatism. In part, this was a deliberate strategic move to encourage a 
merger with the remnants of Progressive Conservative Party, Canada’s historical right-
wing majority party, which never recovered from its electoral collapse in the 1993 
general election. A partial merger occurred in March 2000 and the Reform Party duly 
changed its name to the Canadian Reform Conservative Alliance or, more commonly, 
the Canadian Alliance. While many Progressive Conservative members did change 
sides, others, objecting to the Reform Party’s history of social conservatism, chose to 
carry on as representatives of the Progressive Conservative Party. A complete merger 
was achieved only in December 2003—although some high profile Progressive 
Conservatives, still uneasy with the party’s socially conservative agenda, preferred to 
cross the floor and join the Liberal Party instead. Nonetheless, the newly-formed 
Conservative Party of Canada managed to mobilize centre-right voters and ultimately 
won the January 2006 election, bringing nearly thirteen years of Liberal Government to 
an end. 
 
There can be little doubt that the right-wing Opposition, in its various manifestations, 
supported a more exclusive and impenetrable system of regulation. This is illustrated by 
the fact that it voted against all the Government’s major asylum-related legislation on 
the grounds that its policies were insufficiently restrictive.77 Nonetheless, Opposition 
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members were eager to dispel any notion that they were in any way hostile or 
ambivalent towards refugees or immigrants. Opposition members frequently affirmed 
their support for continued immigration78 and the provision of asylum.79 Their support 
for the latter was justified in terms of rights;80 Canada’s ratification of the 1951 
Refugee Convention;81 and the fact that the continued provision of asylum represented 
the will of the Canadian public, exemplified by a remark from Art Hanger, then the 
Reform Party Member for Calgary Northeast, that ‘Canadians welcome the opportunity 
to provide a new home to those who through no fault of their own are persecuted or 
displaced by political events and turmoil’.82  
Furthermore, the Opposition Party contested any insinuation that their support was 
anything other than genuine,83 vigorously opposing accusations from the left-wing 
parties that they were ‘anti-immigrant’, ‘racist’ or ‘xenophobic’.84 For instance, Art 
Hanger argued that ‘It is time to get beyond the we-are-for-immigration-but-you-are-
not rhetoric. We are all for immigration.’85 Indeed, there is no good reason to assume 
that the Opposition’s support for regulation was driven by racism or xenophobia, 
especially given that some of its members—such as Inky Mark, Gurmant Grewal, 
Rahim Jaffer and Deepak Obhrai—came from non-European backgrounds.  
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These inclusive sentiments were not merely rhetorical. Opposition members 
sometimes took the moral high ground on specific immigration issues, criticizing the 
Government for the harshness of its actions. In 1999, for instance, the Reform Party 
took the side of Dr. Sharif Karimzada, a former Afghani diplomat whose refugee status 
had been revoked and was being threatened with deportation back to Afghanistan.86 In 
another case, Deepak Obhrai, the Reform Party Member for Calgary East, lodged 
private member’s bills in October 1997 and in May 1999 to abandon the ‘right of 
landing fee’, the $1000 application fee for permanent residents that the Liberal 
Government had introduced in early 1995.87 Obhrai argued that ‘the right of landing fee 
is a discriminatory head tax which penalizes genuine refugees seeking protection in 
Canada. It is ludicrous to offer them financial assistance through resettlement on the 
one hand and then force them to go into debt in order to pay this head tax on the 
other.’88 This stance led to an unlikely coalition of the Opposition with the minority 
parties of the left89 yet the Liberal Government used its majority in the House of 
Commons to reject both of the motions. Nonetheless, the Opposition continued to 
criticize the ‘right of landing tax’ in coming years.90  
In sum, then, the Opposition clearly had an aspiration to continue providing asylum to 
refugees, an aspiration based upon the Opposition’s recognition of human rights, 
international law and the public’s support for refugees. This demonstrates that the 
Canadian centre-right was also unwilling to abandon asylum provision, despite the fact 
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that—as we are about to see—it advocated greater levels of restriction towards asylum 
seekers. 
 
 
An Aspiration to Regulate Entrance 
 
When it came to the regulation of entrance, the Opposition’s rhetoric identified a far 
broader and more urgent range of threats to Canada than did the Liberal Government’s. 
In the earlier part of the period covered by this research, the Opposition Party’s support 
for greater regulation was partly justified by economic considerations. This stance 
needs to be understood in the context of economic recession and high unemployment 
that Canada experienced from the late-1980s to mid-1990s. Opposition members 
warned that unsuccessful asylum claimants created a ‘tremendous burden to Canadian 
taxpayers’,91 and advanced a private member’s bill on 3rd March 1997 to withdraw 
social welfare benefits to those who remained in the country to appeal their 
unsuccessful claims, a motion that was rejected by all other parties.92 It was also 
suggested that the annual immigration quota be reduced to relieve pressure on the 
immigration system and limit the number of unwanted entrants.93 Advocacy for this 
latter policy evaporated with the economic upturn in the late 1990s; indeed, by 2000, 
the Opposition Party was expressing its contentment with the existing quota.94 Yet its 
members continued to emphasize the importance of regulating entrance to maximize 
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the potential economic value of immigration into Canada.95 Not only did this mean 
prioritizing entrants who were economically lucrative,96 it also meant restricting those 
whose entrance incurred costs or minimal benefits: entrants with health issues such as 
HIV infections,97 unauthorized entrants98 and ‘economic refugees’.99  
The Opposition Party shared the Liberal Government’s concerns regarding non-
citizens with criminal convictions. Generally, however, Opposition members were more 
uncompromising in their policy suggestions, suggesting, for instance, that entry for 
refugees and immigrants be made strictly conditional on a clean criminal record.100 
While the Opposition Party did insist that the immigration system’s problems were 
created by a minority of individuals,101 its members were liable to muddy the waters, 
even if inadvertently, by drawing associations that seriously misrepresented the status 
of asylum seekers. For example, during a debate on transnational crime, Leon Benoit, 
then the Reform Party Member for Lakeland, argued that ‘international drug cartels 
have targeted our refugee system as an easy mark to get their dealers on to our streets. 
Last week Vancouver police arrested 72 drug dealers, most of whom were refugee 
claimants. [emphasis added]’102 Only minutes later, Grant McNally, the Reform Party 
Member for Dewdney–Alouette, added that ‘Refugees are abusing this system and 
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dealing drugs on our streets’,103 a far broader allegation that switches the blame from 
fraudulent refugee claimants to refugees themselves.  
After 11th September 2001, the threat of criminal infiltration of the community was 
augmented by concerns about terrorism. Opposition members argued that the 
Government’s liberal entrance policy endangered the national security of Canada104 and 
increased the likelihood of Canada being used by terrorists as a way-point for attacking 
the United States.105 This latter threat, the Opposition Party warned, had major 
economic ramifications because any tightening of the United States-Canada border 
would impede the vast commercial trade between their economies.106 As such, the 
Opposition proposed a continental security perimeter, advanced as a motion on 23rd 
October 2001. This policy would be comprised of a safe third country policy that 
rejected asylum applications from individuals who had come from or passed through 
the United States and member states of the European Union;107 a policy of mandatory 
detention for all undocumented arrivals;108 the transformation of Canadian customs 
from a tax collection agency to a law enforcement agency;109 and the enhancement of 
traditional border control capabilities, including the securitization immigration and 
customs officials.110 These measures, the Opposition argued, would allow full 
                                                 
103
 Hansard (21/10/1998: 1435).  
104
 See Stockwell Day in Hansard (17/9/2001: 1040–50). 
105
 For instance, see Gary Lunn in Hansard (1/6/2000: 1600), Paul Forseth (23/10/2001: 1445), Vic 
Toews (23/10/2001: 1510), David Anderson (23/10/2001: 1515), Ted White (23/10/2001: 1705), 
John Reynolds (29/4/2002: 1415) and Val Meredith (7/11/2002: 1445).  
106
 For instance, see Stockwell Day in Hansard (23/10/2001: 1005) and Charlie Penson (23/10/2001: 
1600–10).  
107
 For instance, see Stockwell Day in Hansard (23/10/2001: 1010), Lynne Yelich (23/10/2001: 1450) 
and Chuck Cadman (23/10/2001: 1340). 
108
 For instance, see Stockwell Day in Hansard (23/10/2001: 1010), Chuck Cadman (23/10/2001: 1340) 
and Paul Forseth (23/10/2001: 1220).  
109
 See Stockwell Day in Hansard (23/10/2001: 1010).  
110
 See ibid. (23/10/2001: 1010, 1035) and Paul Forseth (23/10/2001: 1225).  
                   —98— 
regulation of entrance into the country and thus boost Canadian sovereignty.111 While 
the Opposition Party Leader, Stockwell Day, was careful not to suggest that all refugee 
claimants were terrorists’,112 he nonetheless indirectly associated the asylum system 
with the entrance of terrorists, describing the ‘common modus operandi’ for terrorists 
as this: 
 
‘[F]irst they would claim refugee status, allowing the claimant to remain in Canada while 
their case worked its way through the system, which as we all know can take years. Then they 
would apply for benefits in Canada, welfare and health cards that provided an income stream 
while they got established. Next they would link with other criminals and terrorists to commit 
petty theft, economic fraud and other supposedly invisible crime. Then they would launder the 
money through legitimate businesses which then could be used to finance terrorist operations in 
Canada or abroad.’113 
 
Thus, while Day denied that refugee status claimants were typically terrorists, he did 
imply that the typical terrorist was a refugee status claimant, and thereby drew a strong 
link between terrorism and asylum seeking.  
On the issue of national culture, the Opposition took a position that was wholly 
independent from the Government’s pluralism, openly questioning the merits of 
multiculturalism. Inky Mark, for instance, advocating the importance of integration, 
remarked that ‘We should always see ourselves as Canadians first before our country of 
origin. Otherwise we will become a patchwork of ethnic communities, which will 
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weaken our resolve as a nation.’114 As such, Opposition members were critical of the 
apparent ease with which membership to the Canadian community could be gained; 
they spoke of citizenship as a ‘privilege’, as something that ‘should not be given out 
lightly.’115 In providing a context for their criticisms of contemporary immigration, 
reconciling this with Canada’s identity as an immigrant nation, Opposition members 
were apt to mythologize Canada’s past, speaking of historical immigration as free of 
crime and controversy.116 
Opposition members also criticized legal institutions and legal norms as a constraint 
on the nation’s ability to regulate entrance. Domestic legal institutions were singled out 
for criticism—for instance, the Canadian Courts were attacked for their leniency toward 
non-citizens.117 The Immigration Refugee Board was also targeted, with the Opposition 
even introducing a private member’s bill in May 1996 to propose that it be 
disbanded.118 In part, this position was justified by the argument that the Immigration 
Refugee Board applied an excessively broad interpretation of the refugee definition, an 
interpretation that went beyond what the 1951 Refugee Convention definition required 
of them.119 The leniency of legal institutions was blamed on ‘special interests from the 
immigration industry, [who were] perpetuating a system which drains public moneys 
for its own gain’,120 a thinly veiled reference to lawyers and firms that worked on 
immigration-related cases and appeals.  
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Criticism was also directed at domestic legal norms—in particular, the Government’s 
commitment to the Singh decision, which afforded non-citizens and citizens equal 
consideration under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.121 Referring to the 
clause in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act legislation that affirmed the 
Canadian Charter’s full relevance to unauthorized entrants into Canada, Gary Lunn, the 
Canadian Alliance Member for Saanich–Gulf Islands, argued that ‘It is an utter disgrace 
and an abuse of power… They could be convicted criminals, terrorists, or queue 
jumpers.’122 In respect to international norms, the Leader of the Opposition, Stockwell 
Day, complained that the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001 legislation’s 
commitment to offer safe haven to all individuals under threat of persecution was too 
expansive and would impede the removal of ‘undesirables’, among whom he listed 
‘international terrorists, murderers, members of organized crime, sex offenders and 
child abusers.’123  
Yet the Opposition Party was not always resisting legal norms—these norms were 
also used to justify the regulation of entrance. Opposition members argued that, by 
giving non-citizens equal rights of appeal in accordance with the Singh decision, 
Canada was operating outside of international norms.124 In support of a safe third 
country policy, Opposition members argued that such a policy was consistent with the 
norms of other liberal democratic nations,125 as well as being permissible within the 
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guidelines of the United Nations.126 Opposition members even argued in favour of a 
more stringent application of the United Nations’ refugee definition, arguing that it 
would reduce the number of people that were presently accepted by the Canadian legal 
system.127  
The Opposition Party also blamed the immigration system’s faults on the prevalence 
of liberal idealism in political decision-making, using asylum policy as part of a broader 
ideological dispute between the major parties. Referring to the 1976 Immigration Act, 
Jim Hart, the Reform Party Member for Okanagan–Similkameen–Merritt, remarked 
that ‘Since that Liberal heyday of the seventies when Trudeau and his obedient officials 
opened the floodgates to immigration—based not on the needs of the country, not on 
selectivity or high standards, but on some seemingly intangible set of feel good 
principles—Canada has been on a backward slide.’128 In the wake of 11 September 
2001, the Leader of the Opposition, Stockwell Day, identified the immigration system 
as a threat to Canadian national security, concluding that a fundamental cause of its 
laxity was ‘the federal Liberal notion that all people are basically good and that there 
are no mean and nasty people out there.’129 Thus, the Opposition assumed for itself the 
more ‘realistic’ perception of security issues and, in doing so, categorized the 
Government’s idealism as dangerously naive.  
In relation to the Liberal Government, then, the Opposition Party identified a wider 
and more urgent range of threats to Canadian interests under the existing system of 
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regulation, identifying threats to the economy, cultural community, national security 
and the asylum system.  
 
 
A Conflict of Aspirations 
 
Overall, then the policy proposals and rhetoric of the right-wing Opposition was 
distinctly more restrictive than the Liberal Party’s. Nonetheless, with its strong 
commitment to the continued provision of asylum, the Opposition was not so different 
from the Government insofar as it had the same dual aspirations to regulate entrance 
and provide asylum. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, Opposition rhetoric was sometimes 
indistinguishable from the Government’s—consider, for example, this remark by 
Gurmant Grewal, the Canadian Alliance Member for Surrey Central, that ‘The system 
should work for the legitimate, genuine people who want to come to Canada, not for 
those who are criminals or who would enter through the back door and abuse the 
system.’130 In discussing the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act legislation, Leon 
Benoit, the Opposition Critic for Citizenship and Immigration, expressed his approval 
of the Government’s objective of ‘closing the backdoor to open the front door’, even 
suggesting that the tough stance embodied by Bill C-31 ‘sounds a lot like the message 
that the Canadian Alliance Party has been presenting for some time now.’131 The 
Opposition’s refusal to vote in favour of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
legislation was an expression of dissatisfaction with the legislation rather than an 
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outright objection to its goals, a symbolic gesture that ultimately posed no significant 
political obstacle to its transition into law. 
In support of a more regulated system of entrance, Opposition members advocated a 
variety of potential policy measures: a system of safe third country policies with other 
developed nations, to be enforced unilaterally if necessary;132 the mandatory detention 
of entrants until their identities and refugee status were determined;133 the hasty 
removal of asylum claimants whose applications were unsuccessful;134 and a more 
coordinated, multilateral solution to the problem of international organized crime.135 
Opposition members also argued that, just as records were kept on the identities of 
arrivals into the country, records should be kept on those that had departed,136 a 
measure that would help to determine how many asylum claimants, whose whereabouts 
were unknown, were still within the country. Among the other proposals was the 
suggestion of Ken Epp, the Canadian Alliance Member for Edmonton–Sherwood Park, 
that propaganda be used to dissuade illegal immigrants from attempting to reach 
Canada;137 and the suggestion by Rob Anders, the Canadian Alliance Member for 
Calgary West, that a bond be posted by temporary entrants that would be forfeited if he 
or she failed to leave in accordance with their permit.138 Finally, the Opposition argued 
that an impenetrable system of regulation was important for the deterrent effect it had 
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on unwanted entrants. Members argued that a lax entrance policy served to encourage 
further abuse of immigration systems.139 
Not only was the Opposition more restrictive in its policy proposals, it was also less 
compromising in their enforcement. On the issue of a safe third country policy with the 
United States, for instance, Diane Ablonczy, the Canadian Alliance Member for 
Calgary–Nose Hill, advocated its unilateral enforcement. When the Liberal 
Government claimed to be engaged in ongoing bilateral negotiations,140 Ablonczy 
remarked that, ‘as a sovereign country… it is up to us who we decide to let across our 
border. It is not up to us to beg the United States to let us refuse refugee claimants from 
its country.’141 
From the perspective of this thesis, however, the most interesting aspect of 
Opposition policy was its frequent and continued insistence that it would prefer to 
resettle mandated refugees from countries of first asylum rather than providing asylum 
to individuals who had applied from within Canadian territory.142 This policy 
prescription appears to emerge from a set of political calculations that are similar to 
those of the Liberal Government. Like Liberal members, Opposition politicians argued 
that the misuse of the asylum system diminished public support for refugee 
resettlement,143 thus a more effective system of regulation would create a more 
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favourable public attitude for continued asylum provision. This was implicitly tied to 
the Opposition Party’s appeals to populism, its claims that support for regulation was 
representative of the will of the Canadian people.144 The logical conclusion to this 
argumentation is that, if a government decided not to recognize asylum claims on its 
territory it would be free to impose whatever regulations it deemed necessary; yet it 
would also be free to administer a programme of resettlement for mandated refugees 
that conformed to the demands of regulation and thus enjoyed wide public support. The 
aspiration to regulate entrance would be fully satisfied, and the aspiration to provide 
asylum would be satisfied by a controlled programme of refugee resettlement. This is a 
leap that the Liberal Government never quite made, yet it is implicit nonetheless in the 
policies it enforced to tighten Canada’s borders against irregular immigration.  
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3: The Politics of Asylum in Australia 
 
This survey of the asylum policies and related rhetoric of the major political parties 
during the Howard Government will take the same structure as the preceding survey of 
Canadian policy. Firstly, it will begin with a historical overview of Australia’s asylum 
and immigration systems, then survey the asylum policies that the Howard Government 
implemented through legislation and regulation between 1996 and the end of 2005. The 
third and four sections will be surveys of the rhetoric of the Liberal Party of Australia 
and the Australian Labor Party respectively, identifying each party’s aspiration to 
provide asylum, its aspiration to regulate entrance, and its justifications for the balance 
struck between the two.  
 
 
3.1: The Australian Immigration Regime: A Historical 
Overview 
 
The origins of Australia’s refugee resettlement schemes can be found in the Displaced 
Persons Program that operated between 1947 and 1953. In the post-war period, 
Australia aspired to boost its population to meet two immigration objectives: first, to 
satisfy the labour requirements of a prosperous post-war economy and, second, to 
provide a form of defence from its populous Asian neighbours. The slogan ‘populate or 
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perish’ was used successfully by Joseph Chifley’s Labor Government (1945–1949) to 
capture the issue’s political urgency and its pertinence to Australia’s national interests 
(Grattan 1993: 128–9). To address these primary concerns, the Labor Government 
resettled thousands of people from European refugee camps, a policy which coincided 
with the subsidiary concern of fulfilling Australia’s humanitarian obligations. An 
essential part of the Displaced Person’s Program was a mandatory two-year work 
contract as a labourer in a prescribed location, notably the Snowy Mountains 
Hydroelectric Scheme. Given its clear benefits to the Australian nation, the Displaced 
Person’s Program attracted little public controversy (Kabala 1993: 16–7).  
In the following decades, successive governments accepted refugees in an ad hoc 
fashion, responding to major refugee crises when they occurred and political 
circumstances demanded it. These included Hungarian refugees in 1956 and again in 
1972, Czechoslovakians in 1968, Russian Christians from China, and Jews from the 
Soviet Union (Jupp 2002: 180). The sum of this resettlement was vast, accounting for 
250,000 refugees by 1960; but preferential selection meant that refugees were only 
admitted if they were of an ‘acceptable’ ethnicity and sufficient economic utility 
(Neumann 2004: 36–7). 
In the 1970s, however, the Australian government was presented with a very different 
situation. Insecurity within the South East Asian region led to refugees pouring out of 
Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia into camps in neighbouring countries and, eventually, 
across the Torres Strait to the Australian coastline. Unlike other refugees, who arrived 
through official routes from faraway places, these refugees were arriving, unannounced, 
directly onto Australian territory. The arrival of these so-called ‘boat-people’ was met 
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with great controversy in Australia, stimulating latent fears about an imminent invasion 
from the north. Gough Whitlam’s Labor Government (1972–1975) was unsympathetic 
toward refugees escaping South Vietnam, concerned about the political effects of an 
influx of emotional anti-communists who were ideologically disposed against their 
government (Grattan 1993: 130–1; Mares 2001: 67). The Liberal Government of 
Malcolm Fraser (1975–1983) took a more proactive approach, spearheading discussions 
with the UNHCR and the United States that led to the development of an ‘orderly 
departure program’ with Vietnam in 1979. The programme’s ambition was to reduce 
irregular immigration by providing refugees with official avenues to gain asylum in the 
West.  
The strategy worked. By 1981, the stream of boats arriving had dried up and some 
50,000 Indochinese had been relocated to Australia through official channels (Gibney 
2004: 179). The Labor Party, which had initially sided with Australian trade unions to 
oppose the programme, abandoned this position in 1980 and gave the Liberal 
Government its support (Rubenstein 1993: 148–9). Thus, the programme was 
maintained and a quota was established to resettle some 10,000 refugees annually, 
many of whom were accepted on the grounds of pre-existing connections within 
Australia or sponsorship by relatives. Most of these came from Indochina although 
there were also entrants from other troubled nations, significantly Lebanon, Chile, and 
Yugoslavia. Additionally, a Special Assistance Category was created in 1991 to 
accommodate the claims of people who did not meet existing criteria but were in great 
enough danger to warrant special consideration by the Immigration Minister (Stevens 
2002: 867). Thus, between 1945 and the early 1990s, more than half a million refugees 
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and displaced persons had been accepted into Australia, including some 137,000 Indo-
Chinese refugees (Robinson 1998, cited in Gibney 2004: 166). 
Yet the arrival of nine boatloads of Cambodian, Chinese and Vietnamese nationals on 
Australia’s northern coast between November 1989 and December 1991, most of whom 
claimed refugee status, tested the tolerance of political authorities. Given that the 
orderly departure program and the subsequent resettlement quotas were supposed to 
have solved this problem, their arrival was not welcome to the public or politicians. 
Furthermore, it complicated the Cambodian peace process in which Australia was then 
involved, one aspect of which was the repatriation of Cambodians from Thai refugee 
camps (Stevens 2002: 876). Paul Keating’s Labor Government (1991–1996) decided to 
take a tough stance on irregular immigration in the hope of discouraging further arrivals 
(Grattan 1993: 135–6). Up until this point, asylum claimants were typically lodged in 
open migrant hostels while they waited for their refugee status claims to be 
determined.145 Penal detention was only ever been enforced on those whose identities 
could not be ascertained or those who were being deported (Jupp 2002: 189). But this 
situation was abandoned in 1992 when fifteen Cambodian asylum claimants, detained 
for almost two years because of their uncertain identity, attempted to acquire bail 
through the Federal Court. In response, the Labour government introduced a policy of 
mandatory detention for all asylum claimants, enforcing it retrospectively to include the 
bail applicants. The relevant legislation, the Migration Amendment Act 1992, stated 
that ‘it is in the national interest that each non-citizen who is a designated person 
should be kept in custody until he or she leaves Australia or is given an entry permit’ 
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[emphasis added] (s. 54J, cited in Cronin 1993: 101). As such, an asylum seeker would 
be detained until their refugee status had been approved or they left the country. From 
here on in, detention was the norm for any asylum seeker arriving without 
authorization. 
Other considerations have had an important influence on Australian entrance policy. 
The adoption of economic rationalism in policymaking by the Liberal Government in 
the late 1970s encouraged the regulation of immigration to facilitate the entrance of 
skilled immigrants. While economic considerations had long dominated Australian 
entrance policy, responding specifically to labour shortages and surpluses, this new 
attitude introduced neo-liberal ideals to entrance policy. The major features of this 
policy were isolating the immigration system from the influence of special interest 
groups, especially ethnic lobby groups; introducing ‘user-pays’ principles to the 
immigration system; and enhancing the economic benefits of immigration by 
employing strict preferential selection criteria and withdrawing forms of social welfare 
to non-citizens (Jupp 2004: 141–61).  
Another principle that emerged in the 1970s, but embraced as unequivocally, was the 
principle of multiculturalism. This notion was first introduced in the 1970s as an 
alternative to the long-held ‘traditional source’ policy that had regulated Australian 
immigration in accordance to an ideal of replicating British culture. Thus, if immigrants 
from Britain could not meet labour demands, preference was then given to those from 
ethnically similar European nations. The policy was implemented by a dictation test, 
the rumour of which discouraged most non-Europeans from attempting to immigrate; 
and the refusal to officially naturalize any immigrants of non-European descent (Jupp 
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2002: 8–9). These practices—in addition to the neglect and forced assimilation of the 
Aboriginal population—came to be known as the White Australia policy. Whitlam’s 
Labor Government officially abandoned this policy in 1972, paving the way for a 
broader conception of Australian culture (Grattan 1993: 129–31). It was left to the 
following administration, Malcolm Fraser’s Liberal Government, to introduce 
multiculturalism in 1977 by way of an Australian Ethnic Affairs Council report. The 
approach was tagged ‘cultural pluralism’ and defined thus: ‘What we believe Australia 
should be working towards is not a oneness, but a unity, not a similarity, but a 
composite, not a melting pot but a voluntary bond of dissimilar people sharing a 
common political and institutional structure.’ (cited in Jupp 2002: 86). In 1979, the 
Australian Institute of Multicultural Affairs was established to promote the new agenda. 
Yet, with the departure of Fraser in 1983, conservative discontent over the notion of 
multiculturalism blossomed in the Liberal Party, thwarting any attempts to solidify it 
into legislation. Two very public controversies served to inflame the issue further. The 
first involved Professor Geoffrey Blainey, a historian and public commentator, who 
famously decried Asian immigration and multiculturalism in 1984 and, in the process, 
catalysed conservates, bringing about their resurgence in the public arena (Rubenstein 
1993: 151–2). The second involved then-Liberal leader John Howard who broke with 
official bipartisan consensus over multiculturalism in his speech to the party in 1988. 
He criticized Asian immigration and advocated a One Australia policy, an 
assimilationist notion that demanded loyalty to Australian traditions and values over 
any other. The media treated his stance unfavourably and Howard’s support dropped 
swiftly in the polls, precipitating his replacement as Leader the following year 
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(Rubenstein 1993: 152–5). Nonetheless, the conservative critique of multiculturalism 
persisted in the public arena, albeit less vociferously, demanding an Australian culture 
that was homogenous and built upon shared values. For its part, the Labor Government, 
under Bob Hawke and Paul Keating, resisted such sentiments throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, emphasizing the importance of pluralist national values in their official policy 
formulations (Jupp 2002: 110–3). 
Finally, Australian entrance policy has also been influenced by the principle of 
bipartisanship that exists between the two major parties on immigration issues. 
Following the Labor Government’s defeat in 1975, the succeeding Liberal Government 
continued with a very similar approach in respect to immigration, boosting the annual 
quota and distancing the nation from the legacy of the White Australia policy. The 
Australian Labor Party, for its part, lodged its support for the Liberals’ entrance policy, 
raising only mild objections to the high immigration intake for the pressure it put on the 
unemployed (Grattan 1993: 131). By 1981, bipartisanship was formalized as an official 
policy for both parties and since then it has been a norm that is expected of one another 
(McAllister 1993). 
In sum, then, Australia has a history of substantial asylum provision. Strategic and 
economic self-interest has had a significant role in motivating the provision of asylum 
and, perhaps, can help to account for its notable scale. Yet Australia has also 
demonstrated its strong willingness to regulate entrance, to enforce a traditional source 
policy through its White Australia policy and, in the 1990s, to enforce a policy of 
mandatory detention for asylum claimants. 
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3.2: The Asylum Policy of the Australian Liberal Government: 
1996–2005 
 
John Howard returned to the Liberal Party leadership in early 1995 and won the 
general election of March 1996, forming a majority coalition in the House of 
Representatives with the conservative National Party of Australia. The Australian 
Labor Party, after thirteen years in power, took its place in Opposition, the role of Party 
Leader assumed by Kim Beazley. Labor’s representation in the Senate, however, was 
comparatively stronger, so much so that the Government could be overpowered in the 
Senate if the Australian Labor Party could win the support of senators from the 
Democratic Party and the Green Party, and the two independents, Brian Harradine and 
Mal Colston. This put limits on the Liberal Government’s legislative powers: no new 
legislation could be adopted without Senate approval. In such cases, the Government 
could abandon the bill, revise it, or, if the bill was blocked repeatedly, the Government 
could call for a double dissolution, requiring the re-election of both the Senate and the 
House of Representatives. 
During the Liberal Government’s first term, the number of irregular arrivals by boat 
was minimal. Between 1995 and 1998, a total of 1,434 people arrived by boat, mostly 
Chinese and Sino-Vietnamese, of which 170 were accepted as refugees and 1,246 were 
expelled (Manne 2004: 5). Nonetheless, in June 1996, the newly-appointed Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Phillip Ruddock, singled out the asylum system 
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as an area of likely reform, particularly the judicial review of immigration-related 
decisions.146 
The following year, policies were introduced to address these issues on three fronts. 
The first sought to regulate the migration advice industry, reining in legal advisors who 
were encouraging immigrants to lodge an appeal if their initial applications had failed 
or their permits had expired—even if the appeal had little chance of being 
recognized.147 The legislation was passed with Opposition support.148  
The second involved the outsourcing of management for Australian detention 
facilities, a role that had previously been the Government’s. Control was handed over to 
Australasian Correctional Management, a private company owned by the Wackenhut 
Corporation. This move was consistent with the Government’s commitment to 
economic rationalism and, in particular, its ambition to cut public costs.149 
The third legislative solution was the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 4) 
1997, introduced to Parliament on 25th June 1997. The major goal of the legislation was 
to make the immigration system more efficient by limiting opportunities for judicial 
review. Most significantly, the two-tiered procedure of review for immigration 
decisions was reduced to a single review by an independent body. On asylum policy 
specifically, a $1,000 fee was introduced for refugee status claimants who appealed 
their decisions and failed, a means of discouraging individuals from lodging false 
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claims to extend their stay. This punitive measure was criticized by a range of non-
governmental organizations, ethnic lobby groups and refugee advocates.150 Finally, 
Ruddock announced the Liberal Government’s plans to withdraw the right of judicial 
review for immigration cases entirely—including appeals on humanitarian and refugee 
grounds.151 The Shadow Minister for Immigration, Martin Ferguson, announced that 
the Australian Labor Party would support the legislation that was on the table, citing the 
Opposition’s commitment to bipartisanship in immigration matters;152 yet, on the 
possibility of a future withdrawal of judicial reviews, Ferguson warned, ‘We oppose the 
wholesale elimination of judicial review as wrong in principle and the thin edge of the 
wedge for other administrative review matters—that, to the Labor Opposition, is 
exceptionally important.’153 
Despite this warning, the Liberal Government developed its Migration Legislation 
Amendment (Judicial Review) Bill 1998, bypassing the House of Representatives and 
delivering it directly to the Senate on 2nd December 1998. This legislation sought to 
withdraw the right to judicial review for immigration-related appeals. The Australian 
Labor Party opposed the bill on the grounds that it was constitutionally questionable, 
undermined the role of the Courts, and possibly breached international obligations to 
provide equal access to legal institutions. Support from other senators outside the Labor 
Party was mobilized and the Opposition coalition overpowered the Government, 
rejecting the new legislation. Con Sciacca, the new Shadow Minister for Immigration 
(1998–2001), remarked that ‘the Opposition is in agreement with the Government that 
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something has to be done to stop the rorting of the system by unscrupulous lawyers and 
migration agents… [but] taking away the right to judicial review was not the sensible 
and correct course of action.’ (Bills Digest 1998).154  
The salience of the asylum issue, in spite of the relatively small numbers of asylum 
seekers, was reinforced by the parliamentary presence of the radical right, One Nation 
Party.155 One Nation was created around Pauline Hanson, the Member for Oxley, who 
had won the electorate as an independent in 1996.156 Typical of radical right parties, 
One Nation was populist, nationalist and hostile to immigration, advocating a ‘zero net’ 
policy that would only allow enough immigrants to keep the general population stable. 
She denounced the principle of multiculturalism unequivocally, claiming, ‘It is not for 
us to change, but for them to assimilate.’157 On the issue of racism, an accusation which 
Hanson was often denying, Jupp (2002: 138) has described One Nation as ‘not overtly 
racist, [yet] much of its appeal was to racist sentiments.’ In regard to the provision of 
asylum, however, even One Nation lodged its commitment: ‘Compassion must be 
extended to genuine refugees but temporary refuge need not extend to long-term 
permanent settlement in Australia’ (One Nation 1998). While it recognized a need for 
asylum provision, it limited this to ‘temporary refuge’, a principle which would allow it 
greater regulatory control over membership to the Australian national community (and 
a principle which, as we shall see, was later adopted by the Liberal Party).  
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The Liberal Party advanced on this conservative constituency after One Nation’s 
surprise success in the 1998 Queensland state elections where it took nearly 23 per cent 
of the vote. In the lead-up to the general election, the Liberal Government took a 
stronger line on immigration and Aboriginal issues and succeeded in absorbing most of 
One Nation’s electoral support. As a result, Pauline Hanson was knocked out of 
Parliament, One Nation was left only with its one Senate seat, and the Liberal Party 
retained its hold on government. Yet, while its parliamentary presence was brief, its 
political effects have been more substantial. Jupp (2002: 139) has argued that the 
popularity of One Nation legitimized a conservative reactionary view within Australian 
society that was nationalist, assimilationist, anti-intellectual and prevalent enough to 
secure valuable parliamentary seats: ‘[One Nation] created the belief that there was a 
large constituency of “Aussie battlers” whose prejudices had to be treated seriously’ 
(ibid.). 
 
During the Liberal Government’s second term (1998–2001), a new wave of asylum 
seekers began arriving on Australia’s northern coastline that was much larger than 
before. Between July 1999 and February 2000, there were 3,484 unauthorized arrivals 
by boat and another 1,148 by air.158 While not all of these arrivals claimed asylum, the 
Government still received 2,032 asylum applications in the period from January 1999 to 
the end of February 2000.159 The other notable feature of these asylum seekers were 
their origins. Some 57 per cent were Iraqis, 32 per cent Afghani and the rest mainly 
Iranian, Sri Lankan, Turkish, Kuwaiti, Bangladeshi, Somali and Algerian asylum 
                                                 
158
 Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs figures, cited in Hansard 
(9/5/2000: 16110). 
159
 Ibid. (9/5/2000: 16113). 
                   —118— 
seekers.160 This was a huge shift from the largely South East Asian asylum seekers of 
the past. Furthermore, the majority of these asylum seekers were successful in their 
claims of refugee status which, Ruddock remarked, made them ‘unlike those we have 
seen before who have not been able to sustain asylum claims’.161  
The first adjustment to asylum policy after the 1998 election was to strengthen 
traditional border control capabilities. Working from the recommendations of the 
Coastal Surveillance Task Force report, the Border Protection Legislation Amendment 
Act 1999, introduced on 22nd September 1999, announced a $124 million package, 
delivered over four years, to boost the resources of Australia’s coastal surveillance 
facility, the Coastwatch, and increase the powers of Customs officers.162 The legislation 
received Opposition support. 
Yet, with the number of irregular arrivals growing rapidly, the Liberal Government 
announced on October 13th 1999 that it would enforce a number of markedly restrictive 
policy measures, implemented through regulation rather than legislation.163 The first 
was the introduction of a safe third country policy. Henceforth, asylum applications 
would not be accepted from any person who had arrived from a country where they 
were not thought to be in immediate danger. The second measure provided legislation 
for gathering fingerprints and other biometric data, such as DNA testing, face, palm or 
retinal recognition and voice testing, to ascertain the identity of the asylum seeker. The 
third measure was the introduction of the temporary protection visa, a policy that had 
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been at the core of One Nation Party proposals (Jupp 2002: 192). Thus, once a refugee 
status claim had been accepted, the claimant would be given a three year entrance 
permit and, once this period had passed, their circumstances would be reassessed and 
they would be either removed or given a new temporary protection visa. While these 
measures were introduced through regulations and so did not need parliamentary 
support, the Labor Opposition nonetheless announced that it was in favour of the 
Government’s policies,164 smoothing out some minor quibbles through bipartisan 
discussions.165 
The Labor Opposition continued to support Liberal Government policy in the 
following months, expressing its approval of the Government’s restrictions on the rights 
of temporary protection visa-holders to choose where they would live;166 and the 
Government’s novel initiative of disseminating videos throughout the Middle East that 
depicted the route of irregular migration to Australia as extremely hazardous, populated 
by snakes, crocodiles and sharks (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 2000).  
The Labor Party also, by and large, supported the Government’s administration of the 
mandatory detention policy, even in the face of growing public controversy.167 By the 
end of the decade, Australia’s detention facilities and its refugee status determination 
systems were straining to contain the large numbers of recent asylum claimants. To 
accommodate new detainees, extra facilities were constructed, most notoriously the 
detention centre in Woomera, South Australia. Opened in November 1999 (Jupp 2002: 
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194), Woomera came to be a focal point for public consternation over detention. Yet 
the overcrowding of facilities was more easily solved than the growing symptoms of 
unrest: riots, escapes, hunger strikes and other forms of protest. In response, the Liberal 
Government introduced the Migration Legislation Amendment (Immigration 
Detainees) Act 2001 on 27th June 2001, which allowed officers to perform strip 
searches on all detainees—men and women, including those as young as ten years old. 
The Government argued that this policy was required to combat the concealment of 
weapons in detention centres. Initially, the Labor Party rejected the initial bill; yet, 
when the Government adopted Opposition amendments that further specified the 
grounds of suspicion, the Opposition gave its support for the legislation.168  
Only on one issue did the Labor Opposition refuse to acquiesce to the principle of 
bipartisanship: the withdrawal of judicial reviews. On 14th March 2000, Philip Ruddock 
introduced the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2000 which would have 
prevented class actions in the Federal and the High Court, and introduced absolute time 
limits for High Court appeal applications. The Australian Labor Party opposed the 
legislation169 and the Liberal Government, who could not pass it through the Senate 
without Opposition support, abandoned the bill. 
By 2001, with asylum seekers still arriving in substantial numbers, it was clear that 
the Liberal Government’s policies were failing to control entrance. This put the Liberal 
Party in an awkward situation with a general election due that year. Already trailing in 
the polls due to its unpopular goods and services tax (Jupp 2002: 37), the Liberals were 
forced to look for new solutions. In March 2001, Philip Ruddock announced that the 
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refugee resettlement program would be frozen. He argued that Australia’s annual 
refugee quota would be surpassed that year because of the additional refugees arriving 
irregularly, and the only way to stay within the quota was to halt resettlement until 
immigration officials knew what the annual total would be. 170 
The asylum crisis reached its climax in late August 2001. Already in the first three 
weeks of that month, six boats carrying a total of 1,200 people had arrived in Australia 
(Manne 2004: 12). The possibility of employing military deterrence had been mooted in 
earlier months (Marr and Wilkinson 2003: 46) but no firm commitment was made until 
the 26th August, 2001, when the MV Tampa, a Norwegian container ship passing 
through the Torres Strait, picked up 433 asylum seekers from a sinking boat and headed 
for Christmas Island, an Australian dependency. The Government refused the Tampa 
permission to enter Australian waters but the captain, concerned for the health of the 
asylum seekers, disobeyed. Australian defence troops boarded the Tampa and took the 
passengers into military custody on the naval ship, HMAS Manoora (Marr and 
Wilkinson 2003; Betts 2001: 38–40). 
To facilitate these and future asylum seekers, the Government implemented its so-
called Pacific Solution, a conglomeration of inter-related measures. A policy of military 
interdiction—known as Operation Relex—was enforced to halt the arrival of 
subsequent boats. The boats that were too unseaworthy to be turned back to Indonesia 
were taken under Australian military control and their occupants taken into custody. To 
accommodate these asylum seekers, the Australian Government arranged facilitation 
centres to be built on Papua New Guinea and Nauru. In this way, these asylum seekers 
never entered Australian territory where they could lodge an asylum claim. Once 
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delivered to these offshore centres, their claims were processed by the UNHCR. For 
those that meet refugee status criteria, their resettlement as mandated refugees was 
organized in conjunction with other nations. The practical advantage of this 
arrangement, the Government argued, was that the UNHCR generally had a lower rate 
of acceptance than the Australian legal system and so fewer asylum claimants would 
eventually require resettlement.171 The final aspect of the Pacific Solution was the 
excision of a number of islands from Australian territory, including Christmas Island, 
Ashmore reef and the Cocos Islands. Any asylum seeker arriving on these territories 
could no longer make a legitimate asylum claim to the Australian authorities (Jupp 
2002: 194–6).  
The Pacific Solution was decisive, uncompromising and enormously popular. An A. 
C. Nielsen poll for The Age found that 77 per cent of respondents supported the 
government’s decision to refuse entry to the asylum seekers; and 74 per cent approved 
of Howard’s overall handling of the situation (Betts 2001: 41–2). After initially 
opposing the initial bill and blocking it in the Senate (Marr and Wilkinson 2003: 89–
101), the Labor Party voted in favour of the Border Protection Act on 18th September 
2001.172 The Labor Party’s change of position was precipitated by widespread public 
hostility towards its position, the heightened security fears in the wake of the World 
Trade Centre attacks in New York only a week earlier, and the implications of all this 
for the upcoming November election. 
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Taking advantage of the political environment it found itself in, the Liberal 
Government pushed other restrictive bills through the House of Representatives, not 
specifically related to the administration of the Pacific Solution. The Migration 
Legislation Amendment Act (No. 6) 2001 constrained legal interpretations of the 
refugee status in two ways. First, it allowed an asylum application to be presumed false 
if the applicant had fraudulent identification or none at all. Second, it narrowed the 
interpretation of refugee status by limiting its focus specifically to ‘persecution’. These 
measures ensured that Australian legal authorities were not admitting more refugees 
than they were obliged to.173 Again, this legislation was supported by the Australian 
Labor Party.174 
The Liberals also introduced the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) 
Act 2001, a rehash of the Liberals’ earlier attempts to limit the access of immigration 
issues to judicial review. While not a complete withdrawal of appeal rights, the 
legislation limited access for immigration-related cases. In spite of its persistent 
resistance to such legislation, the Opposition voted in favour, swayed by the hostile 
public atmosphere.  
The Liberal Government easily won itself a third term in the general election on 10th 
November, 2001, its victory assured by its uncompromising stance on entrance policy 
and the Labor Party’s indecisiveness. With the Pacific Solution in place, the number of 
asylum seekers arriving by boat to Australia reduced drastically. In the 2001–2002 
financial year, Department of Immigration figures show 3,649 people arriving on 23 
boats. Between 2002 and 2005, however, the only arrivals were 82 people on three 
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boats in the 2003–2004 financial year (DIMIA 2005: 29). Indeed, in March 2004, the 
Liberal Government announced that it would boost the annual humanitarian quota from 
12,000 to 13,000, an adjustment that it attributed to ‘strong border protection and a 
strong economy’.175 Furthermore, the Government was able to ‘mothball’ the 
controversial Woomera detention centre, putting it on standby in case of a future surge 
in asylum claimants (Ruddock 2003). From a purely administrative point of view, then, 
the Pacific Solution was a success, imposing a high level of regulation of entrance into 
Australia and relieving the pressure on Australia’s refugee determination system and 
detention centres.  
Nonetheless, the Liberals continued to introduce restrictive policies, building upon 
the existing system of regulation to tighten its controls and extend its reach. Most of 
these were fairly minor matters, addressing loopholes in the Pacific Solution. The 
legislation that was particularly relevant to asylum included: 
 
• The Migration Legislation Amendment (Procedural Fairness) Act 2002, introduced 
on 13th March 2002, proposed adjustments to the judicial review of immigration-
related cases, emphasizing that the focus should be on procedural aspects of 
decisions, not common law rules.  
• The Migration Legislation Amendment (Transitional Movement) Act 2002, also 
introduced on 13th March 2002, sought to prohibit offshore detainees from lodging 
asylum claims if they were transported to the Australian mainland. For instance, if a 
detainee from Nauru was taken to mainland Australia for medical reasons or for 
                                                 
175
 Amanda Vanstone in Hansard (Senate) (23/3/2004: 21657). 
                   —125— 
facilitating their relocation, they would enter as a ‘transitory person’ and, as such, 
had no right to lodge a refugee status claim.  
• The Migration Legislation Amendment (Protected Information) Act 2002, 
introduced on 12th December 2002, limited what information the Minister of 
Immigration was compelled to disclose regarding immigration decisions under his 
discretion.  
• When the controversial $1,000 fee for failed immigration appeals came up for 
renewal on the 26th May 2003, the fee was not only renewed but raised to $1,400 to 
account for its relative drop in value.  
• The Migration Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2004, introduced on 25th March 
2004, expanded the provisions that limited access to judicial review.  
 
While this legislation all received the Labor Party’s support,176 other proposed 
measures did not fare so well. Once again, the Labor Party had a strong presence in the 
Senate and, with the support of the left-wing minority parties, could block Government 
legislation, as it did when the Liberal Government attempted to excise further 
Australian territory. On June 7th 2002, the Liberal Government sought to excise further 
territory, some 3,000 islands, by regulation, thus avoiding the usual legislative process. 
This move was blocked by the Senate. The Liberal Party responded by reintroducing 
the same measures in the Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection 
Measures) Bill 2002 on 20th June 2003 and using its majority in the House to force it 
through. To the Government’s chagrin, the bill was rejected by the Senate again in 
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December 2002. The bill was introduced yet again on 26th March 2003 as the Migration 
Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002 [No. 2] and 
was again rejected on 16th June 2003. Given the repeated rejection of its legislation, the 
Liberal Party were within their constitutional rights to call for the dissolution of both 
houses, a course of action they chose not to pursue. 
In 2003, the Liberal Government also faced strong opposition for its Migration 
Amendment (Duration of Detention) Bill 2003. This bill sought to prohibit the courts 
from ordering an interim order for the release of an immigration detainee. The 
Australian Labor Party opposed the bill and, when it was reintroduced the following 
year, opposed it yet again.177  
The Opposition’s harder approach was no doubt encouraged by the staunch criticism 
that the Pacific Solution had attracted from the UNHCR (2003) and various non-
governmental organizations, notably Oxfam (2002a, 2002b), Human Rights Watch 
(2002) and Amnesty International (2002a, 2002b), as well as from the Green Party178 
and the well-respected Independent Member for Calare, Peter Andren.179 Most 
importantly, though, there was also greater discontent amongst the public, largely due 
to the growing recognition that the asylum issue had, to some extent, been 
misrepresented by the Liberal Government. This was revealed spectacularly by the so-
called ‘children overboard affair’. This referred to an event, described by John Howard 
and other high-ranking Liberals in the lead-up to the 2001 election, where asylum 
seekers had apparently thrown their children overboard as they were being interdicted 
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by a Royal Australian Navy vessel (Marr and Wilkinson 2003: 184–193). A subsequent 
Senate inquiry found that this incident did not happen, that the intelligence that the 
Liberals had drawn on was false and, furthermore, that it was known to be false by the 
Government. 
On this front, the most interesting development came from a group of moderates 
within the Liberal Party who set out to liberalize the administration of detention. Petro 
Georgiou, the Liberal Member for Kooyong and long-time advocate for 
multiculturalism,180 was the driving force behind this schism and began working on a 
private member’s bill to address perceived deficiencies within the administration of 
detention, particularly its potentially harmful effects on detainees. This internal pressure 
forced Howard to adopt a shift in policy. The Migration Amendment (Detention 
Arrangements) Act 2005, introduced on 21st June 2005, sought to make detention 
procedures more flexible, allowing the Minister of Immigration the discretion to release 
children and their families into community care. The Migration And Ombudsman 
Legislation Amendment Act 2005, introduced on 15th December 2005, imposed time 
limits on the processing of asylum claims. It introduced a three month limit for the 
completion of primary refugee status determinations and for decision reviews with the 
Refugee Review Tribunal.  
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3.3: The Rhetoric of the Australian Liberal Government  
 
An Aspiration to Provide Asylum  
 
The story of asylum politics under John Howard’s Liberal Government is one of 
vigorous regulation, with restrictive policies targeted not merely at irregular immigrants 
but explicitly at asylum seekers among whom there was known to be a high proportion 
of refugees. Nonetheless, the declarations of support for the provision of asylum were 
frequent and ongoing (as exemplified by the numerous—yet by no means exhaustive—
Hansard references cited in the footnotes). In his first major address on asylum, Philip 
Ruddock remarked, ‘I want to affirm that this government maintains, as have 
governments before, a strong commitment to assisting bona fide refugees’,181 a 
sentiment that was reiterated by Ruddock and other Liberal members in the subsequent 
years.182 Liberal members frequently described the Australian refugee system as one of 
the most generous in the world,183 and described it as demonstrative of the Australian 
national identity and its commitment to the notion of the ‘fair go’.184 Members also 
noted that the Liberal Party had a tradition of assisting refugees, frequently citing the 
resettlement of South East Asian refugees;185 and affirmed the Government’s 
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commitment to specific legal norms, the norm of non-refoulement in particular.186 In 
the face of growing domestic and international unease over the Pacific Solution and its 
detention procedures, the Liberal Government’s defence of its commitment to asylum 
provision grew even keener. In 2005, Peter McGauran, then Minister for Citizenship 
and Multicultural Affairs, responded to Opposition criticism by declaring, ‘[D]o not 
give me this “I am ashamed to be Australian” stuff… That is just moral proselytising; 
that is just self-righteous reinforcement. Australia has one of the proudest records with 
regard to refugees anywhere in the world, bar none.’187 In spite of its restrictive policies 
toward asylum seekers, the Liberal Government was desperate to project an attitude of 
humanitarian concern for refugees. 
More generally, Liberal members affirmed their support for immigration and its 
contribution to the Australian nation.188 Liberal members were very careful to 
distinguish their position from that of extremists, a position where border control was 
seen to justify any response: ‘Despite what some people say, we cannot tow boats back 
to sea.’189 In response to the accusations of racism that were sometimes levelled by the 
Opposition members,190 Philip Ruddock once remarked of his party, ‘We have a non-
racial approach. If people breach our law, we deal with them and it does not matter 
where they are from’.191 
In sum, through its political rhetoric, the Liberal Government projected an aspiration 
to provide asylum. In light of its strongly restrictive and punitive policies, it is tempting 
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to view this stated aspiration with some suspicion, to wonder if the Government is not 
making a rhetorical display of humanitarian concern to disguise its genuine absence of 
empathy. Ultimately, this thesis will argue that the Liberal Government’s attitude is not 
that simple, but first it is necessary survey the Liberal aspiration to regulate entrance. 
 
 
An Aspiration to Regulate Entrance 
 
The essence of the Liberal Government view on entrance was carefully articulated by 
John Howard when he introduced the Border Protection Act to the House of Commons 
on 29th August 2001, at the height of the Tampa crisis: 
 
‘This Bill... is essential to the maintenance of Australian sovereignty, including our sovereign right to 
determine who will enter and reside in Australia.’192 
 
The Government’s commitment to the principle of national sovereignty was reiterated 
by other members,193 as was the notion of border control being fundamental to 
Australia’s national interests.194 In doing so, the issue of irregular immigration was 
effectively securitized, bringing border control into close association with military 
control of territory: ‘Our national interests are not merely a matter of protecting our 
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nation from foreign invasion, but of ensuring that our borders are secure enough to 
protect the integrity of our immigration laws.’195 This rhetorical association between 
migratory and military defence culminated, of course, in Operation Relex, the 
deployment of the Royal Australian Navy to stem irregular immigration. In sum, then, 
the overriding justification for the regulation of entrance was the self-evident ‘fact’ of 
national sovereignty, stated baldly here by Philip Ruddock: ‘It is clearly up to Australia 
to determine who can cross our borders, who can stay in Australia, and under what 
conditions such people can remain.’196 
Yet this claim to protect national sovereignty did more than merely justify the Pacific 
Solution’s drastic measures: it pilloried the Labor Party. If Labor chose to take a stand 
against the legislation—which it initially did—the stage was set so that its stance 
appeared to relinquish national sovereignty, to go against the interests of Australian 
citizens. This strategy was remarkably successful: the public backlash against Labor’s 
opposition of the Border Protection Act was so fierce that Labor Party leaders demurred 
from any further dissent from the Government’s entrance policy (Marr and Wilkinson 
2003: 99–100). Clearly, then, there were powerful electoral considerations that 
motivated the Government’s strengthening of regulation. Border control was a ‘wedge’ 
issue that the Government used to distinguish itself from the Opposition. The Liberals 
created a bipolarity out of what had been a bipartisan issue and situated itself on the 
side of the interests of citizens or ‘mainstream Australia’,197 thus forcing the Opposition 
to take the side of the ‘illegals’. To reinforce this strategy, Liberal members would 
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portray the Labor Party as ‘soft’198 while reserving for themselves the label of 
‘tough’199 on irregular immigration. Existing problems with the immigration system 
were blamed on the defective policies of past Labor Governments200 and the current 
Labor Party’s resistance to particular legislation, especially the withdrawal of judicial 
reviews.201 And when the Labor Party did support Government policy, as it eventually 
did on the Pacific Solution, Liberal members claimed that the Opposition was merely 
relenting to public pressure.202 Liberal members even argued that the Labor Party’s 
commitment to bipartisanship was an instance of electoral opportunism, a way of 
disguising its fundamentally ‘soft’ stance on immigration.203 In this way, the Liberal 
Government projected an electorally damaging perception of the Labor Opposition, a 
party whose ‘priorities are in favour of queue jumpers having more rights than the 
Australian people’.204 
Of course, this strategy would have never worked if the Liberal Government did not 
have the public support it did. In this respect, the aspiration to regulate entrance was 
very much a function of representative democracy, an act of identifying public concerns 
over irregular immigration and articulating them in party rhetoric or enforcing them 
through policy. As such, Philip Ruddock argued that ‘we—the Government of Australia 
representing the people of Australia—must have the capacity to manage the movement 
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of people across our borders in an orderly and efficient manner.’205 John Howard put 
this point more strongly: ‘One of the great enduring responsibilities of a government is 
to protect the integrity of its borders.’206 In this regard, what aspects of irregular 
immigration did the Liberal Government, on behalf of Australian citizens, identify as a 
threat to their interests? 
In its first term, the Liberal Government’s core concern was that the asylum system 
was being used by non-citizens to gain entrance to Australia even though the ‘great 
majority are not able to found a claim which engages our protection obligations.’207 It 
was claimed frequently by Liberal members that, to prolong their stay in Australia, 
these failed asylum applicants then lodged multiple appeals, even when they had little 
hope of succeeding in them.208 With asylum-related reviews and appeals making up 
about sixty per cent of all immigration-related cases before the courts in 1996, Ruddock 
argued that an unacceptable proportion of the Immigration Department’s workload and 
budget was being spent on fraudulent asylum claims.209 The actual motives for these 
individuals, he argued, was economic; Ruddock once claimed that ‘People are turning 
up at my department and asking for a “thirty dollar work visa”, the name by which we 
understand the protection visa is now becoming known.’210  
In following years, Liberal members cited other reasons for restricting access to 
irregular immigrants. They warned of the financial burden that the refugee 
                                                 
205
 Hansard (20/6/2002: 4019–20). See also Barry Haase (20/6/2002: 4040). 
206
 Hansard (29/8/2001: 30570). 
207
 Hansard (24/6/1996: 2556).  
208
 For instance, see Philip Ruddock in Hansard (25/6/1997: 6284, 19/6/1997: 5858, 3/9/1997: 7615, 
22/3/1998: 3915), Bruce Billson (24/9/1997: 8287), Graeme McDougall (3/9/1997: 7631) and Petro 
Georgiou (3/9/1997: 7636–7). 
209
 Hansard (24/6/1996: 2556). See also ibid. (19/3/1997: 2431), Graeme McDougall (3/9/1997: 7631) 
and Tony Smith (3/9/1997: 7625–6). 
210
 Hansard (19/6/1997: 5857). See also ibid. (3/9/1997: 7650). 
                   —134— 
determination process imposed upon Australian taxpayers211 and the pressure that 
asylum seekers may potentially put on the public health system.212 Liberal members 
accused asylum seekers of exploiting aspects of the Australian national character, such 
as its ‘generosity’ and ‘tolerance’.213 For instance, Kathy Sullivan, the Liberal Member 
for Moncrieff, remarked that ‘Generous people do not like to feel they are being used, 
and there is a growing feeling that these people are using Australia.’214  
Regulation was also cited as a necessary element of a functional policy of cultural 
diversity: ‘We are one of the most tolerant, diverse societies in the world because we 
have been able to manage our borders and our [immigration] programs successfully 
over a long period of time.’215 Given the Liberal Government’s general preference for 
the assimilation of new immigrants, especially under John Howard’s leadership, this 
remark implies a need for prioritizing entrants that were able or willing to adopt 
Australian values: ‘First and foremost you must be good Australians—that is the 
challenge to all those who come here’.216 
In the wake of 11th September 2001, the Liberal Government could include the threat 
of terrorist infiltration among its justifications for regulation, a threat made all the 
keener by Australia’s close alliance to the United States and its staunch support for 
subsequent military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. This was notoriously 
insinuated by Peter Reith, the Minister of Defence, in a radio interview two days after 
the World Trade Center attacks where he remarked that irregular routes of immigration 
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‘can be a pipeline for terrorists to come in and use your country as a staging post for 
terrorist activities’ (Marr and Wilkinson 2003: 151). Henceforth, ‘security’ and 
‘terrorism’ joined the list of bywords that Liberal members employed in Parliament to 
reinforce the self-evident need for regulation.217  
The Liberal Party also justified its restrictive policies by framing them as part of the 
necessary struggle against the practice of people smuggling.218 In this respect, Liberal 
members compared Australia’s policies to similar trends in other liberal democratic 
countries, noting ‘that many governments around the world are determined to make a 
contribution... to destroying this whole process of people-smuggling’.219 While Philip 
Ruddock did once admit that there were genuine refugees amongst the people being 
smuggled, he maintained that the refugee status determination procedure would identify 
them.220 Furthermore, Liberal members railed against the possibility of a favourable 
interpretation of people-smuggling, arguing, for instance, that ‘these traders are no 
modern-day Oskar Schindlers. They do not assist the underprivileged to find a new life 
in our prosperous land. Rather, they take advantage of the dreamers and try to dump 
them here—for profit.’221 Thus, the issue of people-smuggling was described in 
absolute and uncomplicated terms, a practice that was intrinsically unethical and 
therefore to be thwarted. 
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These, then, are some of the issues of national interest that the Liberal Government 
claimed motivated its regulation of entrance: misuse of the asylum system, depletion of 
public resources, national security, and the international struggle against people-
smuggling. By tackling these issues, the Government claimed that it was developing ‘an 
immigration program which closely resembles the aspirations of most Australians.’222  
Yet, there were also instrumental justifications for regulation: measures that the 
Government argued were necessary to address specific flaws and weaknesses in 
entrance policy. One such reason for regulation was that Australia’s legal institutions 
used an excessively inclusive interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention definition. 
Indeed, Ruddock even took to describing Australia’s refugee status determination 
system as the ‘convention-plus model’.223 The offshore refugee status determination 
centres on Nauru and Papua New Guinea were the political manifestations of this view. 
The Liberal Member for Forrest, Geoffrey Prosser, noted that UNHCR approval rates 
were far lower than Australia’s, claiming that the UNHCR approved the refugee status 
of 14 per cent of Afghans in Indonesia, whereas 84 per cent of Afghans who arrived in 
Australia were approved.224 So, by handing the refugee status determination process 
over to the UNHCR, the Liberal Government hoped to get lower approval rates for its 
intercepted asylum seekers and thereby be responsible for fewer refugees. Liberal 
members even used the UNHCR’s integrity to justify their push for tightened access to 
appeals. Barry Haase, the Liberal Member for Kalgoorlie, argued, ‘I for one believe 
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that the UNHCR does a good job and its decisions ought to be final’,225 an implication 
that any appeal of a UNHCR decision would amount to a slur on its reputation. This 
strand of Liberal Government rhetoric can be seen as part of its wider campaign to 
reduce the influence of the Courts in entrance policy, an ambition that was most clearly 
reflected in its attempts to limit judicial reviews. 
Finally, the Liberal Government supported strict regulation of entrance because, they 
argued, that such an approach had a deterrent effect on asylum seekers.226 Not only 
would tough regulations physically restrict people from entering, it would also 
discourage them from trying. Speaking on restrictive policies introduced in 1999, 
Teresa Gambaro, the Member for Petrie, remarked that, ‘These changes send a message 
to other people considering illegal travel to Australia that we are certainly not a soft 
touch, and that queue jumpers will be dealt with very harshly indeed’.227 Not only did 
these measures deter through their punitive nature, they also ‘reduce the attractiveness 
of Australia as a destination’.228 Mandatory detention was seen to play an especially 
important role in deterrence. Certainly, Liberal members argued that detention was 
necessary as an administrative procedure, a way of isolating asylum claimants from the 
community until the necessary checks for security, identity and refugee status had been 
completed.229 But, after the implementation of the Pacific Solution, Liberal members 
also argued that mandatory detention ‘is a deterrent and it has worked’,230 and therefore 
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ought to remain ‘the cornerstone of our national policy.’231 More broadly, Philip 
Ruddock argued that any softening of the Government’s overall policy framework on 
entrance was akin to giving people smugglers ‘a green light to attempt to recommence 
their operations.’232 
This, then, sums up the factors that motivated the Liberal Government’s aspiration to 
regulate entrance. Regulation was seen as a crucial dimension of deterrence, for reining 
in domestic legal institutions, and for protecting the interests of citizens. It is necessary, 
however, to explore this final point further. To view the Government as a passive actor, 
a puppet pulled by the whims of its electorate, is to underestimate its agency, its 
influence on the political and moral context in which the asylum issue was understood 
by the public. In particular, the way in which the Government reconciled its regulation 
of entrance with its humanitarian obligations played a crucial role in the public’s 
perception of asylum seekers. 
 
 
A Conflict of Aspirations 
 
The conflict between the aspirations to regulate entrance and provide asylum was 
clearly expressed in the rhetoric of the Liberal Government. On 18th August 2001, less 
than a fortnight before the Tampa crisis broke, Howard observed in a radio interview 
that:  
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‘We are a humanitarian country. We don’t turn people back into the sea, we don’t turn 
unseaworthy boats which are likely to capsize and the people on them be drowned. We can’t 
behave in that manner. People say, “Well send them back from where they came”; the country 
from which they came won’t have them back. Many of them are frightened to go back to those 
countries and we are faced with this awful dilemma of, on the one hand, trying to behave like a 
humanitarian decent country; on the other hand, making certain that we don’t become just an 
easy touch for illegal immigrants’ (Marr and Wilkinson 2003: 47).  
 
It was indeed an ‘awful dilemma’233 and, with an already difficult election only 
months away, the Government could not afford to let it run on. If the Liberal 
Government wanted to retain power, it had to take a stand one way or the other.  
Ultimately, Howard chose not to be an ‘easy touch’ and prioritized the regulation of 
entrance over other considerations. This was subsequently reinforced by remarks from 
other Liberal members, such as Russell Broadbent, the Liberal Member for McMillan, 
who argued that ‘The Australian government has a moral obligation to treat all refugees 
and asylum claimants in a humane and compassionate manner, but it also has an 
overriding obligation to the Australian people to ensure the integrity of our borders and 
the safety of our citizens’ [emphasis added].234 More specifically, Philip Ruddock once 
remarked that ‘international obligations do not give people any right to demand 
residence in Australia.’235 Even the announcement, in 2005, of a liberalization of 
detention policy was justified in the context of enhanced regulation. Petro Georgiou, the 
Liberal moderate who drove the new policy direction, framed it in terms of the Pacific 
Solution’s successes, arguing that the newly regulated environment ‘creates an 
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opportunity and an obligation... to ensure that our actions effectively protect our 
borders, prevent abuse, and are humane and just to those affected by them.’236 Thus, the 
satisfaction of the demands of regulation allowed greater accord to be given to the 
ideals of asylum. Peter McGuaran, the Minister of Citizenship and Multicultural 
Affairs, was adamant that regulation would not be sacrificed, declaring, ‘The broad 
framework of the government’s approach is unaltered.’237  
Clearly, the Liberal Government saw the obligation to provide asylum as subordinate 
to the regulation of its borders. Yet this delivered the party into a new conflict, a 
conflict between its liberal aspirations and its restrictive actions. On the one hand, the 
Liberal Government declared a commitment to the principle of asylum, and its moral 
and legal obligations to refugees; on the other hand, the Government enforced policies 
that explicitly denied asylum to refugees and, in achieving this end, subjected them to 
deliberately distressing and punitive measures. Such a lapse might have been forgivable 
to voters at the far end of the conservative spectrum, but it is hard to imagine it being 
tolerated by the broad base of electoral support on which any majority party relies. The 
Liberal Government needed to find a way of defusing the conflict between its actions 
and its aspirations, and political rhetoric proved to be an important tool in achieving 
this. 
In its first term, the conflict between aspirations was not so severe. As already 
mentioned, the move towards regulation was motivated by the high level of misuse of 
the asylum system by people for whom it was not intended. It could be said, therefore, 
that the tightening of entrance regulations targeted fraudulent asylum claimants who 
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were entering irregularly, not genuine refugees (although the latter were invariably 
affected). Indeed, the restriction of irregular immigrants was frequently justified on the 
grounds that that fraudulent asylum claimants were utilizing resources that would have 
otherwise gone to genuine refugees: ‘It is a situation which distorts our priorities and 
limits our ability to help those who are most vulnerable.’238 Crucially, such an argument 
cast a positive moral light upon regulation, making it acceptable to moderate voters, as 
well as appealing to more radical voters (such as One Nation supporters) who were 
intolerant towards immigration.  
In 1999, however, the number of irregular immigrants increased drastically and, more 
problematically, most of their asylum claims were successful. The Liberal Government 
could no longer justify restrictions by arguing that the asylum system was being 
misused by economic immigrants. Instead, the Government developed the argument 
that the asylum system was intended strictly for refugees who arrived by regular means 
and not those who arrived irregularly. Philip Ruddock argued that refugees who entered 
irregularly were not in desperate need of protection, that they ‘have been living in 
security and safety for a number of years in [safe] third countries, and are now seeking 
to get to the front of the queue for asylum places in Australia’.239 So, while it was 
accepted that the new influx of asylum seekers were mostly genuine refugees, the 
asylum system was nonetheless being ‘exploited by those who do have alternatives… 
while those who have no alternatives miss out.’240 
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The Liberal Government’s adjustments to its refugee resettlement programme—
freezing the resettlement of mandated refugees in 2001 when the number of irregular 
entrants was high and expanding the annual humanitarian quota in 2004 when the 
irregular entrance was effectively stemmed—were administrative manifestations of this 
attitude. These fluctuations appear to support the Liberal Government’s argument that 
irregular immigrants take the place of refugees through regulated resettlement. 
However, it must be noted that such an interpretation neatly overlooks the fact that the 
scale of the annual quota is self-imposed, as is the inclusion of asylum seekers at the 
expense of mandated refugees. 
Thus the Government advanced a moral argument that asylum seekers were 
undermining its efforts to assist refugees who were in greater need of assistance.241 The 
fact that there were genuine refugees amongst those being restricted, Liberal members 
argued, was overshadowed by the greater injustice that more deserving refugees were 
having their places taken.242 This argument was expanded into the international context 
to explain identify the flaws of the asylum regime. Philip Ruddock argued that Western 
states were being forced to divert funds from humanitarian projects into their asylum 
systems, concluding that ‘we have lost our sense of priority.’243 This line of argument 
culminated in Ruddock’s suggestion that the 1951 Refugee Convention was in need of 
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reform: ‘It has lost its focus and is not assisting those in greatest need.’244 In support of 
the Liberal Government’s approach, Millbank (2003: 25) has argued that ‘by breaking 
the nexus between migration and asylum that has rendered the asylum system 
unworkable, Australia’s Tampa and Pacific Solution have provided a direction-setting 
circuit breaker in the evolution towards a more rational and equitable international 
refugee system.’ 
In sum, regulation was portrayed as beneficial to the efficacy of asylum provision in 
Australia and other Western nations. Crucially, by contextualizing regulation in this 
way, by providing it with a consequentialist ethical framework, the Liberal Government 
gave its restrictive actions an air of respectability, diminishing the chances of isolating 
its liberal voters, lobby groups, or its own Members of Parliament. Rather than signal 
an abandonment of asylum or humanitarian values, the restriction of asylum seekers 
reflects the Government’s resolve that asylum would be provided only on its own strict 
terms.  
To enhance the idea that asylum seekers were less deserving of asylum than other 
refugees, the Government took a markedly aggressive stance in its rhetoric to 
undermine the integrity of all asylum seekers. Asylum seekers were frequently 
characterized as opportunists who came to Australia as a matter of choice rather than 
necessity,245 typically driven by material incentives.246 In doing so, it was suggested 
that these asylum seekers had given up relative security in other safe third countries.247 
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The perception of asylum seekers as relatively advantaged was explicitly contrasted 
with the situation of those in countries of first asylum: ‘The people in those camps are 
in an awful situation—and we have seen them on television. The boat people are virile, 
well-fed young men with enough money to pay their way into Australia.’248 
Government members even took to invoking these ideas in slang by employing terms 
such as ‘queue jumper’ and ‘forum shopper’ to describe asylum seekers.249 What made 
these arguments particularly effective was that they cast aspersions on the moral 
legitimacy of an asylum seeker’s actions without denying the legitimacy of their 
refugee status claim.  
Asylum seekers were frequently discredited in other ways too. Government members 
argued that the status of asylum seekers was ‘illegal’;250 that no genuine refugee would 
be without proper identification;251 and that no genuine refugee could afford the 
services of a people smuggler.252 The veracity of such claims is controversial,253 relying 
largely on the ambiguities on the legal status of asylum seekers. Moreover, it appears 
that the Government was not beyond fictionalizing or exaggerating events. This was 
illustrated definitively by the ‘children overboard affair’, but also other remarks that 
have since proven to be false, such as Philip Ruddock’s notorious statement to 
journalists on 17th November 1999 that intelligence had predicted some 10,000 people 
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were planning to travel to Australia from the Middle East: ‘The fact is the information 
that is available to us suggests that whole villages are packing up’ (cited in MacDonald 
1999).  
In all, these aspersions contributed to the public perception that asylum seekers were 
less deserving of asylum than other refugees, giving legitimacy to the claim that 
regulation would improve Australia’s capacity to implement a more just distribution of 
asylum. By reconciling its restrictive actions with its aspiration to provide asylum, the 
Liberal Government made its policies acceptable to the broader liberal electorate, to 
mainstream voters who were more sympathetic to the plight of refugees than the 
average One Nation supporter.  
 
 
3.4: The Australian Opposition: Rhetoric and Policy Proposals 
 
An Aspiration to Provide Asylum 
 
Labor members frequently affirmed their party’s commitment to immigration254 and 
the provision of asylum specifically.255 Members spoke variously of Australia’s ‘proud 
history of helping refugees’,256 its ‘international reputation for its humanitarian 
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treatment of refugees’257, and its commitment to the ‘fair go’.258 Essentially, the Labor 
Party expressed this aspiration in a way that was reminiscent of the Liberal 
Government, drawing largely on aspects of the Australian character to justify its 
commitment to asylum.259 
Yet, on two issues, the Labor Party staked out notably more inclusive attitudes than 
the Liberal Government. The first of these was multiculturalism. On this issue, the 
Labor Party’s took a markedly more pluralist position than the Government. Labor 
members tended to emphasize Australia’s success in accommodating cultural 
difference260 and criticized the Liberals for their failure to embrace pluralism.261 On 
account of these differences, the Labor Party sometimes took the moral high ground 
over the Liberal Party, labelling its harsh treatment of asylum seekers as an expression 
of racist sentiments262 and attacking Philip Ruddock for wearing his Amnesty 
International badge in the House.263  
The second issue where Labor took a more inclusive stance was on the matter of 
judicial reviews. In contrast to the Government, which wanted to diminish access for 
immigration-related cases, the Labor Party’s position was decidedly egalitarian, 
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characteristic of left-leaning politics: ‘It does not matter whether you are an asylum 
seeker or whether you are an ordinary citizen of this country… Once you are here, you 
are entitled to your day in court.’264 The Labor Party was resolute on this issue, willing 
to sacrifice its otherwise strong commitment to bipartisanship,265 even declaring that 
this issue revealed ‘the fundamental differences between our two parties’.266 Con 
Sciacca, the Shadow Minister for Immigration, was certainly not unsympathetic to the 
Government’s complaints about misuse of the asylum system, but he argued that a 
blanket withdrawal of legal rights was equivalent to ‘throw[ing] out the baby with the 
bath water.’267 When the Labor Party did finally acquiesce to a limitation of access to 
judicial reviews, driven to retreat by the Tampa affair, Sciacca was openly reluctant. 
After offering his party’s support for the legislation, he added, ‘We do so, though, 
without in any sense or form being of the view that this is the answer to the problem.’268 
He continued with unmistakable bitterness, scolding Philip Ruddock and John Howard 
for the harmful consequences of their electoral opportunism: ‘There is no question why 
you were hairy-chested about the Tampa and everything else... You took certain actions 
because you knew that would be popular, and it has worked your way electorally. Let 
us see what happens in five or 10 years. Let us see how you go down in history.”269 In 
this instance, then, political calculations were allowed to override the Labor Party’s 
ideological and ethical inclinations, yet there were apparently no deliberate changes to 
Labor’s aspirations for ideal immigration practices. This illustrates the resistance of 
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aspirations in the face of incompatible policy; it is a demonstration of how complex and 
contradictory the motives of a political actor can be. 
 
 
The Aspiration to Regulate Entrance 
  
In spite of its more inclusive aspirations for asylum provision, the Labor Party’s 
official position on regulation was remarkably similar to the Liberal Government’s, as 
demonstrated by its broad support for Government policy. Labor rhetoric reinforces this 
close association, as in this comments by Martin Ferguson in 1999, then Shadow 
Minister of Immigration: 
 
‘The choice we have to make at this time is who is determining Australia’s immigration 
policy. Is it the community through our democratically elected representatives or, alternatively, 
are we as a community going to vacate the field and allow crooks, gangsters and those 
responsible for people-smuggling to determine Australia’s immigration policy?’270  
 
This remark parallels Liberal Government rhetoric in advancing a bipolar view of 
entrance: prioritizing the interests of Australian citizens while at the same time focusing 
on the criminality of those organizing irregular entrance and, in doing so, overlooking 
the humanitarian need of many who travelled by it. Generally, then, the Labor Party 
supported the Government’s aspiration to restrict irregular immigration, its members 
arguing that measures were needed ‘to combat the flow of illegal immigrants and to 
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deal genuinely with the problem of queue jumping and non-genuine refugees seeking 
asylum.’271 The Opposition’s criticisms were reserved for the administration or efficacy 
of regulatory policies rather than the object of regulation.272 For instance, the Labor 
Party continued to offer unequivocal support for the principle of mandatory 
detention,273 limiting its criticisms to issues such as the detention of children, the 
outsourcing of detention-centre management to a private security company, and the 
restriction of media access to detention centres.274 Labor members were also keen to 
point out that the range of restrictive measures introduced by the Liberals in 1999 and 
2000 had failed to cease irregular immigration.275 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Labor Party rhetoric was its adoption of 
rhetoric to undermine the integrity of asylum seekers. There are times when Labor 
rhetoric is virtually indistinguishable from the Government’s, as in these remarks by 
Con Sciacca from 2000:  
 
‘As illegal immigration has soared in comparison with previous years, so has the meritorious 
nature of many of these asylum seekers’ claims, and the term “queue jumper” has emerged, 
bringing with it a sinister meaning instantly recognisable as an un-Australian act, an action that 
goes against the very nature of our sense of fair play. To his credit, the Minister for Immigration 
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has devoted much energy to addressing this problem with the full cooperation of the 
Opposition.’276  
 
As such, some Labor members not only failed to contest the Government’s 
controversial claims, they reinforced them through their complaints that ‘People who 
are free enough and wealthy enough to pay a people smuggler are virtually rewriting 
our immigration laws.’277 Labor members worked to promote the image that ‘The 
Labor Party is as tough as, if not tougher than, the Government when it comes to illegal 
immigrants.’278  
 
In part, Labor’s failure to put up a broader opposition can be explained by its 
historical commitment to bipartisanship, a commitment that was frequently cited by 
Labor members.279 In the wake of the Tampa affair, when the Labor Party was eager to 
combat its reputation as ‘soft’ on immigration, bipartisanship became a somewhat 
ambiguous rallying point, as this remark by Con Sciacca illustrates: ‘[...W]e have, in 
effect, a 100 per cent record of straight-out bipartisanship on these issues. That does not 
mean to say that we believe that everything they have done is correct. But, as I said, we 
have made this decision that we will support them, and we have supported them.’280 
This unwavering commitment to bipartisanship can, in part, be explained by Labor’s 
‘small target strategy’ under the leadership of Kim Beazley (2003: 231-62). Rather than 
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develop comprehensive alternatives to Liberal policy, the Labor Party focused its 
attentions on specific issues where the public was notably frustrated with the 
Government. Thus, policies that did not incur widespread public disapproval, such as 
restrictive entrance policies, were not deemed to warrant substantive policy alternatives. 
Once, when Ruddock responded to Sciacca’s criticisms by asking what Labor’s policy 
was, Sciacca replied, ‘Well, I am not the Minister. The Opposition is not in 
government. You are the Minister. You come up with the solutions and we will have a 
look at them’.281 
After its failed bid for the 2001 election, Labor did distance itself from its bipartisan 
approach. Under the leadership of Simon Crean (2002–2003), when Labor temporarily 
took a more combative stance on entrance policy, the principle of bipartisanship in 
immigration was still held as an ideal, yet it was argued then that the Liberal 
Government needed to compromise its aspirations and policies282—no idle threat given 
Labor’s majority in the Senate. For instance, speaking on bipartisanship for asylum 
policy in 2002, Julia Gillard declared, ‘If the Government has a credible plan to make 
Australia’s arrangements faster then we will support it. If you do not have one, then we 
will come up with one and you can support it.’283 Even when Kim Beazley returned to 
Labor leadership in 2005, his appointed Shadow Minister for Immigration, Laurie 
Ferguson, set out to dispute the view that ‘there was no differentiation between the 
major parties’ on asylum policy.284  
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Nonetheless, Labor’s emphasis on the regulation of entrance remained throughout 
these years. Echoing the Government, Labor Party members declared that an orderly 
and effectively regulated border regime was essential;285 and, in light of the World 
Trade Centre attacks on 11th September 2001, affirmed the importance of tight border 
control for national security.286 In sum, then, Labor’s aspiration to regulate entrance 
was much the same as the Government’s, although somewhat less restrictive after the 
Pacific Solution was in place. 
 
 
A Conflict of Aspirations 
 
The Labor Opposition, more so than the Liberal Government, struggled to reconcile 
the aspirations to provide asylum and regulate entrance. As we have seen in weighing 
up these aspirations, regulation generally took precedence, a bias that was demonstrated 
by Labor’s broad support for Government policy. Yet, where there were criticisms, 
Labor did generally fall on the liberal side of Government policy, suggesting that it 
gave relatively greater consideration to the provision of asylum. It usually erred 
towards the cautious side of the bipartisanship, sounding out warnings in respect to a 
policy’s potential encroachment on humanitarian values. This was most strongly 
manifested in the Opposition’s resistance to the withdrawal of judicial reviews, but it 
emerged in debates over other issues. Con Sciacca, who, in his role as Shadow Minister 
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of Immigration, represented Labor’s ‘official’ position, warned the Liberal Government 
not to overreact, comparing the number of irregular entrants in Australia to the far 
higher numbers in other countries;287 and questioned whether the Government had gone 
too far in its treatment of detainees.288  
A more substantive and robust criticism emerged from a minority of Labor members 
who broke with their party’s official position and criticized the direction of bipartisan 
policy. Just days before the Tampa affair broke, Colin Hollis, speaking on the 
Migration Legislation Amendment (Immigration Detainees) Act 2001, remarked, ‘I am 
ashamed that [Members of Parliament] are not coming in here and saying how 
outrageous and totally unacceptable it is to lock up women and children. That criticism 
goes to my own side as much as it goes to the other side.’289 Andrew Theophanous, a 
prominent spokesperson on immigration issues, frequently criticized Australia’s 
entrance policy, arguing that ‘the whole philosophy and approach... has been one of 
control, toughness and lack of compassion.’290 As such, these Labor moderates voiced 
opinions that directly contradicted the Labor Party’s official position, arguing, for 
instance, that asylum seekers were desperate people who could not be deterred by 
border restrictions291 while Con Sciacca was advocating the use of restrictive measures 
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as a means of deterrence.292 Another prominent concern was that the brunt of policy 
was bearing down upon the victims of people smugglers rather than the people 
smugglers themselves.293 These members criticized the ‘demonization’ and 
‘criminalization’ of asylum seekers, 294 noting that irregular routes of immigration were 
often the only plausible way to seek asylum in the West295 and drew historical parallels 
with Jews escaping Nazi persecution by irregular means.296 Finally, these Labor 
members criticized the association that was being drawn between terrorism and asylum 
seekers in the post-9/11 era.297 
It was not that these politicians did not recognize a need for regulation. Colin Hollis 
was well aware of the dilemma that irregular immigration posed but had different 
priorities: ‘The real difficulty that we face is that, although we wish Australia to adhere 
to international conventions, we also do not wish to send a ‘green light’ to people 
smugglers in different parts of the world. The challenge is whether Australia can handle 
this new phenomenon of people movement in a just and humane way.’298 Similarly, 
even in 1997, Andrew Theophanous was warning that Australia’s bipartisan entrance 
policy was ‘shifting the balance too far towards control and not far enough towards 
humanitarian considerations for refuge requirements’.299 For these members, then, the 
prioritization of regulation had gone too far, imposing too greatly on the provision of 
asylum and, in doing so, threatening Australia’s international reputation as a 
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humanitarian nation.300 Consequently, in Caucus, two Labor members formally 
opposed their party’s support for the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement 
Powers) Bill 2001, the major legislative component of the Pacific Solution (Lavelle 
2003: 239), demonstrating their dissatisfaction with Labor’s prioritization of regulation. 
In sum, then, the Labor Party largely failed to convincingly reconcile the conflict 
between its aspirations. In accepting bipartisanship, the Labor Party adopted the Liberal 
Government’s position on entrance and its apparent legitimacy, proposing minor 
alterations so it could claim to support an improved version of the same model. During 
the Tampa affair, however, Labor Party leadership wavered. The Labor Party was 
unable to reconcile itself to the severity of the Government’s legislation, yet unwilling 
to resign itself to the electoral consequences of opposing it. Thus, Labor’s wavering and 
its internal disagreement contributed to the perception, prior to the 2001 election, that 
the Labor Party was supporting a position that it did not whole-heartedly believe in 
(Betts 2002: 39), a suspicion that caused Labor supporters with conservative views on 
entrance to shift their vote to the Liberal Party. Yet, exit polls of electoral booths 
showed that many Labor voters also drifted in the opposite direction to the left-wing 
minority parties: the Greens and the Australian Democrats (ibid.: 43–45). Thus, the 
Labor Party managed to disenfranchise supporters at either end of its constituency. The 
Labor Party’s lack of resolve—and the Liberal Government’s shrewd manipulation of 
it—managed to convince conservative voters that Labor’s aspiration to regulate 
entrance fell far short of their own. On the other side, Labor’s bipartisan approach to 
policy and its ‘tough’ rhetoric served to disenfranchise voters who preferred greater 
consideration of the aspiration to provide asylum. 
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Part 4: Discussion 
 
The fundamental empirical finding of this research is that in the periods covered by 
this thesis the governments of Canada and Australia both reinforced their regulation of 
entrance. Obviously this occurred to quite different degrees: Australia’s shift toward 
greater regulation was dramatic—particularly between 1999 and 2001—while Canada’s 
was more tentative. This difference is all the more notable considering that Canada 
received a relatively higher level of asylum claims than Australia. In 1999, for instance, 
a critical year for both nations, Australia received a total of 9,450 asylum claims (or 5 
asylum claims for every 10,000 inhabitants) while Canada received 30,895 asylum 
claims (or 10 asylum claims for every 10,000 inhabitants) (UNHCR: 2002b). In 
addition these nations had quite different starting points: Australia, with its system of 
mandatory detention, already had a far more impenetrable regime of regulation by the 
mid-1990s than did Canada, where asylum claimants entered the community as soon as 
they passed preliminary identity and security checks.  
In spite of these comparative differences, however, the centre-left government of 
Canada and centre-right government of Australia both enhanced their restriction of 
irregular immigration, demonstrating that they ultimately prioritized the demands of 
regulation over the ideals of asylum. Even when these governments made moves to 
liberalize entrance policy for asylum seekers—such as liberalizing Australia’s detention 
procedures in 2005 or softening Canada’s Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
2001 legislation—these moves were subsumed by the greater shift towards regulation, 
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like a downward step on an upward escalator. Furthermore, the analysis of Opposition 
parties reveals that they too were committed to regulation, suggesting that the 
restriction of irregular immigration would have occurred regardless of who was in 
power—albeit at different levels of intensity. In sum, the observations of this thesis 
support the general observation made at the outset that Western governments are 
converging on a trend toward more restrictive asylum policies. 
The next important finding of this research is that parliamentarians in Canada and 
Australia—like those of Britain, Germany and Switzerland—did not speak ‘against 
refugees or against the principle of asylum’ (Steiner 2000: 134). Moreover, it was fairly 
common practice for Canadian and Australian parliamentarians to begin their speeches 
on asylum policy by declaring their commitment to the state’s obligation to refugees—
regardless of whether they were advocating restrictive policies or not. Yet this thesis 
also detected a subtle rhetorical trend—most pronounced amongst the centre-right 
parties of Canada and Australia—for arguing that refugees who arrived by irregular 
means were less deserving of asylum than refugees who arrived by regular means. So, 
while parliamentarians did not oppose the principle of asylum, some parliamentarians 
did openly oppose asylum seeking as a means of actuating it.  
This desert-based argument for the restriction of irregular asylum seekers, aimed to 
penalize those less deserving, was fundamental to how the major political parties of 
Canada and Australia justified their ‘tough’ policies. On the one hand, it allowed 
politicians to emphasize their obligations to national citizens and to ‘genuine’ refugees, 
and highlighted regulation as a means of satisfying the state’s obligations to both. On 
the other hand, it allowed politicians to devalue their obligations to asylum seekers. 
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Parliamentarians conflated the issue of asylum seeking with the diverse issue of 
irregular immigration and, in Australia especially, actively worked to undermine the 
legitimacy of asylum seekers. In this way, major political parties utilized political 
rhetoric to reconcile the conflict between the aspiration to regulate entrance and the 
aspiration to provide asylum. This came, however, at a serious cost to the inclusivity of 
the latter. While major political parties did succeed in preserving their aspiration to 
provide asylum, they did so by suppressing an activity that had once been widely 
accepted as a legitimate way for refugees to gain asylum.  
It can be said that this desert-based argument for restriction came in ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
forms. While the major political parties of Canada and Australia all employed various 
versions of this argument, it was the centre-right parties of Canada and Australia that 
took the ‘hard’ approach. These parties argued that it was preferable for a government 
to fulfil its humanitarian obligations to refugees through resettlement programmes 
rather than by accepting asylum claims on its territory. The implicit benefit of this 
strategy was that, if a government were to provide asylum only to mandated refugees, it 
could potentially satisfy its obligations to refugees without having to compromise its 
aspiration to regulate entrance. Indeed, if a government felt that its aspiration to provide 
asylum had been fulfilled by its refugee resettlement programmes, it might consider 
itself ethically vindicated to enforce any regulations that it deemed appropriate, even 
those that restricted the irregular entrance of genuine refugees.  
The Australian Liberal Government took this ‘hard’ argument one step further by 
arguing that a highly regulated system of refugee resettlement allowed for a more just 
distribution of asylum among the world’s refugees. Given that the global refugee 
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population drastically outnumbered the spaces for asylum that were available in the 
West, Liberal politicians argued that it would be fairest to prioritize those whose 
situation was most desperate. Essentially, they were advocating for asylum to be 
distributed according to the principle of triage. Asylum seekers were not considered to 
be in critical need of assistance because their ability to travel internationally was taken 
as evidence of their relatively greater personal and economic resources. As such, 
members of the Australian Liberal Government argued that it was morally preferable to 
bypass them and look for more needy refugees. Of course, the force of this argument 
was partly driven by the Government’s aggressive rhetorical campaign to undermine 
the legitimacy of asylum seekers, exaggerating the ambiguities of their legal status and 
implying that their motives were mostly material. Indeed, the Australian Liberal 
Government even reduced its annual humanitarian quota to ‘prove’ that asylum seekers 
were taking the place of mandated refugees, a case of policy being implemented to 
reinforce the veracity of political rhetoric. Irrespective of these attempts to influence 
public perceptions, however, this basic argument does carry some ethical force. In a 
non-ideal world of regulated borders, where the demand for asylum is greater than the 
supply, a principle of triage is arguably an effective way of distributing asylum 
amongst those who need it.301 As such, this ‘hard’ justification for the restriction of 
asylum seeking was—at least in principle—persuasive.  
For its part, the Australian Labor Party largely fell into line behind the arguments of 
the Liberal Government of Australia. Most Labor members put up no substantive 
opposition to these ‘hard’ justifications for restriction and, in some cases, they merely 
reiterated Liberal rhetoric. Only a few fractious Labor members broke from their 
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party’s official position, objecting to the exclusion of asylum seekers from the 
aspiration to provide asylum. This dissent intensified between 2000 and 2001 as 
bipartisanship required the Labor Party to make ever greater compromises on its 
aspirations. Indeed, the Liberal Prime Minister, John Howard, exploited this dilemma 
during the Tampa affair, presenting policies that were too restrictive for the Labor Party 
to reconcile with its relatively broader humanitarian aspirations. Labor faltered, initially 
objecting to the policy’s severity and then relinquishing weeks later, qualifying its 
support for the Border Protection Act 2001 by declaring that the Pacific Solution did 
not reflect Labor’s own aspirations. The Labor Party’s failure to strike a convincing 
balance between asylum and regulation disenfranchised voters at either end of its 
electorate: it lost voters to right-wing parties for not holding a convincing aspiration to 
regulate entrance, and it lost voters to left-wing parties for not holding a convincing 
aspiration to provide asylum. The sharp loss of public support for the Labor Party in the 
lead-up to the 2001 general election is an important cautionary tale, an illustration of 
the consequences of not effectively reconciling the conflict between asylum and 
regulation. 
The centre-left Liberal Government of Canada, on the other hand, did not explicitly 
employ ‘hard’ arguments to justify its own restrictive entrance policies. Nonetheless, 
the idea that some refugees were more deserving than others was implicit in its ‘front 
door/back door’ analogy. This ‘soft’ desert-based argument for regulation proposed 
that, by closing the ‘back door’, the Government could retain and foster public support 
to facilitate the entrance of further refugees through the ‘front door’. Of course, if the 
Liberal Government of Canada did ever succeeded in closing the ‘back door’, it would 
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have restricted the practice of irregular asylum seeking anyway. Essentially, it would 
have achieved much the same outcome as the centre-right had been advocating, without 
ever having to go as far as refusing to accept an asylum claim.  
Crucially, by arguing that the restriction of asylum seekers facilitated the entrance of 
more deserving refugees, the major political parties of Canada and Australia went some 
way in reconciling the potential conflict between their actions and their aspiration to 
provide asylum. By arguing that regulation improved the state’s capacity to provide 
asylum, these politicians made the restriction of asylum seekers more palatable to a 
liberal audience—especially to moderate voters, members of parliament and interest 
groups.  
Certainly, not all liberal agents were convinced by the desert-based justification for 
restricting asylum seekers, sensing that some restrictive measures required an 
unacceptable compromise to what was ideal as an aspiration to provide asylum. As 
such, criticisms of asylum policy in Canada and Australia were lodged by various 
members of parliament, minority parties, domestic lobby groups, non-governmental 
organizations and the UNHCR. Some of these criticisms did appear to have a normative 
effect. In response to criticism of Bill C-31, the earlier version of the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act 2001, the Liberal Government made adjustments to reduce its 
negative impact on asylum seekers.  
The Australian case study demonstrates what can happen when policy measures 
significantly overreach the justifications that are given for them, making too great a 
compromise to a political party’s aspirations. For instance, the Australian Labor Party’s 
bipartisan support for Government policy disaffected moderate voters and created 
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dissent among its own more liberal members of parliament. Even the Liberal Party of 
Australia experienced dissent in 2005 when some of its more moderate 
parliamentarians argued that, in light of the regulatory success of the Pacific Solution, 
the severity of Australia’s detention procedures were no longer justified.302 Moreover, 
as it became apparent that the Liberal Party of Australia had been less than accurate in 
its unfavourable portrayal of asylum seekers, it faced growing volatility amongst 
moderate voters, demonstrating that a rhetorical solution to the reconciliation of asylum 
and regulation could only ever be as good as its rhetoric.  
In sum, then, the case studies of Canada and Australia show that rhetoric played an 
important role in justifying actions that compromised a political party’s aspirations. 
However, there were also humanitarian elements within the major political parties and 
within the national community that worked to protect and preserve the aspiration to 
provide asylum against the encroachments of restrictive policy. 
The desert-based argument for the restriction of asylum seekers was not the only 
justification for policy trends in Canada and Australia. Major political parties also 
justified their restrictive policies as a way of preventing misuse of their asylum systems 
by people for whom they were not intended—specifically, criminals, terrorists and 
economic migrants. What makes such arguments of subsidiary importance, however, is 
that they only ever justified the restriction of specifically those people: criminals, 
terrorists and economic migrants who were lodging false asylum claims. To fully 
satisfy the aspiration to regulate entrance, it was necessary to prohibit all forms of 
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irregular entrance, even those that were vindicated on moral or normative grounds 
(such as asylum seeking). So, while appeals to misuse of the asylum system were useful 
in dealing with specific problems with the asylum system, any political party that 
aspired to a high level of regulatory control would need a broader justification for 
restriction. This is, perhaps, why the centre-right parties of Canada and Australia 
pioneered the ‘hard’ justifications for the restriction of all irregular entrants. With their 
expressed concerns over cultural diversity and their broader recognition of threats, the 
centre-right parties had to justify a far greater level of regulation than the centre-left. 
Clearly, then, the political ideology of the governing party was influential in the level 
of regulation that a nation was likely to enforce. In contrast to parties of the centre-
right, politicians from centre-left wing parties did not express concerns over cultural 
diversity, and were more likely to downplay threats to the national community, 
rationalizing them or putting them in a more favourable context. One notable difference 
between the centre-left and centre-right in Canada and Australia was the issue of legal 
rights for non-citizens. In Australia, the Labor Party strongly resisted the Liberal 
Government’s attempts to withdraw judicial reviews of refugee status decisions, going 
so far as to block such legislation in the Senate. In Canada, Chrétien’s Liberal 
Government persistently declared its commitment to the Singh decision, admonishing 
the centre-right Opposition for its suggestions that the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms should not be applied to non-citizens on Canadian territory. On the issue of 
entrance decisions, centre-left parties seemed willing to give greater autonomy to 
domestic courts, whereas the centre-right parties of Canada and Australia exercised an 
ambition to constrain or disengage their powers. The centre-left’s justifications for this 
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position demonstrated its greater commitment to equality—in particular, equal access to 
legal rights—and its willingness to extend this egalitarian concern beyond the national 
community. Arguably, however, both of the centre-left parties surveyed in this research 
did eventually weaken their resistance: the Canadian Liberal Government by refraining 
from implementing the legislation for the Refugee Appeal Division, and the Australian 
Labor Party by acquiescing to Government restrictions to judicial review in the wake of 
the Tampa affair. This re-emphasizes the point that, while these parties’ aspiration to 
regulate entrance was more reined in than the centre-right’s, it was still strong enough 
to impose itself over their aspiration to provide asylum. 
To sum up, then, the issue of regulation was a priority for all parties operating within 
Canada and Australia: it was beyond contention. With the political centre of gravity 
soundly on the side of regulation, the issue under contention was the necessary level of 
regulation. As such, centre-left parties tended to moderate the regulatory policies of the 
centre-right, while the centre-right tended to coax stricter regulations out of the centre-
left. The sum result, of course, was an inexorable crawl toward greater regulation. 
While this move was perhaps a little too tentative for the right and a little too rash for 
the left, the policies that were passed through the Canadian and Australian parliaments 
generally built upon—rather than dismantled—the existing system of regulation. This 
move towards greater regulation was justified on the grounds that it would encourage 
an immigration regime that facilitated the entrance of refugees arriving by regular 
means. Implicitly or explicitly, major political parties advanced the notion that these 
refugees were more deserving of protection than asylum seekers. 
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Conclusions 
 
Examining how major political parties justified the restriction of asylum seekers in 
Canada and Australia has helped to reveal the complexity out of which asylum policy 
emerges. The politics of asylum in Canada and Australia do not readily conform to the 
model of a ‘tug-of-war’, a conflict between the interests of a particularist state and the 
universalism of morality and international norms. A more appropriate model, advanced 
by this thesis, defines the politics of asylum as a conflict between the aspirations to 
regulate entrance and provide asylum, each of which is motivated by a set of material 
and non-material factors—among which are norms, morals and interests. Importantly, 
this conflict of aspirations occurs within political agents—within states, parliaments, 
political parties, individual politicians and voters. Their restrictive actions are not the 
outcome of a singular intention to restrict—they emerge out of a tangle of conflicting 
motives. Thus, rather than conceive of asylum provision as a duty that is forced upon 
one actor by another, it can be conceived as an activity that is self-motivated and self-
defined.  
Once the asylum politics of Canada and Australia are viewed in this manner, it is 
possible to make better sense of the relationship between asylum policy and its related 
political rhetoric. Major political parties do not support the restriction of asylum seekers 
because they do not care about their humanitarian obligations; they restrict them 
because it provides a solution to the conflict between two earnestly held aspirations. 
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Indeed, it is because political parties cannot escape their humanitarian obligations that 
they put so much emphasis on declaring their aspiration to provide asylum in public, as 
well as justifying the negative effects of their actions. It is not in the interests of any 
major political party operating in a representative democracy to be seen as 
unreasonably callous towards foreigners, especially those who claim to be refugees. 
Framed in the right way, however, major political parties do have significant scope for 
repealing ideal humanitarian practices without seriously offending the liberal 
conscience—or, more importantly, liberal voters. Therefore the justifications offered by 
major political parties are an important feature of the shift towards regulation.  
Given that this research offers a clear and nuanced model of asylum politics, it is 
worth drawing from it some normative conclusions. Firstly, given the current global 
situation, it would be extremely difficult to reverse or even halt the trend toward greater 
regulation of entrance, in spite of its negative implications for refugees. The political 
impetus to regulate entrance is fuelled by powerful electoral considerations, a factor 
that cannot be ignored by any majority party operating in a representative democracy. 
Unless there was a dramatic moral shift amongst the electorates of Canada and 
Australia, voters will ultimately continue to prioritize their own interests and thereby 
compel power-seeking parties to do the same. As such, public and political debates will 
continue to focus on what level of regulatory control is appropriate, not on whether it is 
appropriate at all. At best, refugee advocates can hope to mitigate only the worst 
consequences of regulation, blocking measures that grossly impinge on the rights and 
well-being of asylum seekers.  
                   —167— 
On the more positive side, the governments of Canada and Australia are likely to 
continue to hold an aspiration to provide asylum. As long as these nations are capable 
and willing to accept an inflow of foreign immigrants, there will be ongoing public and 
political support for dedicating a proportion of places to refugees. The moral 
foundations of asylum are simply too powerful for a liberal community to renounce 
entirely. Only in a radically different global environment303 is it conceivable that 
Canada and Australia would cease to provide asylum—and even then they are likely to 
aspire to reinstate asylum in more favourable circumstances.  
If regulation of entrance was ever successfully enforced, effectively ceasing the 
irregular arrival of asylum seekers, then there would be only two ways by which a 
refugee could gain asylum in Canada and Australia. Firstly, asylum could be provided 
to individuals whose legitimate permits had expired and who were unable to safely 
return home. Secondly, asylum could be provided to mandated refugees through 
resettlement programmes. Because these means of gaining asylum are both subject to 
regulatory procedures, refugees who use them do not pose a serious threat to the 
nation’s ability to regulate its own membership. In particular, the resettlement of 
mandated refugees allows governments a very high level of control—they can easily 
adjust their selection procedures to conform to any public or political preferences. It is 
in this area, then, that there is potential for major change to asylum provision. Given 
that mandated refugees are not as politically controversial as asylum seekers, there is 
significant scope for refugee advocates to lobby for change to the size and nature of a 
nation’s refugee resettlement programmes.  
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The danger, otherwise, is that governments will determine their refugee intakes 
arbitrarily. After all, if nations such as Canada and Australia do have absolute control 
over entrance, there is a real risk that they will be influenced by considerations that, 
from a liberal ethical perspective, should not be allowed to override the urgent demands 
of refugees. By way of illustration, it is worth drawing a historical analogy. After the 
Second World War, immigrant nations—Canada and Australia among them—used 
refugee resettlement programmes as a means of satisfying their post-war labour 
requirements and their humanitarian obligations. In implementing these programmes, 
governments were highly selective, imposing economic and racial criteria to prioritize 
refugees who suited a nation’s labour requirements and were the least culturally 
controversial. Priority usually went to young, able-bodied Northern Europeans. Major 
refugee crises elsewhere in the world—such as the exodus created by the Chinese Civil 
War—were almost completely ignored by Western nations (Binzegger 1979: 62–70; 
Beaglehole 1986: 124–6). Due to the difficulty of transcontinental travel, there was no 
easy way for refugees to bypass this arrangement. Consequently, this system had the 
effect of being highly regulated.  
As contemporary regimes of regulation become more effective, the provision of 
asylum may once again be dominated by the strategic, economic and cultural 
preferences of receiving nations, and thus fail to reflect the scale and nature of the 
refugee problem. As it stands, the UNHCR presently recognizes 10 million refugees.304 
Of these, fifteen Western nations accepted 71,700 refugees through resettlement 
programmes in 2006, almost 60 per cent of whom were taken by the United States 
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(UNHCR 2008). Clearly the scale of displacement is much greater than the level of 
relief. Moreover, a recent incident in Australia reemphasized the way in which 
regulation can be used to determine the make-up of a nation’s refugee quota. In late 
2007, the Liberal Government announced (with Labor Party support) that it would no 
longer be taking African refugees through its resettlement programme, purportedly due 
to the failure of recent Sudanese arrivals to properly integrate. In fact, the Sudanese had 
an excellent reputation for integration, and members of the Australian police publicly 
refuted the claim by Kevin Andrews, then Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, 
that Sudanese refugees were over-represented in crime figures (Browne 2007). Given 
the upcoming election, it can be argued that this was a tactical move, appealing to a 
misconception of African immigrants which had some traction in the Australian 
electorate. In an ideal world, of course, such a factor—being discriminatory and 
inaccurate—would not be allowed to influence policy formulation. 
In conclusion, there is a danger that a regulated asylum regime, rather than being used 
to implement a more equitable and just distribution of asylum, can be used by a nation 
to physically shut itself off from humanitarian situations. From their fortress of 
regulation, a nation is then free to exercise its obligations on its own terms, imposing 
self-interested biases that may be irrational or unjust. It is important to recognize that 
the irregular and disorganized nature of asylum seeking creates serious difficulties for 
governments, problems that they cannot afford to ignore. Yet asylum seeking also 
serves to involve nations in the rectification of humanitarian problems beyond their 
borders. While these problems may not have the same political pressure, problems 
which they ought not to neglect. 
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